Updated on 2022/05/22

写真a

 
KANEKO, Mamoru
 
Affiliation
Faculty of Political Science and Economics
Job title
Professor Emeritus

Degree

  • Tokyo Institute of Technology   Engineering

Professional Memberships

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    Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory

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    Econometric Society

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    Game Theory Society

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    Society for Social Choice and Welfare

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    Japanese Economic Association

 

Research Areas

  • Economic doctrines and economic thought

  • Economic theory

  • Theory of informatics

Research Interests

  • 理論経済学、数理論理学、住宅市場の均衡論的分析、22世紀の地球ための社会経済思想

Papers

  • Small Infinitary Epistemic Logic

    Mamoru Kaneko

    The Review of Symbolic Logic   12 ( 4 ) 702 - 735  2019.12  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • Expected utility theory with probability grids and preference formation

    Mamoru Kaneko

    Economic Theory     1 - 42  2019.08  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • Exploring New Socio-Economic Thought for a Small and Narrow Earth

    Mamoru Kaneko

    Advances in Applied Sociology   08 ( 05 ) 397 - 421  2018.05  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    The earth has been getting smaller and narrower with the expansion of human activities. Now, it is an urgent task for social scientists to explore and study new socio-economic thoughts for this small and narrow earth. This article provides a normative theory and a descriptive theory for the present and future earth. The former is to provide, viewing the earth and human community as unity, evaluations of possible events and of designs of social institutions. The normative theory helps us think about where we should direct the earth. The latter discusses social sciences for practical management of the earth. Since, however, great diversity of cultures will remain, a unified management of the earth is practically impossible. We are required to rethink and develop new socio-economic thoughts in radical manners.

    DOI

  • Approximate Quasi-Linearity for Large Incomes

    Mamoru Kaneko

    Mathematical Programming and Game Theory, Springer     159 - 177  2018.05  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • 30年前の研究を振り返って

    金子 守

    経済学者が贈る 未来への羅針盤 経済セミナー増刊   ( 増刊3月 ) 16 - 19  2018.03  [Refereed]

  • An equilibrium-econometric analysis of rental housing markets with indivisibilities

    Mamoru Kaneko, Tamon Ito

    Springer Optimization and Its Applications   118   193 - 223  2017  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We develop a theory of an equilibrium-econometric analysis of rental housing markets with indivisibilities. It provides a bridge between a (competitive) market equilibrium theory and a statistical/econometric analysis. The listing service of apartments provides the information to both economic agents and an econometric analyzer: each economic agent uses a small part of the data from the service for his economic behavior, and the analyzer uses them to estimate the market structure. It is argued that the latter may be done by assuming that the economic agents take the standard price-taking behavior. We apply our theory to the data in the rental housing markets in the Tokyo area, and examine the law of diminishing marginal utility for household. It holds strictly with respect to the consumption, less with commuting time-distance, and much less with the sizes of apartments.

    DOI

  • Understanding the other through social roles

    Mamoru Kaneko, J. Jude Kline

    International Game Theory Review   17 ( 1 ) 1 - 31  2015.03  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Inductive game theory has been developed to explore the origin of beliefs of a person from his accumulated experiences of a game situation. It has been restricted to a person's view of the structure not including another person's thoughts. In this paper, we explore the experiential origin of one's view of the other's beliefs about the game situation, especially about the other's payoffs. We restrict our exploration to a 2-role (strategic) game, which has been recurrently played by two people with occasional role-switching. Each person accumulates experiences of both roles, and these experiences become the source for his transpersonal view about the other. Reciprocity in the sense of role-switching is crucial for deriving his own and the other's beliefs. We also consider how a person can use these views for his behavior revision, and we define an equilibrium called an intrapersonal coordination equilibrium. Based on this, we show that cooperation will emerge as the degree of reciprocity increases.

    DOI

  • Elimination of Dominated Strategies and Inessential Players

    Mamoru Kaneko, Shuige Liu

    Operations Research and Decisions   25   35 - 56  2015  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We study the process, called the IEDI process, of iterated elimination of (strictly) dominated strategies and inessential players for finite strategic games. Such elimination may reduce the size of a game considerably, for example, from a game with a large number of players to one with a few players. We extend two existing results to our context; the preservation of Nash equilibria and order-independence. These give a way of computing the set of Nash equilibria for an initial situation from the endgame. Then, we reverse our perspective to ask the question of what initial situations end up at a given final game. We assess what situations underlie an endgame. We give conditions for the pattern of player sets required for a resulting sequence of the IEDI process to an endgame. We illustrate our development with a few extensions of the Battle of the Sexes.

    DOI

  • 【インタビュー】制度と認識の経済学の構築に向けて――金子守は何者か?

    金子守, 石川竜一郎

    経済セミナー   ( 10月ー11月号 ) 69 - 75  2013.10  [Refereed]

  • Symposium: logic and economics-interactions between subjective thinking and objective worlds

    Mamoru Kaneko

    ECONOMIC THEORY   53 ( 1 ) 1 - 8  2013.05  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This is the second symposium of the same title "Logic and Economics" in this journal and has four papers studying the issues expressed in the subtitle. In this introduction, the guest editor first describes a general perspective for this symposium and then explains each paper from this perspective. Finally, a few remarks are given.

    DOI

  • Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior

    Mamoru Kaneko, J. Jude Kline

    ECONOMIC THEORY   53 ( 1 ) 27 - 59  2013.05  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We explore the inductively derived views obtained by players with partial temporal (short-term) memories. A player derives his personal view of the objective game situation from his accumulated (long-term) memories, and then uses it for decision making. A salient feature that distinguishes this paper from others on inductive game theory is partiality of a memory function of a player. This creates a multiplicity of possibly derived views. Although this is a difficulty for a player in various senses, it is an essential problem of induction. Faced with multiple possible views, a player may try to resolve this using further experiences. The two-way interaction between behavior and personal views is another distinguishing feature of the present paper.

    DOI

  • Inductive Game Theory: A Simulation Study of Learning a Social Situation

    E. Akiyama, R. Ishikawa, M. Kaneko, J. J. Kline

    Game Theory Relaunched, Chapter 3     55 - 76  2013.03  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • 行動経済学会第7回大会パネルディスカッション『行動経済学で考える社会正義』

    大竹 文雄, 大垣 昌夫, 金子 守, 齊藤 誠

    行動経済学   6 ( 0 ) 50 - 61  2013  [Refereed]

    CiNii

  • A Simulation Study of Learning a Structure: Mike's Bike Commuting

    E. Akiyama, R. Ishikawa, M. Kaneko, J. J. Kline

    Technologies (SIMULTECH 2012),     208 - 217  2012.05  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper undertakes a simulation study of a player’s learning about the structure of a game situation. In a simple 1-person example called Mike’s Bike Commuting, we simulate the process by which Mike experiences and accumulates memories about the game structure. It is the basic requirement that to keep an experience as a long-term memory, Mike needs enough repetitions of that experience. By the choice of our simple and casual example, we can discuss relevant time spans for learning. In particular, we argue that the limit case of Mike’s learning as time tends to infinity is of little relevance to the problem of learning. We find also that the concept of “marking” introduced by Kaneko-Kline is important for obtaining sufficient structural knowledge in a reasonable time span. The simulation study shows that Mike’s learning can change drastically with the concept. We also consider Mike learning his preferences from his experiences, where we will meet various new conceptual problems.

  • Two Dialogues on Epistemic Logics and Inductive Game Theory

    M. Kaneko, J. J. Kline

    Advances in Mathematics Research   12   199 - 238  2012  [Refereed]

  • Discrimination in festival games with limited observability and accessibility

    Mamoru Kaneko, Aniruddha Mitra

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   62 ( 1 ) 34 - 45  2011.07  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper provides an analysis of discrimination and prejudices from the perspective of inductive game theory. We extend the festival game, originally given by Kaneko-Matsui, to include new constraints on the observability of ethnic identities and on accessible locations for players. We characterize the Nash equilibrium set, which reveals a different variety of segregation patterns and discriminatory behavior. In order to facilitate the analysis of discrimination and prejudices, we introduce a measure of discrimination, which chooses a representative equilibrium with the smallest degree of discrimination. Using this measure, we discuss various new phenomena, such as discrimination in an ethnic hierarchy; similar ethnicities as discriminated and as discriminating; and mutual discrimination. The introduction of limited observability and accessibility enables us to obtain those results. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • A Measure of Logical Inference and Its Game Theoretical Applications

    Mamoru Kaneko, Nobu-Yuki Suzuki

    A Measure of Logical Inference and Its Game Theoretical Applications     139 - 150  2011  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper presents a measure of inference in classical and intuitionistic logics in the Gentzen-style sequent calculus. The definition of the measure takes two steps: First, we measure the width of a
    given proof. Then the measure of inference assigns, to a given sequent, the minimum value of the widths of its possible proofs. It counts the indispensable cases for possible proofs of a sequent. This measure expresses the degree of difficulty in proving a given sequent. Although our problem is highly proof-theoretic, we are motivated by some general and specific problems in game theory/economics. In this paper, we will define a certain lower bound function, with which we may often obtain the exact value of the measure for a given sequent. We apply our theory a few game theoretical problems and calculate the exact values of the measure.

    DOI

  • Corrigendum: Inductive Game Theory: A Basic Scenario

    M. Kaneko, J. J. Kline

    Journal of Mathematical Economics   46   620 - 622  2010  [Refereed]

  • Inductive Game Theory: A Basic Scenario

    M. Kaneko, J. J. Kline

    Game Theory     83 - 128  2010  [Refereed]

  • Inductive game theory: A basic scenario

    Mamoru Kaneko, J. Jude Kline

    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS   44 ( 12 ) 1332 - 1363  2008.12  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    The aim of this paper is to present the new theory called "inductive game theory". A paper, published by one of the present authors with A. Matsui, discussed some part of inductive game theory in a specific game. Here, we present a more entire picture of the theory moving from the individual raw experiences, through the inductive derivation of a view, to the implications for future behavior. Our developments generate an experiential foundation for game theory and for Nash equilibrium. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Information Protocols and Extensive Games in Inductive Game Theory

    M. Kaneko, J. J. Kline

    Game Theory and Applications   13   57 - 83  2008  [Refereed]

  • Duality in comparative statics in rental housing markets with indivisibilities

    M Kaneko, T Ito, Y Osawa

    JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS   59 ( 1 ) 142 - 170  2006.01  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We present certain duality results on comparative statics on competitive rent vectors in the rental housing market model. In the model, apartments as indivisible goods are classified into a finite number of categories, and are traded for one composite commodity. Our concern is about certain general properties of the behavior of rents with parameter changes. In particular, the rent changes are intimately related to the boundary income changes of the categories of apartments. Both changes are endogenously determined in equilibrium. We will show that these changes exhibit nice dual structures. We will also apply our model and comparative statics to a rental housing market in the Tokyo metropolitan area. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Utility theories in cooperative games

    M. Kaneko, M. H. Wooders

    Handbook of Utility Theory   12 ( 19 ) 1065 - 1098  2004  [Refereed]

  • Epistemic models of shallow depths and decision making in games: Horticulture

    M Kaneko, NY Suzuki

    JOURNAL OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC   68 ( 1 ) 163 - 186  2003.03  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Kaneko-Suzuki developed epistemic logics of shallow depths with multiple players for investigations of game theoretical problems. By shallow depth, we mean that nested occurrences of belief operators of players in formulae are restricted, typically to be of finite depths. by a given epistemic structure. In this paper we develop various methods of surgical operations (cut and paste) of epistemic world models. An example is a bouquet-making. i.e., tying several models into a bouquet. Another example is to engraft a model to some branches of another model. By these methods. we obtain various meta-theorems on semantics and syntax on epistemic logics, To illustrate possible uses of our meta-theorems. we present one game theoretical theorem. which is also a meta-theorem in the sense of logic.

  • Epistemic logic of shallow depths and game-theoretical applications

    M. Kaneko, N.-Y. Suzuki

    Advances in Modal Logic   3   279 - 298  2002.09  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper presents a multi-modal epistemic logic GLEF of shallow depths. Logic GLEF is a fragment of multi-modal KDn, and enables us to consider interpersonal inferential epistemic complexities. The subscripts E and F are called epistemic structures, which restrict interpersonal epistemic depths involved in formulae and proofs. We give its Gentzen-type sequent formulation as well as its semantics. Also, we provide some meta-theorems in order to evaluate interpersonal inferential epistemic complexities of the provability of a given sequent. These meta-theorems are applied to some game theoretical problems.

    DOI

  • Epistemic logics and their game theoretical applications: Introduction

    M. Kaneko

    Economic Theory   19   7 - 62  2002.01  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • Bounded interpersonal inferences and decision making

    M Kaneko, NY Suzuki

    ECONOMIC THEORY   19 ( 1 ) 63 - 103  2002.01  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Individual decision making is based on predictions about other players' choices as well as on valuations of reactions to predictions. In this sense, a player has a prediction-decision criterion for decision making. We develop a theory of prediction-decision criteria, which enables us to capture new phenomena on individual decision making in games. The decision making situation is described in the epistemic logic GL(EF) of shallow depths. There, each player considers his and other players' decision making down to some shallow depths. It is a point of our theory to investigate inferential complexities of interpersonal introspections. In particular, we can discuss a minimal epistemic inferential structure for prediction-decision making. We will find parallel structures in decision making and prediction making, which is called an inner parallelisms. The climax of the paper is the consideration of inner parallelisms of prediction-decision making.

    DOI

  • A map of common knowledge logics

    Mamoru Kaneko, Takashi Nagashima, Nobu-Yuki Suzuki, Yoshihito Tanaka

    Studia Logica   71 ( 1 ) 57 - 86  2002  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    In order to capture the concept of common knowledge, various extensions of multi-modal epistemic logics, such as fixed-point ones and infinitary ones, have been proposed. Although we have now a good list of such proposed extensions, the relationships among them are still unclear. The purpose of this paper is to draw a map showing the relationships among them. In the propositional case, these extensions turn out to be all Kripke complete and can be comparable in a meaningful manner. F. Wolter showed that the predicate extension of the Halpern-Moses fixed-point type common knowledge logic is Kripke incomplete. However, if we go further to an infinitary extension, Kripke completeness would be recovered. Thus there is some gap in the predicate case. In drawing the map, we focus on what is happening around the gap in the predicate case. The map enables us to better understand the common knowledge logics as a whole. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    DOI

  • Epistemic considerations of decision making in games

    M Kaneko

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   38 ( 2 ) 105 - 137  1999.09  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    From the Ex Ante point of view, an axiomatization of decision making in a game with pure strategies is given, while considering its epistemic aspects in propositional game (epistemic) logic. Our axiomatization consists of four base axioms for predicted final decisions. One of them is an epistemic requirement, which together with the others leads to an infinite regress of the knowledge of these axioms. The resulting outcome of this regress is expressed as the common knowledge of the base axioms. We give meta-theoretical evaluations of the derivation of this infinite regress, and consider its implications in solvable and unsolvable games. For a solvable game, it determines predicted decisions to be the common knowledge of a Nash equilibrium, and for an unsolvable game, it is the common knowledge of a subsolution in Nash's sense. The latter result needs the common knowledge of the additional information of which subsolution would be played. We give also meta-theoretical evaluations of these results. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

  • Common knowledge logic and game logic

    M Kaneko

    JOURNAL OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC   64 ( 2 ) 685 - 700  1999.06  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We show the faithful embedding of common knowledge logic CKL into game logic GL, that is. CKL is embedded into GL and GL is a conservative extension of the fragment obtained by this embedding. Then many results in GL are available in CKL, and vice versa. For example, an epistemic consideration of Nash equilibrium for a game with pun: strategies in GL is carried over to CKL. Another important application is to obtain a Gentzen-style sequent calculus formulation of CKL and its cut-elimination. The faithful embedding theorem is proved for the KD4-type propositional CKL and GL, but it holds for some variants of them.

    DOI

  • Inductive game theory: Discrimination and prejudices

    Mamoru Kaneko, Akihiko Matsui

    Journal of Public Economic Theory   1 ( 1 ) 101 - 137  1999  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper proposes a new theory, which we call inductive game theory. In this theory, the individual player does not have a priori knowledge of the structure of the game that he plays repeatedly. Instead, he accumulates experiences induced by occasional random trials in the repeated play. A stationary state is required to be stable against intentional deviations based on the player's experiences, and then it turns out to be a Nash equilibrium. The main part of the paper is the consideration of possible individual views of the society based on individual experiences. This view is defined to be a model of the society which the player builds from his experiences. Coherency with these experiences and a condition called rationalization are required for a model. As concrete objects of the theory, this paper analyzes the phenomena of discrimination and prejudice. The development of the new theory is undertaken by contrasting its observational and behavioral aspects with mental and judgmental aspects. The relationship between discrimination and prejudice will emerge in this dichotomous consideration. © 1999 Blackwell Publishers, Inc.

    DOI

  • Axiomatic indefinability of common knowledge in finitary logics. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Game and Decision

    M. Kaneko, T. Nagashima

    eds. M. Bacharach, L.A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin and H. Shin. Kluwer Academic Press     69 - 93  1997  [Refereed]

  • Game Logic and its Applications II

    Mamoru Kaneko, Takashi Nagashima

    Studia Logica   58 ( 2 ) 273 - 303  1997  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper provides a Genzten style formulation of the game logic framework GLm (0 ≤ m ≤ ω), and proves the cut-elimination theorem for GLm. As its application, we prove the term existence theorem for GLω used in Part I. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    DOI

  • Game logic and its applications I

    M. Kaneko, T. Nagashima

    Studia Logica   57   325 - 354  1996.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper provides a logic framework for investigations of game theoretical problems. We adopt an infinitary extension of classical predicate logic as the base logic of the framework. The reason for an infinitary extension is to express the common knowledge concept explicitly. Depending upon the choice of axioms on the knowledge operators, there is a hierarchy of logics. The limit case is an infinitary predicate extension of modal propositional logic KD4, and is of special interest in applications. In Part I, we develop the basic framework, and show some applications: an epistemic axiomatization of Nash equilibrium and formal undecidability on the playability of a game. To show the formal undecidability, we use a term existence theorem, which will be proved in Part II.

    DOI

  • N-person Nash bargaining with variable threats

    M. Kaneko, W. Mao

    Japanese Economic Review   47   235 - 250  1996.09  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We consider two models of n‐person bargaining problems with the endogenous determination of disagreement points. In the first model, which is a direct extension of Nash's variable threat bargaining model, the disagreement point is determined as an equilibrium threat point. In the second model, the disagreement point is given as a Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. These models are formulated as extensive games, and axiomatizations of solutions are given for both models. It is argued that for games with more than two players, the first bargaining model does not preserve some important properties valid for two‐person games, e.g., the uniqueness of equilibrium payoff vector. We also show that when the number of players is large, any equilibrium threat point becomes approximately a Nash equilibrium in the underlying noncooperative game, and vice versa. This result suggests that the difference between the two models becomes less significant when the number of players is large.

    DOI

  • The nonemptiness of the f-core of a game without side payments

    M Kaneko, MH Wooders

    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY   25 ( 2 ) 245 - 258  1996  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions - ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality - are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets.

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  • On symmetric agents: Comments on Kemp and Shimomura

    M. Kaneko, K.Suzumura

    Japanese Economic Review   46   296 - 299  1995.09  [Refereed]

  • Axiomatic considerations of Nash equilibrium

    Mamoru Kaneko

    Bulletin of the Section of Logic   24   6 - 12  1995  [Refereed]

  • BEHAVIOR STRATEGIES, MIXED STRATEGIES AND PERFECT RECALL

    M KANEKO, JJ KLINE

    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY   24 ( 2 ) 127 - 145  1995  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    When perfect recall is not satisfied, the informational contents of mixed and behavior strategies differ and are more than what the information partition describes. First, we consider two kinds of additional information strategies may carry, and show that such information leads to the perfect recall refinement of a given information partition. This does not, however, imply that the strategies compensate fully for the lack of perfect recall. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on an information partition, called A-loss, for the informational content of mixed strategies to fully compensate for the lack of perfect recall. The informational content of behavior strategies never fully compensates.

    DOI

  • Widespread externalities and perfectly competitive markets: Examples

    M. Kaneko, M. H. Wooders

    Imperfection and Behavior in Economic Organizations, eds. R. Gilles and P. Ruyes, Kluwer Academic Publisher     71 - 87  1994  [Refereed]

  • A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT OVERHANG

    M KANEKO, J PROKOP

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE   58 ( 1 ) 1 - 24  1993  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We consider an international financial problem called debt overhang, by which we mean a situation where a sovereign country has borrowed money from foreign banks and has been unable to fulfill the scheduled repayments for some period. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game with n lender banks as players where each decides either to sell its loan exposure to the debtor country at the present price of debt on the secondary market, or to wait and keep its exposure. This game has many pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We show, however, that in any Nash equilibrium, the resulting secondary market price remains almost the same as the present price for a large number of banks. We also obtain the comparative statics result that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, a bank with a smaller loan exposure has a greater tendency to sell than one with a larger loan exposure. We discuss the implications of these results for the functioning of the secondary market and the resolution of debt overhang.

    DOI

  • CONVENTIONS, SOCIAL PREJUDICES AND DISCRIMINATION - A FESTIVAL GAME WITH MERRYMAKERS

    M KANEKO, T KIMURA

    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR   4 ( 4 ) 511 - 527  1992.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper provides a simple game-theoretic account of racial discrimination without assuming individual prejudices as a basic concept. We consider a recurrent situation of a festival game with merrymakers, and give a formulation of a stable convention. We show that stable conventions of one type involve discrimination against one group of players. We look closely into the structure of these stable conventions and consider them in comparison with recent developments of sociological thought on ethnic relations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers 026, 900 and American Mathematical Society Classification Numbers 90D10, 90D80, 90D99.

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  • A game theoretical description of the von Neumann growth model, Game Theory and Economic applications

    M. Kaneko

    Lecture notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems   389   369 - 408  1992  [Refereed]

  • THE ORDERED FIELD PROPERTY AND A FINITE ALGORITHM FOR THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

    M KANEKO

    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY   20 ( 3 ) 227 - 236  1992  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This note proves that the two person Nash bargaining theory with polyhedral bargaining regions needs only an ordered field (which always includes the rational number field) as its scalar field. The existence of the Nash bargaining solution is the main part of this result and the axiomatic characterization can be proved in the standard way with slight modifications. We prove the existence by giving a finite algorithm to calculate the Nash solution for a polyhedral bargaining problem, whose speed is of order Bm(m - 1) (m is the number of extreme points and B is determined by the extreme points).

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  • FINAL DECISIONS, THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND SOLVABILITY IN GAMES WITH COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF LOGICAL ABILITIES

    M KANEKO, T NAGASHIMA

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   22 ( 3 ) 229 - 255  1991.12  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper attempts to explain the Nash equilibrium concept from the viewpoint of its one-shot play interpretation. We consider a final decision to be made by each player before the game is actually played. We formalize this game situation in terms of an infinitary first-order predicate logic. Then we give an axiom for final decisions-in the two-person case, the central requirement for this axiom is: for players i and j, if x is a possible final decision for player i, then (1) player i knows that x is his final decision; (2) there is a final decision y for player j; and (3) for any final decision y for j, x is a best response to y and player i knows that y is j's final decision. The entire axiom takes the form of the common knowledge of the above requirement by its very nature. We assume that the complete logical abilities of the players are common knowledge. Then we prove that for solvable games in Nash's sense, x is a final decision for player i if it is common knowledge that x is a Nash strategy. A similar result will be obtained for unsolvable games.

    DOI

  • Continuum economies with finite coalitions: core, equilibria and widespread externalities, (with P. Hammond and M. H. Wooders), Journal of Economic Theory 49 (1989), 113--134.

    P. Hammond, M. Kaneko, M. H. Wooders

    Journal of Economic Theory   49   113 - 134  1989.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We develop a new model of a continuum economy with coalitions consisting of only finite numbers of agents. The core, called the f-core, is the set of allocations that are stable against improvement by finite coalitions and feasible by trade within finite coalitions. Even with widespread externalities—preferences depend on own consumptions and also on the entire allocation up to the null set—we obtain the result that the f-core coincides with the Walrasian allocations. Without widespread externalities, the f-core, the Aumann core, and the Walrasian allocations all coincide; however, with widespread externalities there is no obvious natural definition of the Aumann core.

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  • THE CORE OF A CONTINUUM ECONOMY WITH WIDESPREAD EXTERNALITIES AND FINITE COALITIONS - FROM FINITE TO CONTINUUM ECONOMIES

    M KANEKO, MH WOODERS

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY   49 ( 1 ) 135 - 168  1989.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    When permissible coalitions in finite economies are constrained to be small relative to the player set, the continuum model with finite coalitions and its f-core are the limits of large finite economies and their ε-cores. We show convergence both of game-theoretic structures—relatively small coalitions in the finite economies converge to finite coalitions-and of solutions—ε-cores converge to the f-core. Our convergence is carried out in the context of exchange economies with widespread externalities where the requirement that coalitions be small is critical.

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  • The conventionally stable set in noncooperative games with limited observations II: the application to monopoly and oligopoly

    M. Kaneko

    Economic Studies Quarterly   39   335 - 355  1988  [Refereed]

  • THE CONVENTIONALLY STABLE SETS IN NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES WITH LIMITED OBSERVATIONS .1. DEFINITIONS AND INTRODUCTORY ARGUMENTS

    M KANEKO

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   13 ( 2 ) 93 - 128  1987.04  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper attempts to define a new solution concept for n-person noncooperative games. The idea of it is close to that of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, more precisely, is based on their ‘standards of behavior’ interpretation of the stable set. This new approach enables us to consider new interesting problems of information. Further this approach gives us a plausible interpretation of the Nash equilibrium concept. This paper provides the definition and considers certain general properties of our solution concept. Further we consider our solution concept for zero-sum two-person games, the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of the sexes and several simple games with a continuum of players.

    DOI

  • THE CORE OF A GAME WITH A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS AND FINITE COALITIONS - THE MODEL AND SOME RESULTS

    M KANEKO, MH WOODERS

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   12 ( 2 ) 105 - 137  1986.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    In this paper we develop a new model of a cooperative game with a continuum of players. In our model, only finite coalitions - ones containing only finite numbers of players - are permitted to form. Outcomes of cooperative behavior are attainable by partitions of the players into finite coalitions: this is appropriate in view of our restrictions on coalition formation. Once feasible outcomes are properly defined, the core concept is standard - no permissible coalition can improve upon its outcome. We provide a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core in the case where the players can be divided into a finite number of types. This result is applied to a market game and the nonemptiness of the core of the market game is stated under considerably weak conditions (but with finite types). In addition, it is illustrated that the framework applies to assignment games with a continuum of players.

    DOI

  • Economics with labor indivisibilities-Part I: optimal tax schedule

    Y. Funaki, M. Kaneko

    Economic Studies Quarterly   37   11 - 29  1986.03  [Refereed]

  • THE EXISTENCE AND COMPUTATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MARKETS WITH AN INDIVISIBLE COMMODITY

    M KANEKO, Y YAMAMOTO

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY   38 ( 1 ) 118 - 136  1986.02  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper considers an exchange economy called a generalized assignment market, in which sellers and buyers trade one indivisible commodity possibly with product differentiation for a perfectly divisible commodity. The existence of a competitive equilibrium in this economy is proved using Kakutani's fixed point theorem. This existence theorem is applied to a production economy in which sellers are formulated as producers with convex cost functions. Two examples of housing markets are provided and their competitive equilibria are numerically calculated.

    DOI

  • Economies with labor indivisibilities-Part II: optimal tax schedule

    Y. Funaki, M. Kaneko

    Economic Studies Quarterly   37   199 - 222  1986  [Refereed]

  • Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games II

    P. Dubey, M. Kaneko

    Mathematical Social Sciences   10   247 - 262  1985.12  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of the these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results.

    DOI

  • Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games I

    P. Dubey, M. Kaneko

    Mathematical Social Sciences   8   111 - 139  1984.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure strategies. But in Section 2 behavioral strategies are also examined. It turns out that they can be modeled as pure strategies of an appropriately enlarged game. Our results, applied to the enlarged game, can then be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral strategies of the original game.

    DOI

  • REFORMULATION OF THE NASH SOCIAL-WELFARE FUNCTION FOR A CONTINUUM OF INDIVIDUALS

    M KANEKO

    SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE   1 ( 1 ) 33 - 43  1984  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper provides a new formulation of the Nash social welfare function for a continuum of individuals. The new formulation removes redundant assumptions of Kaneko's original formulation and in particular shows that the continuity axiom on social orderings is unnecessary. The derivation of the Nash social welfare function is also much directer and shorter than Kaneko's original derivation.

  • ON INTERPERSONAL UTILITY COMPARISONS

    M KANEKO

    SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE   1 ( 3 ) 165 - 175  1984  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper argues that interpersonal comparisons of utility levels are difficult in principle and that interpersonal comparisons of utility differences can also hardly be defined based solely on individual choice behavior.

  • Housing markets with indivisibilities

    Mamoru Kaneko

    Journal of Urban Economics   13 ( 1 ) 22 - 50  1983  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    A model of a rental housing market in which houses are treated as indivisible commodities is presented. A recursive equation that determines a competitive equilibrium is provided, and it is argued that this competitive equilibrium is representative of the set of all competitive equilibria. Using this representative equilibrium, several propositions on comparative statics are considered that have to do with how the competitive rents change when certain parameters of the model change. © 1983.

    DOI

  • Linearization of cost functions in public goods economies

    Y. Ito, M. Kaneko

    Economic Studies Quarterly   32   237 - 246  1982.02  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • The optimal progressive income tax- the existence and the limit tax rates

    M. Kaneko

    Mathematical Social Sciences   3   193 - 221  1982  [Refereed]

  • THE CENTRAL ASSIGNMENT GAME AND THE ASSIGNMENT MARKETS

    M KANEKO

    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS   10 ( 2-3 ) 205 - 232  1982  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Initially this paper considers an assignment game without side payments and proves the non- emptiness of the core of it. Next, a market model with invisible goods but without the transferable utility assumption is presented, and the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium of the market model are shown, using the first result. Finally this paper presents a generalization of the market model and also shows the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium using the results in the previous model.

    DOI

  • SOME REMARKS ON THE FOLK THEOREM IN GAME-THEORY

    M KANEKO

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   3 ( 3 ) 281 - 290  1982  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.

    DOI

  • CORES OF PARTITIONING GAMES

    M KANEKO, MH WOODERS

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   3 ( 4 ) 313 - 327  1982  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • The bilateral monopoly and the Nash cooperative solution

    Mamoru Kaneko

    Journal of Economic Theory   24   311 - 327  1981.06  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • RATIO EQUILIBRIUM IN AN ECONOMY WITH EXTERNALITIES

    Y ITO, M KANEKO

    ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE-JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS   41 ( 3-4 ) 279 - 294  1981  [Refereed]

  • THE NASH SOCIAL-WELFARE FUNCTION FOR A MEASURE SPACE OF INDIVIDUALS

    M KANEKO

    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS   8 ( 2 ) 173 - 200  1981  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    In this paper we consider the Nash social welfare function for a society which is given as an arbitrary finite measure space. We show that the Nash social welfare function for the society is derived from certain rationality criteria.

    DOI

  • ON THE EXISTENCE OF AN OPTIMAL INCOME-TAX SCHEDULE

    M KANEKO

    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES   48 ( 4 ) 633 - 642  1981  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • A game theoretical interpretation of the Stackelberg disequilibrium

    Y. Ito, M. Kaneko

    Keio Economic Studies   17   29 - 40  1980.01  [Refereed]

  • AN EXTENSION OF THE NASH BARGAINING PROBLEM AND THE NASH SOCIAL-WELFARE FUNCTION

    M KANEKO

    THEORY AND DECISION   12 ( 2 ) 135 - 148  1980  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper provides an extension of Nash's bargaining model. The extension permits the domain of a solution function to contain non-convex sets. First, it is shown that the proposed extension is a mathematical generalization of Nash's bargaining problem. Next, some relations between the extension and the Nash social welfare function are developed. The formal equivalence of the two constructs is demonstrated, and the intuitive significance of the results is discussed.

    DOI

  • The Nash social welfare function

    Mamoru Kaneko, Kenjiro Nakamura

    Econometrica   47 ( 2 ) 423 - 435  1979.03  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This article considers an economy in which there is one public good financed by means of commodity taxes (lump sum transfers being not available). The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of tax equilibria. Sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with respect to a given tax system are given. When the tax system is modified, the structure of the corresponding set of tax equilibria is analyzed, and continuity properties of equilibria (with respect to the tax system) are stated. In the second part, attention is focused on the Pareto ranking of tax equilibria. In a given equilibrium, the directions of policy tools changes for a Pareto improvement (if any) are characterized. The "size" of the set of second best Pareto optima in the set of tax equilibria is evaluated.

    DOI

  • Cardinalization of the Nash social welfare function

    M. Kaneko, K. Nakamura

    Economic Studies Quarterly   30   236 - 242  1979  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • Price oligopoly as a cooperative game

    Mamoru Kaneko

    International Journal of Game Theory   7 ( 3-4 ) 137 - 150  1978.09  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We consider an oligopolistic market as follows. In the market, one good is traded for money. Each oligopolist is a price setter and has the same linear cost function. Each buyer is a price taker and buys the good from oligopolists setting the lowest price. We formulate this market as a cooperative game, and consider two kinds of solution concepts, the core and a bargaining set of the game. First we show that in the monopolistic market, the core gives the monopoly price, but in the oligopolistic market, the core is empty. Second, we obtain the bargaining set of the oligopolistic market.

    DOI

  • The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

    Mamoru Kaneko

    Journal of Economic Theory   16 ( 2 ) 123 - 136  1977.12  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    An economic model of the allocation process with public goods is presented. We define a concept of equilibrium and prove the existence. Next we present a voting game in which a level of the public goods to be produced is decided. We prove that the core of the voting game and the equilibria exist simultaneously, and that they coincide.

    DOI

  • The ratio equilibrium and the core of the voting game G(N,W) in a public goods economy

    Mamoru Kaneko

    Econometrica   45 ( 7 ) 1589 - 1594  1977.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    In Kaneko [6] we considered the relationship between the ratio equilibria and the core of the voting game G(N, W,r), in which a fixed ratio is given. In this paper we present a new voting game G(N, W) in which no fixed ratio is given, and consider the relationship between the ratio equilibria and the core of G(N, W). We prove that the core of G(N, W) coincides with the ratio equilibria.

    DOI

  • Note on transferable utility

    Mamoru Kaneko

    International Journal of Game Theory   5 ( 4 ) 183 - 185  1976.12  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We provide a condition for an individual preference ordering to be represented by a function measured in terms of a commodity, i.e., for the commodity to be transferable utility. We also consider the relationships between conditions of the preference ordering and the utility function.

    DOI

  • On the core and competitive of a market with indivisible goods

    Mamoru Kaneko

    Naval Research Logistics Quarterly   23 ( 2 ) 321 - 337  1976.06  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We consider a generalization of the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [4]. In the market which we consider, s kinds of indivisible goods are exchanged for money. The market consists of buyers and sellers. Each buyer wants to buy at most one unit of the goods, and each seller may sell more than one unit. First, we show that the set of all competitive imputations is given by the solutions of a certain linear programing problem dual to the optimal problem. Second, we show that the core of the market coincides with the set of all competitive imputations under some condition, and consider the core of the market where s=1 and the condition does not hold.

    DOI

  • Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory

    Mamoru Kaneko

    Journal of Economic Theory   11   385 - 393  1975.12  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    In this paper we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity of the social preferences given by two types of social decision processes. We consider transitivity of the dominance relation of a proper simple game and that of the social preference given by the simple majority decision rule.

    DOI

  • Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a majority game

    Mamoru Kaneko

    International Journal of Game Theory   4   215 - 219  1975.12  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    In this note we consider the core of a game with side payments representing simple majority voting. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the game to have a nonempty core.

    DOI

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Books and Other Publications

  • 社会正義 地界で考える

    金子 守

    勁草書房  2007.05 ISBN: 9784326153916

  • ゲーム論家の酔夢譚:詩の饗宴

    金子 守

    勁草書房  2006.03 ISBN: 9784326550524

  • Game Theory and Mutual Misunderstanding

    Mamoru Kaneko, Ruth Vanbaelen

    Springer Verlag  2004.12 ISBN: 9783540222958

  • ゲーム理論と蒟蒻問答

    金子 守

    日本評論社  2003.04 ISBN: 9784535552883

Research Projects

  • Majority decision rule with minority protection: meta-agreement by deliberaiton

    Project Year :

    2019.06
    -
    2022.03
     

  • An Interdisciplinary Study of the Interaction between Utterances and Social Contexts in terms of Dynamic Modal Logic

    Project Year :

    2017.04
    -
    2022.03
     

  • 制度・認識・社会正義の経済学の構築に向けて

    科学研究費助成事業(早稲田大学)  科学研究費助成事業(基盤研究(A))

    Project Year :

    2014
    -
    2018
     

  • Logic and Computation of Prediction, Judgment and Decision Making

    Project Year :

    2011.07
    -
    2016.03
     

     View Summary

    We clarified various aspects of many-layered logical judgement-decision making processes, by introducing new methodologies combinig theoretical methods and experimental methods. Our findings include; (1) effects of different ways of graphic-diagrammatic information-representation on judger's logical inferences and multi-attribute decision making; (2) influences of genetic factors on individual's decision making, logical inference and cognitive abilities; (3) influences and potential influences of the logical-philosophicalnt works of the early 20th century (Husserl, Hilbert, Wittgenstein)on our contemporary logical theories.(4) We developed linear logical vews and possible world-semantical views of classical-logical judgments and gave their applications to computer scientific judgments (e.g., on logical judgment for communication network security). (5) We also gave a new relationship between game theory and epistemic logic, and between philosophy of action and dynamic logic

  • game theory

    Project Year :

    2009.04
    -
    2014.03
     

     View Summary

    In this research project, we have studied social institutions from those in the broad sense such as customs, and moralities to those in the narrow sense such as legal and economic institutions having written codes. Studies of those enable us to make comparisons between societies with different cultural backgrounds. Taking those problems as concrete objects, we conducted research extensively on inductive game theory, epistemic logic, and experimental studies

  • THEORY OF SOCIAL NORM AND EVOLUTION

     View Summary

    In these three years, there have been developments in various directions. Although it is impossible that we summarize our accomplishment in this space, let us raise one point which we think is important. By examining the issues on social norms, we are now able to consider free competition, which is the central paradigm in neoclassical economics, as one of many possible norms ; rather than the only norm. Economics cannot exist without relating itself to the economy it is developed. It became clear that the concept of free competition is regarded as the ideal form of market economy because the neoclassical economists set the US economy, which is based on natural selection, at the core of the theory. The understanding of society will be greatly depened by recognizing this point.In relation to the above point, the best accomplishment of our project is that our group greatly contributed to the recognition and the establishment of the new field. This fact is clearly reflected in the list of our publications. It is not an exaggeration to claim that we succeeded in uniting social norms and evolution, the former being recognized as a field of sociology, and the latter a field of biology in

  • 非標準論理とその情報科学への応用

     View Summary

    木研究は、非標準論理の研究を発展させていくために、国内および関連する海外の研究者との研究連絡を活性化することをその目的としている。具体的には、近い将来において「非標準論理と情報科学の論理的局面」に関する国際会議を開催するための企画およびそのための国内における研究体制の整備を目標とした。この目標に対し、本研究ではつぎのことを行なった。・国際会議開催のための準備として、1997年秋にAustralian National University(ANU)の機械推論プロジェクト(ARP)のR.Gore博士が北陸先端科学技術大学院大学を訪問、また1998年1月には本研究のメンバーのうち3名がANUを訪問し、具体的な計画について検討をおこなった。その結果として、1999年に日本またはオーストラリアにおいて上記の会合を開催することとし、近くロシアの関連する研究者とも連絡をとり、組織委員会をスタートさせることとした。なお、この計画の一環として若手研究者の育成のためのサマースクール等の開催

  • Experience and Individual Image of the Society

     View Summary

    In these three years, we have pursue the foundations of individual experiences and individual images constructed from experiences. The paper by Mamoru Kaneko and Akihiko Matsui [1] constructed a theory of individual images of the society. Then I found that epistemic foundations are required for further research. I together with Nobu-Yuki Suzuki have developed epistemic logics and their applications to game theory. Kaneko [4] and Kaneko-Suzuki [5], [6] are papers on this development. This development gives foundations of further research of individual images of the society. Now, we are working on this problem

  • Advances in Nonstandard Logic

     View Summary

    Main aim of this project is to promote the study of nonstandard logic and its application. When starting the project, we have chosen the following four as major subjects of our study :1. algebraic approach to substructural logics,2. epistemic logic and game theory,3. study of nonstandard predicate logics,4. proof-theoretic approach to nonstandard logics.Here are major achievments of our project :1. In collaboration with T.Kowalski, H.Ono has been developing a study of varieties of residuated lattices as algebraic semantics for logics without contraction rule. He has completed four joint papers, two of which have already been published in international journals. At the same time, H.Ono has given four invited talks on this topics at Torun, Poland, 1998, Barcelona, Spain, 1999, Milano, Italy, 1999, and Mantova, Italy, 2000. Recently, Kowalski and Ono have written up a monograph "Residuated Lattices".2. Kaneko and Suzuki have been developing a comprehensive study of game logic and common knowledge logic as logical frameworks of game theory. Kripke-completeness and incompleteness problems of minimum extensions of modal predicate logics are discussed by Shimura and One, while Suzuki intr

  • Extended Kripke Semantics and its Application to Epistemic Logics and Game Theory

     View Summary

    We dealt mainly with multi-modal epistemic logics which can describe interpersonal epistemic inference. The idea of applying multi-modal epistemic logics to analysis of the "game theoretical decision-making process" described by game theory enables us to get new perspectives on relations between epistemic logic and game theory. Many suggestions on future research were obtained. We find that the restriction of inter-personal epistemic inference to "shallow depths" is an important facet of the bounded rationality. The bounded rationality is a concept interested in the recent literature of game theory. We succeeded to construct the extended Kripke-type semantics for such multi-modal epistemic logics. The main and ralated results are the following.1.The restriction of inter-personal epistemic inference to shallow depths is found to be an important facet of the bounded rationality. We showed that multi-modal epistenic logics provide a theoretical framework to this restriction. The proof theory and Kripke-type model theory for such multi-modal epistemic logics are established.2.Natural transformations in sheaf theory and functors in category theory are interpreted into extended Kripke se

  • Individual Perspectives of Society and Socio-economic Norms

     View Summary

    In this project, we consider the formation of a player's perspective on the social (game) situation he is in. This has two parts : deductive and inductive parts. Both are our research targets. The principal investigator, Mamoru Kaneko, and Nobu-Yuki Suzuki have developed the theory of epistemic logic as the deductive part. As the inductive part, Kaneko (together with Jeffrey J.Kline) has started developing the theory of info-memory protocols and the inductive derivations of as the inductive part. The latter is just at the starting stageIn these three years, we had various research activities such as organizing various workshops and attending at quite a few domestic and international conferences. Particularly, we had organized three workshops on epistemic logic and game theory. One conference was held an game theory. These activities enhanced our research a lotAs results of our research activities, the principal investigator, Kaneko, as the invited editor, organized one issue of Economic Theory as the special issue on "Logic and Economics". The issue has Cave papers on relations on logic and economics. Thus, our project resulted as a fruitful on

  • Study of multi-modal logics and its application to game theory

     View Summary

    Among other multi-modal logics, we dealt mainly with multi-agent epistemic logics. We can describe inter-personal epistemic inference by making use of multi-agent epistemic logics, and hence we can apply them to game theory. As application, we tried mainly to analyze the game theoretical decision-making process. The idea of applying multi-modal epistemic logics enables us to get new perspectives on relations between epistemic logic and game theory. Many suggestions on future research were obtained.We found that the restriction of inter-personal epistemic inference to "shallow depths" is an important aspect of bounded rationality.In this system IGEF, we can bescribe such restriction by making use of thought sequents. Our system enables us to 'isolate' inter-personal epistemic inference from other ability, and to consider bounded rationality as restrictions on the ability of inter-personal epistemic inference. Moreover, we succeeded to construct the extended Kripke-type semantics for such multi-modal epistemic logics.The main and ralated results are the following.1. Systems IGEF of multi-agent epistemic logics with the feature of the restriction of inter-personal epistemic inference

  • 社会経済状況における役割と行動様式:他者の心の経験からの理解

     View Summary

    本年度は本プロジェクトの2年目にあたり、本プロジェクトの基礎的部分から応用までを研究した。具体的には社会経済状況における個人の内的構造の形成・発展(進化)と、それらの社会経済への影響を研究した。まず、社会構成員の心的内的構造という概念を明確にした。ここで、個人の心的内的構造とは、理性(思考形式・思考規範)・記憶・信念・知識・行動基準・経済規範・倫理・選好・嗜好等々を意味する。これらの構造を明確にすると、多くの経済・ゲーム論の基礎的問題への接近が可能になり、より具体的な社会経済現象への応用も可能になる。また、これによって、これらの内的構造の社会的文脈における形成・発展も議論できるようになる。例えば、個人の社会経済規範や社会観の形成の考察ができるようになった。本年度はとくに、「他者の心の経験からの理解」について研究し、大きな成果をあげている。具体的には、ゲーム的状況において、プレイヤーが経験をつみ、

  • Inductive Game Theory and Limited Rationalities : Individual Derivations of Social Views and Behavioral Decision

  • Integrated study of multi-modal logics and game theory

  • 賃貸住宅市場シミュレータの開発:その具体応用と経済理論・ゲーム論の基礎の検証

     View Summary

    本年度は本プロジェクトの最終年度にあたり、本プロジェクトの基礎的部分から応用までを研究した。具体的には、賃貸住宅市場の均衡論的分析の計算機シュミュレータを発展させて、計量経済学的な考察へのつながりを研究してきた。シミュレーションのための計算機プログラムの発展に力をいれ、賃貸住宅市場シミュレータはかなり構成できてきた。多分、もう数年で具体的使用に耐えるシミュレータが完成されると期待している。また計量経済学的へのつながりも明確になってきており、残る課題はそれをどこまで応用して、具体的な賃貸住宅市場のデータに応用するかである。このためには、東京近郊の通勤路線の賃貸価格調査が必要であり、その調査を現在行っている。また、理論的な研究として、効用関数の形状をどの程度許すかが問題になる。最終年度の研究成果として、現在、住宅市場についての論文を執筆中である。本論文ではシミュレーションの結果の他に、計量経済

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Presentations

  • 社会の理解:ゲーム理論の概念的問題

    金子 守

    研究会:社会慣習・行動パターン・限定合理性  (青森公立大学(青森県 青森市))  金子 守

    Presentation date: 2018.08

  • Majority Decision Rule with Minority Protection: Cost Assignments for Public Projects

    Mamoru Kaneko  [Invited]

    International Conference on Applied Economics  (Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw)  Warsaw School of Economics

    Presentation date: 2018.07

  • Expected Utility Theory with Probability Grids and Preferential Incomparabilities

    Mamoru Kaneko  [Invited]

    TUSIV(Time, Uncertainties & Strategies IV ) 2017 Conference, Paris, France  (Paris) 

    Presentation date: 2017.12

  • Expected utility theory with probability grids and preferential incomparabilities

    Mamoru Kaneko

    (Shizuoka Univ.) 

    Presentation date: 2017.12

  • Approximate Quasi-Linearity for Large Incomes

    Mamoru Kaneko  [Invited]

    2017 Nanjing International Conference on Game Theory and the Fourth Microeconomics workshop  (Nanjing) 

    Presentation date: 2017.11

  • Expected utility theory with probability grids and incomparabilities

    Mamoru Kaneko

    The 10th Pan Pacific Game Theory Conference and TGU Positive/Empirical Analyses of Political Economy Symposium  (Waseda University)  Waseda University, Mamoru Kaneko

    Presentation date: 2017.09

  • Expected Utility Theory with Probability Grids and Preferential Incomparabilities

    Mamoru Kaneko

    17th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics Faro, Portugal  (Faro) 

    Presentation date: 2017.06

  • Expected of Utility Theory with Probability Grids and Preferential Incomparability

    Mamoru Kaneko  [Invited]

    International Forum on Silk Road Economy  (Xi’an University) 

    Presentation date: 2017.06

  • 限定合理性の様々な様相

    金子 守

    研究会:社会慣習・行動パターン・限定合理性  (早稲田大学(東京都 新宿区))  金子 守

    Presentation date: 2017.03

  • Expected Utility Theory with Bounded Probability Nets

    Mamoru Kaneko  [Invited]

    Logic and Game Theory  (Korean Institute of Advanced Study) 

    Presentation date: 2016.12

  • Expected Utility Theory with Bounded Probability Nets

    Mamoru Kaneko

    The 9th Pan Pacific Game Theory Conference and TGU Empirical Analyses of Political Economy symposium  (Waseda University)  Waseda University, Mamoru Kaneko

    Presentation date: 2016.10

  • Expected Utility Theory with Bounded Probability Nets

    Mamoru Kaneko

    (Waseda University)  THE UNION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION IN JAPAN

    Presentation date: 2016.09

  • Expected Utility Theory with Bounded Probability Nets

    Mamoru Kaneko  [Invited]

    The 27th International Conference on Game Theory  (Stony Brook University) 

    Presentation date: 2016.07

  • ゲーム理論の概念的問題

    金子 守

    研究会: 社会慣習・行動パターン・限定合理性  (早稲田大学)  金子 守

    Presentation date: 2016.03

  • Small Infinitary Epistemic Logics and Some Fixed-point Logics

    Mamoru Kaneko

    認識論理と様相論理に関しての研究会  (早稲田大学)  金子 守

    Presentation date: 2015.12

  • A Bridge between Inductive Game Theory and Epistemic Logic

    Mamoru Kaneko  [Invited]

    East Asia Game Theory Conference 2015 Tokyo  (Waseda University) 

    Presentation date: 2015.08

  • Foundational Issues in Game Theory and Economics

    Mamoru Kaneko

    14th SAET (Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory) Conference on Current Trends in Economics  (Waseda University Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)  Mamoru Kaneko

    Presentation date: 2014.08

  • パネルディスカッション「行動経済学で考える社会正義」

    金子 守(パネリスト  [Invited]

    行動経済学会第7回大会  (京都大学 農学部総合館)  行動経済学会第7回大会

    Presentation date: 2013.12

  • Epistemic Logic and Inductive Game Theory

    Mamoru Kaneko  [Invited]

    AI 2012: Advances in Artificial Intelligence: 25th International Australasian Joint Conference  (Sydney Harbour Marriott Hotel) 

    Presentation date: 2012.12

  • Interactions between cognition and behavior:An experimental study

    Presentation date: 2011.06

  • A Simulation Study of Learning a Structure: Mike’s Bike Commuting

    Mamoru Kaneko

    The 2nd Taiwan-Dutch and International Conference on Game Theory  (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei) 

    Presentation date: 2009.08

  • Deductive and Inductive Inferences in Game Theoretical Situations

    Mamoru Kaneko  [Invited]

    5th International conference on Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice  (Bilbao) 

    Presentation date: 2007.06

  • False Beliefs and Decision Making

    Mamoru Kaneko  [Invited]

    Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice Second International Conference  (Saint-Petersburg)  St.Petersburg State University

    Presentation date: 2001.06

▼display all

 

Committee Memberships

  • 2011
    -
     

    Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory  Economic Theory Fellow

  • 2011
    -
     

    Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory  Economic Theory Fellow