Updated on 2022/01/25

写真a

 
TAGO, Atsushi
 
Affiliation
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, School of Political Science and Economics
Job title
Professor
Profile
専門:国際政治学(主たる関心はアメリカ外交、同盟・有志連合、計量手法)
多湖の個人ページ(https://a-tago.github.io/)のCV(英語)を最新情報としてご覧ください。

Research Institute

  • 2021
    -
    2022

    データ科学センター   兼任センター員

Degree

  • University of Tokyo   Ph.D.

Research Experience

  • 2018.04
    -
    Now

    Waseda University   School of Political Science and Economics   Professor

  • 2015.04
    -
    2018.03

    Kobe University   Graduate School of Law   Professor

  • 2007.07
    -
    2015.03

    神戸大学 法学研究科   准教授

Professional Memberships

  •  
     
     

    European Political Science Association

  •  
     
     

    International Studies Association

  •  
     
     

    日本国際政治学会

  •  
     
     

    Peace Science Society (International)

 

Research Areas

  • Politics

  • International relations

Research Interests

  • 国際政治と国際法

  • アメリカ

  • 有志連合

  • データセット構築

  • 援助

  • 多国籍軍

▼display all

Papers

  • Resistance to the six elements of political apologies: Who opposes which elements?

    Yohsuke Ohtsubo, Kazunori Inamasu, Shoko Kohama, Nobuhiro Mifune, Atsushi Tago

    Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology    2020.03  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • Social dominance orientation as an obstacle to intergroup apology

    Mifune Nobuhiro, Inamasu Kazunori, Kohama Shoko, Ohtsubo Yohsuke, Tago Atsushi

    PLOS ONE   14 ( 1 )  2019.01  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • Information Sharing in Early Stage International Disputes: How China and Japan Communicate

    Shoko Kohama, Atsushi Tago, Kazunori Inamasu

    Suzuki M. and Okada A., eds. Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia     57 - 82  2017

    DOI

  • To Denounce, or Not To Denounce: Survey Experiments on Diplomatic Quarrels

    Shoko Kohama, Kazunori Inamasu, Atsushi Tago

    POLITICAL COMMUNICATION   34 ( 2 ) 243 - 260  2017  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Despite widespread concern over heated diplomatic debates and growing interest in public diplomacy, it is still incompletely understood what type of message is more effective for gaining support from foreign public, or the international society, in situations where disputing countries compete in diplomatic campaigns. This study, through multiple survey experiments, uncovers the effect of being silent, issuing positive justification, and negative accusation, in interaction with the opponent's strategy. We demonstrate that negative verbal attacks work and undermine the target's popularity as they do in electoral campaigns. Unlike domestic electoral campaigns, however, negative diplomacy has little backlash and persuades people to support the attacker. Consequently, mutual verbal fights make neither party more popular than the other. Nevertheless, this does not discourage disputants from waging verbal fights due to the structure similar to the one-shot prisoner's dilemma. We also find that positive messages are highly context-dependentthat is, their effects greatly depend on the opponent's strategy and value proximity between the messenger and the receiver.

    DOI

  • Seeing the Lexus for the Olive Trees? Public Opinion, Economic Interdependence, and Interstate Conflict

    Seiki Tanaka, Atsushi Tago, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch

    INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS   43 ( 3 ) 375 - 396  2017  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Many scholars argue that economic interdependence and more extensive economic ties between countries decreases the risk of violent conflict between them. However, despite considerable research on the capitalist peace at the macro or dyadic level, there has been less attention to its possible individual-level microfoundations or underpinnings. We argue that public perceptions about economic ties with other states and the costs of conflict should influence the expected constraints on the use of force for leaders. Actual high interdependence and potential economic costs may not suffice to create political constraints on the use of force if people are unaware of the degree of interdependence or fail to understand the benefits of trade and the likely economic costs of disruptive conflict. We examine the linkages between individual perceptions about economic interdependence and their views on conflict and peace through a survey experiment, where we ask respondents in Japan about approval for belligerent actions in a territorial dispute with China and varying information about economic ties. Our findings indicate that greater knowledge and information about economic interdependence affects attitudes about territorial disputes and increases support for peaceful solutions with China.

    DOI

  • The Differentiation of Security Forces and the Onset of Genocidal Violence

    Ulrich Pilster, Tobias Boehmelt, Atsushi Tago

    ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY   42 ( 1 ) 26 - 50  2016.01  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Which factors drive the onset of genocidal violence? While the previous literature identified several important influences, states' military capabilities for conducting mass-killings and the structure of their security forces have received surprisingly little attention so far. The authors take this shortcoming as a motivation for their research. A theoretical framework is developed, which argues that more differentiated security forces, that is, forces that are composed of a higher number of independent paramilitary and military organizations, are likely to act as a restraint factor in the process leading to state-sponsored mass-killings. Quantitative analyses support the argument for a sample of state-failure years for 1971-2003, and it is also shown that considering a state's security force structure improves our ability to forecast genocides.

    DOI

  • Political Leadership Changes and the Withdrawal from Military Coalition Operations, 1946-2001

    Ulrich Pilster, Tobias Boehmelt, Atsushi Tago

    INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES   16 ( 4 ) 463 - 483  2015.11  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Several studies have claimed that changes in the political leadership of a country affect foreign policy decision making. The following paper systematically tests this in the context of states' participation in military coalition operations. By building on previous theoretical models, the authors argue that new leaders may differ from their predecessors in that the former (i) have dissimilar preferences with regard to the involvement in military interventions, (ii) evaluate relevant information differently, and (iii) are less likely to be entrapped in intervention policies. Ultimately, the net effect of these factors should make it more likely that political leadership turnovers are associated with premature withdrawals from ongoing military coalitions. The theory is tested by quantitative analyses of newly collected data on military coalition operations in 1946-2001 and a qualitative case study. The authors find strong and robust support for their argument.

    DOI

  • An 'A' for Effort: Experimental Evidence on UN Security Council Engagement and Support for US Military Action in Japan

    Atsushi Tago, Maki Ikeda

    BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE   45 ( 2 ) 391 - 410  2015.04  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Existing research emphasizes how United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval helps convey information to domestic audiences that military action is conducted with good intentions, for desirable consequences and in a legitimate manner. This information transmission mechanism can also increase support for UNSC-endorsed military action in countries unlikely to provide major contributions to military actions. There is some cross-national evidence supporting the information transmission mechanism in the United States. Examining the causal mechanisms underlying foreign public support for US military action through a survey experiment with approximately 2,000 respondents in Japan shows that foreign public support varies depending on whether the military action has UNSC approval. The process of presenting draft resolutions to the UNSC also affects public support.

    DOI

  • Why Buy American? The International Politics of Fighter Jet Transfers

    Srdjan Vucetic, Atsushi Tago

    CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE-REVUE CANADIENNE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE   48 ( 1 ) 101 - 124  2015.03  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    When it comes to buying military aircraft, what leads states to prefer one supplier over the other? This paper explores this question from the perspective of international relations theory. First we use social network analysis to map out fighter jet transfers during and after the Cold War and examine the extent to which historical structures of international hierarchy shape contemporary supplier-receiver relationships. Next, we use a basic probit model to analyse the origins of fighter jets in the world's air forces today to evaluate the effect of interstate orders of super-ordination and sub-ordination on sourcing patterns. All things being equal, the more a state is embedded in US security and economic hierarchy, the more it is likely to buy American-made fighter jets.

    DOI

  • Winning over foreign domestic support for use of force: power of diplomatic and operational multilateralism

    Maki Ikeda, Atsushi Tago

    INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC   14 ( 2 ) 303 - 324  2014.05  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    The United States uses two forms of multilateralism to increase levels of foreign public support for military action: diplomatic multilateralism and operational multilateralism. Diplomatic multilateralism is typically done by obtaining a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing military action. The use of multinational forces, the so-called coalition of the willing and many flags program, is an example of operational multilateralism. While scholars have empirical evidence that diplomatic multilateralism generates foreign domestic support for the use of force, there is no equivalent study for operational multilateralism. We do not know if or how much the two types of multilateralism would differ in inducing foreign domestic support for military action. This article, by using Japan as a field of survey experiment, answers these questions.

    DOI

  • Why do states formally invoke the right of individual self-defense? Legal-, diplomatic- and aid-politics to motivate states to respect international law

    Atsushi Tago

    CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACE SCIENCE   30 ( 2 ) 161 - 177  2013.04  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    The use of force is prohibited under the UN Charter. An exception is written in Article 51, which allows a state to conduct an act of self-defense. This study explains why only some states invoke it. The author claims that the baseline probability of claiming the right remains low because explicit reference to Article 51 accompanies the uncertainty of justification success and poses legal and diplomatic costs. However, balanced escalation and no alliance relationship negate those costs and increase the likelihood of self-defense justification. Moreover, under the strict conditionality, minor powers receiving American military aid frequently and promptly claim self-defense.

    DOI

  • The "only choice": Canadian and Japanese F-35 decisions compared

    Atsushi Tago, Srdjan Vucetic

    International Journal   68 ( 1 ) 131 - 149  2012.12  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • The Political Economy of Arms Export Restrictions: The Case of Japan

    Atsushi Tago, Gerald Schneider

    JAPANESE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE   13   419 - 439  2012.09  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    The export of arms belongs to the most contested issues in democracies. In this article, we examine the economic repercussions of the recent easing of the Japanese arms exports restrictions. We develop a rational expectations argument to understand why some political events increase the income of the arms manufacturers, while other ones reduce it or have no effect at all. Event studies suggest that investors closely observe relevant political developments since stock prices of the six arms manufacturers companies reacted consistently to the announcements and leaks as to whether the arms export restrictions would be lifted or not.

    DOI

  • 戦争をめぐるアメリカ国内政治と日本 経済情勢・党派政治・選挙

    多湖淳

    『「戦争」で読む日米関係100年』 朝日選書    2012.06

  • The Redistributive Effect of Loosening Arms Export Restrictions: An Event Study Analysis of the Japanese Case

    Atsushi TAGO, Gerald SCHNEIDER

    Japanese Journal of Political Science   13 ( 3 ) 419 - 439  2012  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • Explaining the onset of mass killing, 1949-87

    Frank W. Wayman, Atsushi Tago

    JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH   47 ( 1 ) 3 - 13  2010.01  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This article aims to demonstrate that differences in the two major datasets can significantly affect the results of predictions of mass political killing. Mass political killing (such as Hitler's killing of some six million Jews, or the Rwanda genocide of 1994) has been studied for decades with the aid of valuable datasets measuring 'democide' and 'genocide and politicide', respectively. Without attempting to take sides as to whether one or the other is a more valid measure of the phenomenon of mass political killing, the authors aim in this investigation to see what independent variables best account for the onset of mass political killing, with the state-year as the unit of analysis. The predictor variables are level of economic development; types of war and violent unrest short of war; and regime type. By using a Cox proportional hazard model, the authors find that important regime effects either appear or disappear depending on the dataset used, with regime generally having a significant effect on onset of democide, but not having a significant effect on onset of geno-politicide. It is important for the scholarly community to be aware of these dataset effects, which may be the source of some of the most important existing controversies in the literature on explaining mass political killing.

    DOI

  • Explaining the onset of mass killing, 1949-87

    Frank W. Wayman, Atsushi Tago

    JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH   47 ( 1 ) 3 - 13  2010.01  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This article aims to demonstrate that differences in the two major datasets can significantly affect the results of predictions of mass political killing. Mass political killing (such as Hitler's killing of some six million Jews, or the Rwanda genocide of 1994) has been studied for decades with the aid of valuable datasets measuring 'democide' and 'genocide and politicide', respectively. Without attempting to take sides as to whether one or the other is a more valid measure of the phenomenon of mass political killing, the authors aim in this investigation to see what independent variables best account for the onset of mass political killing, with the state-year as the unit of analysis. The predictor variables are level of economic development; types of war and violent unrest short of war; and regime type. By using a Cox proportional hazard model, the authors find that important regime effects either appear or disappear depending on the dataset used, with regime generally having a significant effect on onset of democide, but not having a significant effect on onset of geno-politicide. It is important for the scholarly community to be aware of these dataset effects, which may be the source of some of the most important existing controversies in the literature on explaining mass political killing.

    DOI

  • When are democratic friends unreliable? the unilateral withdrawal of troops from the 'coalition of the willing'

    Atsushi Tago

    Journal of Peace Research   46 ( 2 ) 219 - 234  2009.03  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Why do some democracies break their security commitments whereas others do not? This study proposes a research strategy to answer the question by analyzing the timing of unilateral exits from a coalition military operation. Coalition participants typically do not exit until a military mission has been accomplished. However, in the case of the US-led coalition occupying Iraq since May 2003, 16 states have unilaterally withdrawn their armed forces. Despite the danger such defections may cause to the relationship of these states with the USA, why and when do they exit? The author creates a dataset with a state-month unit of analysis that contains information on 37 partner states and applies a Cox proportional hazard model. The study finds that the occurrence of a national election serves as a strong driving force to accelerate an exit from the coalition. An incumbent leader who faces a challenger who opposes military contributions in Iraq would reverse the policy to support the USA and exit the coalition to win an election, even at the risk of damaging a bilateral relationship with the USA. A change in leadership after an election, on the other hand, failed to be a predictor of the timing of defection. Furthermore, results reveal that the division of power within the government and the constitutional rules that enable significant parliamentary control over executive decisions to use force neither delay nor accelerate the timing of withdrawal. To understand the conditions under which democracies break their security commitments, more attention should be paid to election cycles than to a change in leadership and to types of democratic institutional and constitutional arrangements.

    DOI

  • When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from the 'Coalition of the Willing'

    Atsushi Tago

    JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH   46 ( 2 ) 219 - 234  2009.03  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Why do some democracies break their security commitments whereas others do not? This study proposes a research strategy to answer the question by analyzing the timing of unilateral exits from a coalition military operation. Coalition participants typically do not exit until a military mission has been accomplished. However, in the case of the US-led coalition occupying Iraq since May 2003, 16 states have unilaterally withdrawn their armed forces. Despite the danger such defections may cause to the relationship of these states with the USA, why and when do they exit? The author creates a dataset with a state-month unit of analysis that contains information on 37 partner states and applies a Cox proportional hazard model. The study finds that the occurrence of a national election serves as a strong driving force to accelerate an exit from the coalition. An incumbent leader who faces a challenger who opposes military contributions in Iraq would reverse the policy to support the USA and exit the coalition to win an election, even at the risk of damaging a bilateral relationship with the USA. A change in leadership after an election, on the other hand, failed to be a predictor of the timing of defection. Furthermore, results reveal that the division of power within the government and the constitutional rules that enable significant parliamentary control over executive decisions to use force neither delay nor accelerate the timing of withdrawal. To understand the conditions under which democracies break their security commitments, more attention should be paid to election cycles than to a change in leadership and to types of democratic institutional and constitutional arrangements.

    DOI

  • Is there an aid-for-participation deal?: US economic and military aid policy to coalition forces (non)participants

    Atsushi Tago

    INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC   8 ( 3 ) 379 - 398  2008  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    There is an empirical evidence of an aid-for-policy deal between the United States and other states; the United States has utilized aid programs to promote affirmative votes in the UN General Assembly and to maintain an alliance relationship with strategically important states. However, whether there is a systematic evidence of an aid-for-participation deal remains inconclusive. Does the United States generally utilize its foreign aid to reward the contribution of troops to the US-led multinational forces and to punish the lack of contribution? The author argues that US foreign aid is used to prevent free-riding in coalition participation. To test the argument, I examined whether states were punished or rewarded by the United States for their behavior in sending or failing to send troops to 15 post-Second World War US-led coalition forces. The results show that the United States punished states for unexpected nonparticipation, but did not always provide rewards for support.

    DOI

  • Is there an aid-for-participation deal?: US economic and military aid policy to coalition forces (non)participants

    Atsushi Tago

    International Relations of the Asia-Pacific   8 ( 3 ) 379 - 398  2008  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    There is an empirical evidence of an aid-for-policy deal between the United States and other states
    the United States has utilized aid programs to promote affirmative votes in the UN General Assembly and to maintain an alliance relationship with strategically important states. However, whether there is a systematic evidence of an aid-for-participation deal remains inconclusive. Does the United States generally utilize its foreign aid to reward the contribution of troops to the US-led multinational forces and to punish the lack of contribution? The author argues that US foreign aid is used to prevent free-riding in coalition participation. To test the argument, I examined whether states were punished or rewarded by the United States for their behavior in sending or failing to send troops to 15 post-Second World War US-led coalition forces. The results show that the United States punished states for unexpected nonparticipation, but did not always provide rewards for support. © The author [2008]. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the Japan Association of International Relations
    all rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: The compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy

    Atsushi Tago

    International Relations of the Asia-Pacific   7 ( 2 ) 179 - 202  2007.05  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Why do states join US-led military coalitions? The war/dispute-diffusion literature suggests that opportunity and willingness are crucial determinants of coalition participation (Siverson snd Starr.1990, 1991). A state joins a coalition if it has a strong interest in war and enough capability to send armed forces abroad. Alliance studies connect coalition participation problems with the reliability of allied countries (Leeds, 2003 Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004). These studies seem to provide a fairly good picture on the question
    however, they are not free of problems. In particular, they study only coalitions for interstate war and militarized disputes but ignore coalitions for other purposes. Coalitions can be formed for military operations other than war (Kober, 2002). There are coalitions for humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and even for the evacuation of noncombatants. This article shows how difference in operation-types and collective legitimacy affect the decision of a state to participate in US-led coalitions. A coalition with United Nations' authorization may appear to be a legitimate international 'police' act and attract more partner states. A coalition for intervention into domestic affairs may be less attractive to possible participants because of the violation of the noninterference norm of international law. Statistical analysis on United States coalition partners from 1950 to 1999 suggests that how and for what purposes coalitions are formed cannot be overlooked. Coalition participation is not fully explained by the existing perspectives found in war/dispute-diffusion literature and alliance studies, and there is a need to invok 'the compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy'. © The author [2007]. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the Japan Association of International Relations
    all rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: The compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy

    Atsushi Tago

    INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC   7 ( 2 ) 179 - 202  2007  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Why do states join US-led military coalitions? The war/dispute-diffusion literature suggests that opportunity and willingness are crucial determinants of coalition participation (Siverson and Starr, 1990, 1991). A state joins a coalition if it has a strong interest in war and enough capability to send armed forces abroad. Alliance studies connect coalition participation problems with the reliability of allied countries (Leeds, 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004). These studies seem to provide a fairly good picture on the question; however, they are not free of problems. in particular, they study only coalitions for interstate war and militarized disputes but ignore coalitions for other purposes. Coalitions can be formed for military operations other than war (Kober, 2002). There are coalitions for humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and even for the evacuation of noncombatants. This article shows how difference in operation-types and collective legitimacy affect the decision of a state to participate in US-led coalitions. A coalition with United Nations' authorization may appear to be a legitimate international 'police' act and attract more partner states. A coalition for intervention into domestic affairs may be less attractive to possible participants because of the violation of the noninterference norm of international law. Statistical analysis on United States coalition partners from 1950 to 1999 suggests that how and for what purposes coalitions are formed cannot be overlooked. Coalition participation is not fully explained by the existing perspectives found in war/dispute-diffusion literature and alliance studies, and there is a need to invoke 'the compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy'.

    DOI

  • Determinants of multilateralism in US use of force: State of economy, election cycle, and divided government

    Atsushi Tago

    Journal of Peace Research   42 ( 5 ) 585 - 604  2005.09  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    US presidents used military force 212 times from 1948 to 1998. In 45 of these cases, the force was embedded in a multilateral context. The article distinguishes between procedural multilateralism, where US military operations are endorsed by an international organization, and operational multilateralism, where military actions are coordinated with the armed forces of other countries. In some cases, such as the Korean War and the first Gulf War, the United States obtained UN authorization and created a multinational force. However, there are also partially multilateral cases, in which either political endorsement or execution of the use of force is made by a multilateral approach while the other is subject to unilateralism. This article focuses on the varieties of multilateralism and homes in on exploring why such varieties of multilateralism exist. An original dataset for studying multilateral-unilateral choice in US use of force is analyzed using a multinomial logit model and a bivariate probit model. The analyses suggest that three domestic conditions - recession, election cycle, and divided government - can cause partial multilateralism, since they create different incentives for the president to seek burden-sharing with allies or seek collective legitimacy in international organizations. © 2005 Journal of Peace Research.

    DOI

  • Determinants of multilateralism in US use of force: State of economy, election cycle, and divided government

    A Tago

    JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH   42 ( 5 ) 585 - 604  2005.09  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    US presidents used military force 212 times from 1948 to 1998. In 45 of these cases, the force was embedded in a multilateral context. The article distinguishes between procedural multilateralism, where US military operations are endorsed by an international organization, and operational multilateral ism, where military actions are coordinated with the armed forces of other countries. In some cases, such as the Korean War and the first Gulf War, the United States obtained UN authorization and created a multinational force. However, there are also partially multilateral cases, in which either political endorsement or execution of the use of force is made by a multilateral approach while the other is subject to unilateralism. This article focuses on the varieties of multilateralism and homes in on exploring why such varieties of multilateralism exist. An original dataset for studying multilateral-unilateral choice in US use of force is analyzed using a multinomial logit model and a bivariate probit model. The analyses suggest that three domestic conditions - recession, election cycle, and divided government - can cause partial multilateralism, since they create different incentives for the president to seek burden-sharing with allies or seek collective legitimacy in international organizations.

    DOI

▼display all

Books and Other Publications

  • 戦争とは何か : 国際政治学の挑戦

    多湖, 淳

    中央公論新社  2020.01 ISBN: 9784121025746

  • 国際紛争と協調のゲーム

    鈴木, 基史, 岡田, 章( 経済学), 岩波, 由香里, 多湖, 淳, 飯田, 敬輔, 石黒, 馨, 林, 光, 石田, 淳, 栗崎, 周平

    有斐閣  2013.03 ISBN: 9784641149045

  • 国際政治哲学

    小田川, 大典, 五野井, 郁夫, 高橋, 良輔, 上原, 賢司, 清水, 耕介, 多湖, 淳, 芝崎, 厚士, 春名, 展生, 西, 平等

    ナカニシヤ出版  2011.05 ISBN: 9784779505607

  • 武力行使の政治学 : 単独と多角をめぐる国際政治とアメリカ国内政治

    多湖, 淳

    千倉書房  2010.01 ISBN: 9784805109373

Misc

  • 座談会 政治学をどう教えるか : 『政治学の第一歩』をもとに考える(下)

    伊藤 武, 多湖 淳, 砂原 庸介, 稗田 健志

    書斎の窓 = The window of author's study   ( 645 ) 4 - 15  2016.05

    CiNii

  • 座談会 政治学をどう教えるか : 『政治学の第一歩』をもとに考える(上)

    伊藤 武, 多湖 淳, 砂原 庸介

    書斎の窓 = The window of author's study   ( 644 ) 4 - 14  2016.03

    CiNii

  • 書評 加害者としての大衆,被害者としての民間人 : 奈良岡聰智著『対華二十一ヵ条要求とは何だったのか 第一次世界大戦と日中対立の原点』 奈良岡聰智著『「八月の砲声」を聞いた日本人 第一次世界大戦と植村尚清「ドイツ幽閉記」』

    多湖 淳

    レヴァイアサン   ( 59 ) 195 - 198  2016

    CiNii

  • A Study on Economic Interdependence Perception and Conciliatory Attitudes toward Foreign Countries : A Survey Experiment

    多湖 淳

    旭硝子財団助成研究成果報告 Reports of research assisted by the Asahi Glass Foundation     1 - 6  2016

    CiNii

  • 民主的平和論

    多湖淳

    『国際政治哲学』   ナカニシヤ出版  2011.05

  • 国際政治学における計量分析 (特集 政治現象の計量分析)

    多湖 淳

    オペレ-ションズ・リサ-チ   56 ( 4 ) 215 - 220  2011.04

    CiNii

  • 国際政治学における計量分析

    多湖 淳

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ : 経営の科学 = [O]perations research as a management science [r]esearch   56 ( 4 ) 215 - 220  2011.04

     View Summary

    国際政治学における計量分析の活用は我が国ではまだ限定的であるが,海外では非常に盛んである.学術誌を見ても計量手法の存在感は圧倒的である.この背景には,合理的選択論を軸とする戦争原因研究の理論的進展とそれに影響された他分野の理論研究に計量手法が大きな役割を果たしてきたことがある.ここでは国家間武力紛争,武力行使,同盟と有志連合という三つのトピックについて最近の研究を紹介し,それを通じて代表的なデータセット,分析単位,手法を明らかにしていく.

    CiNii

  • 国際政治学における計量分析(<特集>政治現象の計量分析)

    多湖 淳

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ : 経営の科学   56 ( 4 ) 215 - 220  2011.04

    CiNii

  • Predicting the Horizontal Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Tago Atsushi, Singer J. David

    Kobe University law review   45   51 - 68  2011

    CiNii

  • 国際制度と集団正当化--米国の軍事行動における制度選択の分析 (国際関係の制度化)

    多湖 淳

    季刊国際政治     90 - 103  2003.02

    CiNii

  • International Institutions and Collective Legitimization: An Analysis of the US Institutional Choice under Military Actions

    TAGO Atsushi

    International Relations   2003 ( 132 ) 90 - 103,L10  2003

     View Summary

    The monumental works by Inis Claude Jr. have led many scholars of International Relations to regard collective legitimization as one of the most important mechanism for the institutionalization of international relations. This paper explores the enhancement of international institutions by focusing on the US collective legitimization in the Dominican intervention (1965) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).&lt;br&gt;This paper argues that collective legitimization enhances institutionalization of international relations in two different ways: constraining the US decision about its military actions, and expanding the roles and functions of the formal international organizations. In the case of the Dominican intervention in 1965, due to opposition by other countries in the region, the US failed to continue deployment of its troops, especially the Army and Air Force, as it wished. The US also reluctantly accepted a Brazilian general for the commander of the Inter-American Peace Forces even though it wanted an American commander. In addition to these constraints, as a result of creation of Inter-American Peace Forces, the roles and functions of the OAS were expanded into peace-keeping operations and humanitarian military operations, neither of which was within the scope of the Charter of the OAS.&lt;br&gt;A comparison of the Dominican Intervention in 1965 with the Cuban Missile Crisis shows there are two strategies of collective legitimization: assertive (offensive) legitimization and negative (defensive) legitimization. Assertive legitimization is a strategy whereby the United States tries to show the legality and justice of its military actions by gaining formal support from international institutions. Negative legitimization is a strategy whereby the United States tries to show the legality and justice of its military actions by denying the claim of an enemy or counterpart such as Cuba or the USSR. In the Dominican Intervention, the United States utilized assertive legitimization. The OAS, which legitimized the US position, was institutionalized considerably; but the UN, which was bypassed by the US, was not institutionalized. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, on the other hand, the United States chose negative legitimization. Neither the UN, nor the OAS was institutionalized. From these empirical analyses, this paper provides a new hypothesis that assertive legitimization by the United States enhances institutionalization of international relations more than negative legitimization.

    CiNii

  • The U.S. Instrumental Choice between Multilateral and Unilateral Military Actions 1946-2000 : Introduction and Analysis of the USICC Dataset

    多湖 淳

    Pacific and American studies   2   203 - 226  2002.03

     View Summary

    In international crisis, the United States uses its military power under two approaches: the multilateral and the unilateral approach. The multilateral approach was used in the Persian Gulf War, while the unilateral approach was used in the 1989 u.s. intervention in Panama. How many military interventions were exercised as multilateral actions? How often the United States utilized its military power unilaterally? This paper would answer to the question. As is widely known, there have been many datasets on military actions and wars, such as COW, 1GB, MID, and KOSIMO; however none of them provide us with enough data for the study of the instrumental choice. These datasets have focused on only occurrences of international conflicts and wars, and never tried to make sufficient dataset on instrumental choice. In this respect, after introducing a new dataset on the U.S. instrumental choice named &quot;&quot;USICC&quot;&quot; (United States Instrumental Choice under Crisis), this paper would try to figure out some interesting features of the U.S. instrumental choice. Firstly, USICC would inform us that the United States tends to be much &quot;&quot;multilateral&quot;&quot; only in Europe but not in other regions. Secondly, it would be also shown that the United States increases uses of the multilateral efforts after the end of the Cold War. In addition to these findings, it would be seen that the more armed forces are needed, or the longer duration of deployment of the forces becomes, the more likely the United States utilizes the multilateral approach.

    CiNii

  • 安全保障の手段選択における「費用分担」と「正当化」--なぜアメリカは多角的アプローチで行動するのか?

    多湖 淳

    国際関係論研究   ( 18 ) 1 - 25  2002.03

    CiNii

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Research Projects

  • Risk Management of Comprehensive Monetary/Fiscal Policy: From Financial Crises to International Relations and Natural Disasters

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S)

    Project Year :

    2020.08
    -
    2025.03
     

  • International Collaborative Research on Political Information Transmission by Using Survey Experiment Methods

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Fund for the Promotion of Joint International Research (Fostering Joint International Research (B))

    Project Year :

    2018.10
    -
    2024.03
     

  • Communicating Security Threat: Newspaper Coverage of North Korean and Iranian Nuclear Programs

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)

    Project Year :

    2019.04
    -
    2022.03
     

  • The Decline and Renovation of International Institutions: Political Economic Analysis

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)

    Project Year :

    2018.04
    -
    2022.03
     

  • Interdisciplinary Empirical Studies on Group Apology

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Research (Pioneering)

    Project Year :

    2017.06
    -
    2022.03
     

  • Power of Words in the Early Escalation Stage of International Conflict

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)

    Project Year :

    2017.04
    -
    2022.03
     

  • The effects of diversifying media environment on international relations: Revisiting "Audience Cost theory" and "Diversionary Theory" from the view points of Social psychology

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)

    Project Year :

    2017.04
    -
    2022.03
     

  • An interdisciplinary study on the historical and territorial disputes between Japan and South Korea

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)

    Project Year :

    2015.07
    -
    2019.03
     

    KOBAYASHI TETSURO, HAHN kyu sup, SATO shin'ichi, KATAYAMA norio, MO hiroshi, SUZUKI takafumi, RENOUST benjamin

     View Summary

    Focusing on conflicts in Japan-South Korea relations, particularly historical and territorial issues, this project investigated the relationship between public opinion and the media in both countries through interdisciplinary approaches, including social psychology, political science, and information science. A series of online experiments using social psychology and political approaches revealed that viewing public diploma videos raised awareness of the need for Japan-South Korea cooperation, and that the perception that the gap in economic power between Japan and South Korea was narrowing would harden Japanese public opinion on history and territorial issues. On the other hand, analysis of newspaper article data revealed that historical and territorial issues were reported with different frames in Japan and South Korea. These results were presented in English peer-reviewed journals and international conferences.

  • Dialogue between International Relations Theory and Japanese Diplomatic History: Applications to Theoretical Development from Historical Knowledge and Historical Research on Theoretical Knowledge

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)

    Project Year :

    2015.04
    -
    2018.03
     

    OYANE Satoshi, FUKUSHIMA Hiroyuki, TYOKYU Asuka

     View Summary

    Research on international relations in Japan is lacking in the area of dialogue between theory and history, and new research developed based on mutual stimulation is considered to be weak. This study considers conditions and methods for dialogue between theory and history that is possible today.
    Against a backdrop of macro theoretical disputes in international relations and the spread of rational-choice theory, dialogue between theory and history is becoming increasingly difficult. However, there are examples from Japan, the United States, and elsewhere of using theory--albeit in modified form--to transform the subjects and concepts of historical research. Today, it is difficult to apply a theoretical paradigm to historical research or to develop theories from patterns abstracted from history. However, basic theoretical concepts themselves include topics that should be examined historically, and these can serve as hints for reinterpreting historical phenomena.

  • Political Economy of State Policies in Changing Global Governance

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)

    Project Year :

    2014.04
    -
    2018.03
     

    Suzuki Motoshi

     View Summary

    This research team conducted a collaborative research project for April 2014-March 2019. It focused on the relationship between the external conduct of states and international institutions and produced 24 conference papers, 23 journal articles and 6 books.A major achievement was publication of an edited volume, Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia, from Springer in March 2017. The edited volume compiled 11 articles written by members of the research team on the realms of regional security and economy. Several articles examined how institutions influence interstate conflict and cooperation in the region, while others analyzed how regional institutions are shaped through states'strategic calculus in light of power, interest, and global institutions. The volume uncovered that regional institutions involve flexibility and ambiguity to accommodate with the shifting distribution of power, while retaining behavioral constraints to promote limited interstate cooperation.

  • Economic Interdependence between States in Discord: the impacts of heterogenization in dense systems

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)

    Project Year :

    2013.04
    -
    2016.03
     

    Tadokoro Masayuki, ENDO Ken, SEJIMA Makoto, CEN Zhiwei, HASHIMOTO Takashi, FUJIMOTO Shigeru, OGAWA Hiroko, YAMAMOTO Kazuya, YUKI Kazuhiro, TAGO Atsushi, YAMAKI Hirofumi, SUZUKI Kazutoshi, EGASHIRA Susumu, AKIYAMA Eizou

     View Summary

    By case studies of multiple states and issues-areas, we have shown that indigenous risks emerge when interdependence deepens in a system inhabited with heterogeneous agents. We then used these case studies and their findings as inputs to a combined method of quantitative analysis and multi-agent simulation, in order to build and verify new theorization on the new risks that are arising from the deepening interdependence and power shift in the heterogeneous system of contemporary world.

  • Empirical Research on International and Domestic Politics over Legal Explanations of War and Use of Force

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (A)

    Project Year :

    2012.04
    -
    2016.03
     

    TAGO ATSUSHI, IKEDA Maki, GARTZKE Erik, GLEDITSCH Kristian S., BOEHMELT Tobias, PILSTER Ulrich

     View Summary

    The project aims at uncovering how international legal control for the use of force can be explained by a theory in International Relations/Political Science. As the project generated variety of research articles in the quality journals like British Journal of Political Science, Conflict Management of Peace Science and International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, our team could make a clear and significant contribution by emphasizing that the rationalist model is powerful to explain how international law is utilized by state governments.

  • Survey Experiment over Japan-Korea Territorial Dispute

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research

    Project Year :

    2013.04
    -
    2015.03
     

    TAGO Atsushi

     View Summary

    The research project was aimed at finding conditions when the general public can support a government that gives in to the other country in territorial dispute. We hypothesize that the ICJ judgment would ease the domestic opposition to make a compromise to the other state. While such a hypothesis is intuitive and a sort of common knowledge in International Relations, our survey experiment did not support that notion. ICJ solution seems not bring a peaceful end of territorial dispute as easy as it has been believed by International Relations scholars.

  • Review on Japanese Characteristic of International Relations Theory

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)

    Project Year :

    2012.04
    -
    2015.03
     

    OYANE Satoshi, YAMADA Takahiro, ISHIDA Atsushi, MIYAWAKI Noboru, TAGO Atsushi, MORI Yasuo, NISHIMURA Kuniyuki

     View Summary

    In general international relations theory in Japan is considered to be dependent on theories imported from overseas and to lack originality. This study reconsiders the way important theories were imported in the past, identifying originality in areas such as agenda setting and analytical tendencies, recurring like “basso ostinato (Masao Maruyama) ”.
    In Japan, against the backdrop of previous historical and area studies, there is a deep-seated tendency to assign greater importance to duality of implication and complexity in phenomena than to the simplification and systematization that accompanies theoretical research. In addition, interest in pursuing leads to peaceful change stands out when looking at new phenomena and analytical methods. Furthermore, in Japan numerous examples are apparent of adding new analytical dimensions to concerns related to existing subjects such as international norms and social movements through stimulation by theory from overseas.

  • Political Economic Analysis of Coalition Formation and Institutional Building in International Governance

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)

    Project Year :

    2011.04
    -
    2014.03
     

    SUZUKI Motoshi

     View Summary

    This research project has sought to analyze the problems of coalition formation and institutional building that are commonly observed in the realms of trade, money, peacekeeping operations, non-proliferation, global warming, etc. The problems are intrinsically intertwined with each other, hindering effective governance: a large coalition would be preferable in solving a global issue, but needs to be content with weak behavioral rules because it necessarily entails many heterogeneous members. A small coalition can create strong rules but is often ineffective in solving a global issue because it is simply too small. The research team, composed of political scientists and economists, have analyzed the problems by applying political theories of realism and constructivism and economic theories of rational choice and new institutionalism. Their analyses have illuminated the nature of the problems and uncovered appropriate institutional arrangements to reduce the dilemma.

  • Data Creation and Analyses on International Military Coalitions

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

    Project Year :

    2008
    -
    2011
     

    TAGO Atsushi, GARTZKE Erik, GLEDITSCH Kristian s., BOEHMELT Tobias, PILSTER Ulrich

     View Summary

    This project generated a comprehensive dataset on the multinational forces/coalition of the willing led by the United States of America after 1948. The Principle Investigator(PI) completed various manuscripts and has submitted them to international journals(still under review). The PI emphasized the importance of power as well as international norms/law ; also, the PI showed how domestic politico-economic factors influence the"coalition politics"at international level.

  • Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation : Integrating Theories of International Relations with Economics

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)

    Project Year :

    2008
    -
    2010
     

    SUZUKI Motoshi, IIDA Keisuke, ISHIGURO Kaoru, ISHIDA Atsushi, OKADA Akira, FURUSAWA Tatji, YAMAMOTO Yoshinobu, TAGO Atsushi

     View Summary

    This research project has sought to find common problems behind conflicts in the realm of international security and political economy. To do so, the researchers of the project have built analytical models based on theories of economics and international relations. They have focused on include the problems of coalition formation, distribution, coordination, and credible commitment. Their analyses have illuminated the nature of the conflicts and uncovered appropriate institutional arrangements to turn the conflicts into cooperation.

  • 集団正当化をめぐる国際政治の実証研究-理念重視と手続重視の二つの正当化に注目して

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業 特別研究員奨励費

    Project Year :

    2004
    -
    2006
     

    多湖 淳

     View Summary

    3年目の本年は、国際政治における正当化・正当性をめぐって研究の総仕上げを行うこと、また、今まで作成してきたデータセットを分析し終え、それを適宜まとめて発表することに力を注いだ。具体的には、二つの研究課題を設定した。第一に、アメリカが武力行使をするにあたって、正当性を議会の承認という形で「国内調達」する場合と国際法に準拠して国際機構からの授権を得ることで「国外調達」する場合がなぜ異なるのかを問う研究をまとめた。第二に、2003年5月以降のイラク占領に伴う有志連合から離脱する国の属性と条件について分析を行い、正当性を欠く軍事作戦においてどのような場合に連合参加国が大義名分を失い部隊撤退を決めるのかを論じた。
    第一の分析では、アメリカ議会が大統領の所属政党と同じ政党によってコントロールされている場合(いわゆる「統一政府」)においては武力行使をめぐる正当性の国内調達が追求されやすく、他方、議会多数派と大統領の所属政党が違う、いわゆる「分割政府」においては正当性の外部調達が追求されやすいとわかった。この研究成果は博士論文として東京大学大学院総合文化研究科に提出され、2007年2月28日に学位論文として合格した。なお、これ以後はこれを早期に出版することが課題である。
    第二の分析については、有志連合から離脱する国にとって選挙日程の影響が小さくないことがわかった。すなわち、選挙が実施されるたびに連合離脱の誘因が高まる。ただし、それは選挙に伴うリーダーシップの交代に因るのではなく、選挙において現職候補が人気のない政策を自ら転換する強いインセンティブを持つためであると考えられる。この研究成果は2007年4月に開催されるMidwest Political Science Association年次大会、2007年9月に開催されるAmerican Political Science Association年次大会で発表予定である。また、ある英語ジャーナルにおいてRevise and Resubmitの状態にある。

  • 国際組織の活生化と停滞のメカニズム 加盟国による役割・機能付与に注目して

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業 特別研究員奨励費

    Project Year :

    2001
    -
    2003
     

    多湖 淳

     View Summary

    三年目の本年は、研究成果をまとめることに力を注いだ。(1)国際組織を活用することが米国の軍事行動を長期化させることを発見したという論文、(2)米国の国際組織活用の傾向が経済情勢と分割政府(divided government)によって左右されるという議論を展開する論文を作成した。当初から予定していたように、英語で論文を執筆し、現在、投稿中である。本については既に年度の初めにJournal of Politicsに対して投稿を行ったが、三人のレフェリーのうち、一人が即掲載可、一人が条件付で掲載可、一人が掲載不可の裁定を下し、最終的には不採用になった。問題は理論部分が弱いこととされ、その点について継続的に修正を施した。また、二本目の論文を執筆した。
    年度の後半は二つの論文について校正を繰り返した。現在、Journal of Peace ResearchおよびJournal of Conflict Resolutionに対して投稿を行っている。本年度中に成果を掲載できなかったことは残念であるが、早期に上記で挙げたような北米の学術雑誌に掲載される論文を仕上げたいと考えている。なお、このプロジェクトで作成したデータセットは論文を学術雑誌上に発表した段階でホームページを通じて公表する方針である。また、2004年4月にシカゴで開かれるMid-west Political Science Associationの年次大会で成果報告を行う予定である(Duration of the US Use of Force and Institutional Effects of Multilateral Military Actions)。

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Specific Research

  • パワートランジションをめぐる実験研究

    2020   三船恒裕

     View Summary

    高知工科大学の三船准教授とともに、国際政治学におけるパワートランジション理論に紐づけられた経済ゲーム実験(その中でも最後通牒ゲームとして知られる設定)をオンライン上で行うという、分野横断的な挑戦的な研究に取り組んだ。科研の集団謝罪研究のグループで培った協力関係をうまく活かし、社会心理学と国際政治学の理論と分析手法をそれぞれ意識した、かつ、従来実験室でしかできなかった経済ゲーム実験をオンラインで行うという取り組みであった。70秒間に自分の能力が相対的に下がる場合、または上がる場合において、相手を攻撃するボタンを押すまでの時間を計測し、その違いを群間で観察した。さらに追加の実験をし、その上で英語で成果を刊行する予定である。

  • インターネットサーベイ実験調査における自己検閲の国際共同研究

    2018   Kristine Eck, Sophia Hatz, Charles Crabtree

     View Summary

    政治や社会に対する態度を表明するにあたって、市民は国家の監視を気にするのだろうか。この問いはサーベイ実験という手法が政治学で多用される今日、重要なものである。というのも、実験で表明された意見が監視されていないという保証はないわけで、どのようなタイプの人が監視の目を気にし、どのように意見を表明しなくなるのか、または表明しても真実を語りにくくなるのかを理解しなくてはどのように調査をデザインしていいのかがわからない。われわれは日本において調査を複数回行い、一般市民が監視の可能性にどのように反応するのかを検討した。本調査はウプサラ大学やミシガン大学所属の研究者との共同研究である。

 

Syllabus

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Committee Memberships

  • 2017.02
    -
    Now

    Peace Research Institute, Oslo  Global Fellow

  • 2012.08
    -
    Now

    Political Science Research and Methods,  Member of the Editorial Board

  • 2009.01
    -
    2018.01

    International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 編集委員