2024/05/26 更新

写真a

ロメスヴィンケル ヘンドリック
ロメスヴィンケル ヘンドリック
所属
附属機関・学校 高等研究所
職名
准教授(任期付)
学位
B.A. in Economics ( 2008年09月 University of St.Gallen )
M.Sc. in Economics and Philosophy ( 2009年09月 London School of Economics and Political Science )
Ph.D. in Economics and Finance ( 2014年10月 )

研究分野

  • 経済学説、経済思想   意思決定理論

研究キーワード

  • 意思決定理論

受賞

  • Jaffray Lecture

    2023年07月   Risk Uncertainty Decision Conference  

  • Sun-Chen Young Scholar Award

    2019年09月   National Taiwan University  

 

論文

  • Quasi-separable preferences

    Wei-zhi Qin, Hendrik Rommeswinkel

    Theory and Decision    2024年06月

    DOI

    Scopus

  • Preference for Knowledge

    Hendrik Rommeswinkel, Hung-Chi Chang, Wen-Tai Hsu

    Journal of Economic Theory    2023年12月

    DOI

    Scopus

  • Additive representations on a simplex

    Qin, W.-Z., Rommeswinkel, H.

    Journal of Mathematical Economics   103  2022年

    DOI

    Scopus

    1
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • Group size and group success in conflicts

    Martin Kolmar, Hendrik Rommeswinkel

    Social Choice and Welfare   55 ( 4 ) 777 - 822  2020年12月

     概要を見る

    This paper analyzes the occurrence of the group-size paradox in situations in which groups compete for rents, allowing for degrees of rivalry of the rent among group members. We provide two intuitive criteria for the group-impact function which for groups with within-group symmetric valuations of the rent determine whether there are advantages or disadvantages for larger groups: social-interactions effects and returns to scale. For groups with within-group asymmetric valuations, the complementarity of group members’ efforts and the composition of valuations are shown to play a role as further factors.

    DOI

    Scopus

    3
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts

    Martin Kolmar, Hendrik Rommeswinkel

    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization   89   9 - 22  2013年05月

     概要を見る

    This paper starts from the observation that in public-goods group contests, group impact can in general not be additively decomposed into some sum (of functions) of individual efforts. We use a CES-impact function to identify the main channels of influence of the elasticity of substitution on the behavior in and the outcome of such a contest. We characterize the Nash equilibria of this game and carry out comparative-static exercises with respect to the elasticity of substitution among group members' efforts. If groups are homogeneous (i.e. all group members have the same valuation and efficiency within the group), the elasticity of substitution has no effect on the equilibrium. For heterogeneous groups, the higher the complementarity of efforts of that group, the lower the divergence of efforts among group members and the lower the winning probability of that group. This contradicts the common intuition that groups can improve their performance by solving the free-rider problem via higher degrees of complementarity of efforts. © 2013.

    DOI

    Scopus

    56
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
 

現在担当している科目

担当経験のある科目(授業)

  • ゲーム理論

    早稲田大学  

    2023年10月
    -
    継続中
     

  • 数理経済学

    早稲田大学  

    2023年04月
    -
    継続中
     

  • Microeconomic Theory

    National Taiwan University  

    2016年09月
    -
    2022年01月
     

  • Philosophy of Economics

    National Taiwan University  

    2016年01月
    -
    2021年07月
     

  • Advanced Public Finance

    National Taiwan University  

    2017年01月
    -
    2019年07月
     

  • Public Finance

    National Taiwan University  

    2015年09月
    -
    2016年01月
     

▼全件表示

 

学術貢献活動

他学部・他研究科等兼任情報

  • 政治経済学術院   政治経済学部

特定課題制度(学内資金)

  • Preference for Verifiability

    2023年  

     概要を見る

      Decision makers may face situations in which they cannot observe the outcomes that result from their actions. In such decisions, motivations other than the expected utility of outcomes may play a role. The present paper axiomatically characterizes a decision model in which the decision maker cares about whether it can be ex post verified that a good outcome has been achieved. Preferences over acts uniquely characterize a set of events that the decision maker expects to be able to verify in case they occur. The decision maker chooses the act that maximizes the expected utility across verifiable events of the worst possible outcome that may have occurred.  For example, a firm choosing between different carbon emission reduction technologies may find some technologies to leave ex post more uncertainty about the level of emission reduction than other technologies. The firm may care about proving to its stakeholders that a certain amount of carbon reduction has been achieved and may employ privately obtained evidence to do so. It may choose in expectation less efficient technologies if the achieved carbon reduction is better verifiable using the expected future evidence.

  • Eliciting Ambiguity Attitudes from Information Preferences

    2022年  

     概要を見る

    The background of the research project is to research models of individual decision making about information that 1) are readily applicable to data and 2) allow for behavioral biases. In the first step, this project obtains a model of stochastic information choice. In this model, the decision maker chooses a sequence of search keywords. The model accounts for a crucial difference between information choice as commonly modeled using information partitions and information choice in practice. Information about whether an event in an information partition is true is equivalent to information whether its negation is true. However, for lists of keywords (for example, a search engine query) there is no meaningful negation.