Updated on 2023/12/01

写真a

 
ROMMESWINKEL, Hendrik
 
Affiliation
Affiliated organization, Waseda Institute for Advanced Study
Job title
Associate Professor(non-tenure-track)
Degree
B.A. in Economics ( 2008.09 University of St.Gallen )
M.Sc. in Economics and Philosophy ( 2009.09 London School of Economics and Political Science )
Ph.D. in Economics and Finance ( 2014.10 )

Research Areas

  • Economic doctrines and economic thought   Decision Theory

Research Interests

  • Decision Theory

Awards

  • Jaffray Lecture

    2023.07   Risk Uncertainty Decision Conference  

  • Sun-Chen Young Scholar Award

    2019.09   National Taiwan University  

 

Papers

  • Preference for Knowledge

    Hendrik Rommeswinkel, Hung-Chi Chang, Wen-Tai Hsu

    Journal of Economic Theory    2023.09

    DOI

    Scopus

  • Additive representations on a simplex

    Qin, W.-Z., Rommeswinkel, H.

    Journal of Mathematical Economics   103  2022

    DOI

    Scopus

  • Group size and group success in conflicts

    Martin Kolmar, Hendrik Rommeswinkel

    Social Choice and Welfare   55 ( 4 ) 777 - 822  2020.12

     View Summary

    This paper analyzes the occurrence of the group-size paradox in situations in which groups compete for rents, allowing for degrees of rivalry of the rent among group members. We provide two intuitive criteria for the group-impact function which for groups with within-group symmetric valuations of the rent determine whether there are advantages or disadvantages for larger groups: social-interactions effects and returns to scale. For groups with within-group asymmetric valuations, the complementarity of group members’ efforts and the composition of valuations are shown to play a role as further factors.

    DOI

    Scopus

    3
    Citation
    (Scopus)
  • Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts

    Martin Kolmar, Hendrik Rommeswinkel

    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization   89   9 - 22  2013.05

     View Summary

    This paper starts from the observation that in public-goods group contests, group impact can in general not be additively decomposed into some sum (of functions) of individual efforts. We use a CES-impact function to identify the main channels of influence of the elasticity of substitution on the behavior in and the outcome of such a contest. We characterize the Nash equilibria of this game and carry out comparative-static exercises with respect to the elasticity of substitution among group members' efforts. If groups are homogeneous (i.e. all group members have the same valuation and efficiency within the group), the elasticity of substitution has no effect on the equilibrium. For heterogeneous groups, the higher the complementarity of efforts of that group, the lower the divergence of efforts among group members and the lower the winning probability of that group. This contradicts the common intuition that groups can improve their performance by solving the free-rider problem via higher degrees of complementarity of efforts. © 2013.

    DOI

    Scopus

    52
    Citation
    (Scopus)
 

Syllabus

Teaching Experience

  • Game Theory I

    Waseda University  

    2023.10
    -
    Now
     

  • Mathematical Economics

    Waseda University  

    2023.04
    -
    Now
     

  • Microeconomic Theory

    National Taiwan University  

    2016.09
    -
    2022.01
     

  • Philosophy of Economics

    National Taiwan University  

    2016.01
    -
    2021.07
     

  • Advanced Public Finance

    National Taiwan University  

    2017.01
    -
    2019.07
     

  • Public Finance

    National Taiwan University  

    2015.09
    -
    2016.01
     

▼display all

 

Academic Activities

Sub-affiliation

  • Faculty of Political Science and Economics   School of Political Science and Economics

Internal Special Research Projects

  • Eliciting Ambiguity Attitudes from Information Preferences

    2022  

     View Summary

    The background of the research project is to research models of individual decision making about information that 1) are readily applicable to data and 2) allow for behavioral biases. In the first step, this project obtains a model of stochastic information choice. In this model, the decision maker chooses a sequence of search keywords. The model accounts for a crucial difference between information choice as commonly modeled using information partitions and information choice in practice. Information about whether an event in an information partition is true is equivalent to information whether its negation is true. However, for lists of keywords (for example, a search engine query) there is no meaningful negation.