Updated on 2024/12/21

写真a

 
ITOH, Hideshi
 
Affiliation
Faculty of Commerce, Graduate School of Business and Finance
Job title
Professor
Degree
Ph.D. ( Stanford University )
Homepage URL
https://go2hitoh.github.io/

Research Experience

  • 2017.04
    -
    Now

    Waseda University   Graduate School of Business & Finance   Professor

  • 2000.04
    -
    2017.03

    Hitotsubashi University   Graduate School of Commerce & Management   Professor

  • 2004.03
    -
    2004.06

    University of Munich   Center for Economic Studies (CES)   Visiting Researcher

  • 1996.04
    -
    2000.03

    Osaka University   Institute of Social & Economic Research   Assistant Professor

  • 1998.01
    -
    1998.12

    Columbia University   Department of Economics   Visiting Associate Professor

  • 1988.04
    -
    1996.03

    Kyoto University   Faculty of Economics   Assistant Professor

  • 1993.04
    -
    1993.08

    Stanford University   Department of Economics   Visiting Associate Professor

  • 1988.09
    -
    1990.07

    University of California, San Diego   Graduate School of International Relations & Pacific Studies   Visiting Assistant Professor

▼display all

Education Background

  • 1984.09
    -
    1988.03

    Stanford University   Graduate School of Business   (Decision Sciences)  

  • 1982.04
    -
    1984.03

    Hitotsubashi University   Graduate School of Commerce  

  • 1978.04
    -
    1982.03

    Hitotsubashi University   Faculty of Commerce   Department of Management  

Professional Memberships

  • 　
    　
    　

    Econometric Society

  • 　
    　
    　

    Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE)

  • 　
    　
    　

    Law and Economics Association

  • 　
    　
    　

    European Economic Association

  • 　
    　
    　

    Japanese Economic Association

  • 　
    　
    　

    American Economic Association

▼display all

Research Areas

  • Economic theory / Public economics and labor economics / Economic policy / Business administration

Research Interests

  • Organizational Economics

  • Contract Theory

  • Behavioral Economics

Awards

  • Nakahara Prize

    2003   Japanese Economic Association  

 

Papers

  • What Do Contracts Do to Facilitate Relationships?

    Hideshi Itoh

    The Japanese Economic Review   74 ( 3 ) 333 - 354  2023.07  [Refereed]  [Invited]  [International journal]

    　View Summary

    Abstract

    I demonstrate that transacting parties may expend resources on ex ante contracting, which may not be legally enforceable, to help build and maintain their long-term relationships. I first introduce three legal concepts, namely scaffolding, managerial provisions, and formal relational contracts, which highlight the recent trend towards more detailed contracts. These concepts indicate that the role of detailed contracts is not to improve judicial contract enforcement, but to enhance clarity and alignment of interests and to reduce renegotiation costs, which ultimately support the parties’ relationships. I then proceed to present and analyze a simple reduced-form model, which demonstrates that the parties’ efforts for ex ante contracting are not necessarily monotonic with the level of alignment of their interests. Furthermore, I discuss recent contracting practices in Japan and attempt to provide an explanation for the lack of change observed in these practices.

    DOI

    Scopus

  • Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations

    Hideshi Itoh, Kimiyuki Morita

    Management Science   69 ( 1 ) 446 - 463  2023.01  [Refereed]  [International journal]

    　View Summary

    We study the value of divergence in values and preferences in organizations by combining three stages of a decision process—ex ante information acquisition, interim project choice, and ex post project execution—into a tractable model. A key insight is that our unified model provides predictions different from models without the execution decision stage. We consider an organization that consists of a decision maker who selects a project and an implementer who acquires costly information before project choice and executes the selected project. They have intrinsic and possibly divergent preferences over projects. We show that, although the implementer’s dual role generates a disadvantage of designing conflicts in terms of the implementation motivation, it simultaneously boosts the implementer’s motivation for information acquisition to influence the decision maker’s project choice more under divergent preferences. Our results provide managerial insights that designing conflicts is beneficial only in environments where additional information is sufficiently precise and must be accompanied by a manager who is balanced and incorporating feedback.

    This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.

    Funding: This work was financially supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI [Grants 25245031 and 18H03640] toH. Itoh and the JSPS Fellows [Grant 26.5608] to K.Morita.

    Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4373 .

    DOI

    Scopus

    3
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect

    Hideshi Itoh, Hodaka Morita

    AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS   7 ( 3 ) 318 - 346  2015.08  [Refereed]

    　View Summary

    We investigate whether formal contracts can help in resolving the holdup problem by studying repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer. Contrary to previous findings, we demonstrate that a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. Furthermore, we show that focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force is a possibility that the relation-specific investment decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very plausible, has been largely ignored in previous analyses of the holdup problem.

    DOI

    Scopus

    8
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Complementarities among authority, accountability, and monitoring: Evidence from Japanese business groups

    Hideshi Itoh, Tatsuya Kikutani, Osamu Hayashida

    JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES   22 ( 2 ) 207 - 228  2008.06  [Refereed]

    　View Summary

    This paper offers an empirical test of complementarities among delegated authority, accountability, and monitoring, using unique survey data collected from group-affiliated companies in Japan. The survey provides information about how various decisions are made within business groups, each of which consists of a large core parent firm and its network of affiliated firms such as subsidiaries and related companies. We find some evidence that delegated authority and accountability are complementary, implying that increasing assigned accountability raises the marginal return from increasing delegated authority. We also obtain a stronger result that performance is likely to be better under the combination of low authority and low accountability or that of high authority and high accountability than under the "mix and match" combinations where one is low and the other high. We then study the effects of monitoring intensity on the authority-accountability pair and find that performance of the firm with the combination of high authority and high accountability is increasing in monitoring intensity, while the combination of low authority and low accountability is not. This result is consistent with the theoretical hypothesis that increasing monitoring intensity raises the marginal return from increasing delegated authority and accountability.

    DOI J-GLOBAL

    Scopus

    6
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Moral hazard and other-regarding preferences

    H Itoh

    JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW   55 ( 1 ) 18 - 45  2004.03  [Refereed]  [Invited]

    　View Summary

    The paper aims at obtaining new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding preferences, in particular inequity aversion theory. The principal is in general worse off, as the agent cares more about the wellbeing of the principal. When there are multiple symmetric agents who care about each other's wellbeing, the principal can optimally exploit their other-regarding nature by designing an appropriate interdependent contract such as a "fair" team contract or a relative performance contract. The approach taken in this paper can shed light on issues on endogenous preferences within organizations.

    DOI CiNii J-GLOBAL

    Scopus

    122
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Corporate restructuring in Japan Part I: Can M-form organization manage diverse businesses?

    H Itoh

    JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW   54 ( 1 ) 49 - 73  2003.03  [Refereed]  [Invited]

    　View Summary

    The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent organizational restructuring in Japan in the framework of organizational economics, assuming that the product/market portfolio of the firm is fixed. How does a firm set about organizing its internal divisions? I first summarize some stylized facts on corporate diversification strategy and multi-divisional (M-form) organization in large Japanese firms from different perspectives. I then analyse the problem of,choosing an organizational form. In particular, I argue that, precisely because of its related diversification, the multi-business Japanese firm adopting the M-form finds it difficult to differentiate its diverse businesses internally.

    DOI CiNii

    Scopus

    9
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Moral hazard and renegotiation with multiple agents

    S Ishiguro, H Itoh

    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES   68 ( 1 ) 1 - 20  2001.01  [Refereed]

    　View Summary

    We investigate the effects of contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk-averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after the agents observe a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. We show that renegotiation with multiple agents reduces the cost of implementing any implementable action profile down to the first best level, even though the principal cannot observe the agents' actions. Moreover, it is sufficient for the principal to use a "simple" initial contract, in the sense that it consists of no more than a single sharing scheme for each agent and the total payments to the agents are the same regardless of the realised state. An important implication is that decentralization, in the sense of delegated negotiation and proposals from the agents, can be as effective as centralized schemes that utilize revelation mechanisms in unrestricted ways.

    DOI CiNii

  • JOB DESIGN, DELEGATION AND COOPERATION - A PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS

    H ITOH

    EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW   38 ( 3-4 ) 691 - 700  1994.04  [Refereed]  [Invited]

    　View Summary

    This paper analyzes how tasks are assigned in organizations. Tasks can be allocated vertically between a principal and an agent, or laterally among agents. The resulting organizational job design determines how many tasks are delegated to agents, and how the agents' tasks are divided among them. In the framework of the standard principal-agent relationship with moral hazard, it is shown that (i) an incentive consideration causes the principal to group a broad range of tasks into an agent's job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of them specialize in just one task; and (ii) the principal may choose to delegate all the tasks in order to mitigate a conflicting incentive problem with agents.

    DOI

    Scopus

    64
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing

    H ITOH

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY   60 ( 2 ) 410 - 427  1993.08  [Refereed]  [International journal]

    　View Summary

    This paper analyzes the effects of coalitional behavior in principal–multiagent relationships with moral hazard and identifies cases where the principal prefers agents to form a coalition via side contracting. It is shown that the principal can implement given efforts, via non-individualistic incentive contracts, at a lower cost when the agents can monitor each other′s efforts perfectly and hence coordinate their effort choice than when the agents behave independently. Permitting the principal to utilize more complex communication mechanisms does not alter the result, for there is no coalition-proof revelation mechanism improving the principal′s welfare.

    DOI

    Scopus

    110
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective

    H ITOH

    JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION   8 ( 2 ) 321 - 345  1992.04  [Refereed]  [International journal]

    DOI

  • Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations

    H ITOH

    ECONOMETRICA   59 ( 3 ) 611 - 636  1991.05  [Refereed]  [International journal]

    　View Summary

    This paper concerns moral hazard problems in multi-agent situations where cooperation is an issue. Each agent chooses his own effort, which improves stochastically the outcome of his own task. He also chooses the amount of "help" to extend to other agents, which improves their performance. By selecting appropriate compensation schemes, the principal can design a task structure: the principal may prefer an unambiguous division of labor, where each agent specializes in his own tasks; or the principal may prefer teamwork where each agent is motivated to help other agents. We provide a sufficient condition for teamwork to be optimal, based on its incentive effects. We also show a nonconvexity of the optimal task structure: The principal wants either an unambiguous division of labor or a substantial teamwork.

    DOI

  • Japanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive Theory

    Hideshi Itoh

    Ricerche Economiche   45 ( 2/3 ) 345 - 376  1991  [Refereed]  [Invited]

    DOI

  • Information Processing Capacities of the Firm

    Hideshi Itoh

    Journal of the Japanese and International Economies   1 ( 3 ) 299 - 326  1987  [Refereed]  [International journal]

    　View Summary

    We analyze the informational structure of a one-top and one-subordinate organization of the firm facing an uncertain environment. Before the realization of the true state, the top manager must choose the information processing capacity of the subordinate, which is an ability to discern the local aspect of the environment and depends upon the global aspect of the environment observed by the top manager. We examine how uncertainty in the environment affects the degree of specialization in the optimal capacity and the amount of knowledge resources in the firm, and discuss its implications for comparisons between Japanese management and American management.

    DOI

    Scopus

    14
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • 長期継続的関係を円滑なものとするために契約はどのような役割を果たすのか?

    伊藤 秀史

    現代経済学の潮流   2023   3 - 32  2023.12  [Refereed]  [Invited]

    DOI

  • Revisiting Japanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Organizational and Personnel Economics

      ( 737 ) 42 - 50  2021.12  [Invited]  [Domestic journal]

  • パネルディスカッション「法と経済学で、今後どのような研究テーマが重要か」

    伊藤秀史, 宍戸善一, 宮島英昭, 柳川範之

    法と経済学研究   9 ( 1 ) 11 - 26  2014.07  [Invited]

  • 組織の異質性がもたらすインセンティブ効果

    伊藤秀史, 森田公之

    一橋ビジネスレビュー   61 ( 1 ) 78 - 88  2013.06  [Invited]

  • 情報収集と情報開示のインセンティブ・トレードオフ

    伊藤秀史

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ   57 ( 10 ) 566 - 573  2012.10  [Invited]

    　View Summary

    本稿では，たとえば組織のトップとミドルの関係を表すシンプルなプリンシパル・エージェント理論によって，(a)情報収集努力を行うインセンティブと(b)情報をトップに正直に上げるインセンティブとの関係を分析する．そして，(a)のインセンティブを強めることが(b)のインセンティブを歪め阻害して「イエスマン」を生み出すこと，(b)のインセンティブを与えるためには(a)のインセンティブを弱めなければならないことを明らかにする．

    CiNii

  • Economic Theories of Middle Management: Monitoring, Communication, and the Middle Manager's Dilemma

    Hideshi Itoh, Fumitoshi Moriya

    Japan Labor Review   7 ( 4 ) 5 - 22  2010  [Invited]

    CiNii

  • Economic theories of middle management: monitoring, communication, and middle managers' dilemma

    The Japanese journal of labour studies   592 ( 11 ) 47 - 59  2009.11  [Invited]

    CiNii

  • Organizational innovation and corporate performance

    George Baker, Takeo Hoshi, Hideshi Itoh

    JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES   22 ( 2 ) 143 - 145  2008.06  [Invited]

    DOI

    Scopus

    1
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Contract Theory : Path toward the Third Theory of Microeconomics

    伊藤秀史

    経済学史研究   49 ( 2 ) 52 - 62  2007  [Invited]

    　View Summary

    The purpose of this article is to offer an overview of contract theory, a highly successful and active research area in microeconomics, with particular emphasis on its history and influence on modern economics. According to Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), currently a standard textbook in this field, the theory of incentives, information, and economic institutions is generally referred to in short as contract theory. Contract theory is thus a theory of imperfect markets, mainly because of asymmetric information such as moral hazard and adverse selection. Contract theory is also a theory of economic institutions and as such applies far beyond markets. The basic model of moral hazard and that of adverse selection both use agency (or principal-agent) relationships as the main analytical framework, in response to various attempts to lay open the black-box nature of the firm in the standard neoclassical model. Furthermore, theories of boundaries of the firm, originating out of Coase's classical work, are today analyzed in the framework of incomplete contracts that leads to the third basic model of contract theory, along with those of moral hazard and adverse selection. Although these basic models are games with specific extensive forms, they are formulated as optimization problems subject to incentive compatibility and participation conditions, and are solved without explicit reference to equilibrium concepts. Contract theory is thus related to both price theory and game theory, but it has developed its own analytical frameworks and tools to solve problems under conditions of asymmetric information or incomplete contracts. Contract theory is also a theory of incentive design. Incentive design is not important under perfect competition but is crucial when there is asymmetric information or contractual incompleteness. Myerson claims that today, "economists can define their field more broadly, as being about the analysis of incentives in all social institutions." (Myerson 1999) I argue that it is contract theory that enables us to define today's field more broadly.

    CiNii

  • Job design and incentives in hierarchies with team production

    Hideshi Itoh

    Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management   36 ( 1 ) 1 - 17  2001  [Invited]

    DOI CiNii

  • 人事の歴史制度分析に向かって―経済理論の視点

    伊藤秀史

    日本労働研究雑誌   42 ( 482 ) 44 - 51  2000  [Invited]

    CiNii

  • 現代の経済学における株主利益最大化の原則―契約の不完備性と人的資本の見地から―

    伊藤秀史

    商事法務   1535 ( 1535 ) 5 - 12  1999  [Invited]

    CiNii

  • 組織のエージェンシー・モデル―集団ネットワークの視点―

    伊藤秀史

    組織科学   31 ( 31-1 ) 51 - 59  1997  [Invited]

    CiNii

  • 分社化と権限委譲―不完備契約アプローチ―

    伊藤秀史, 林田修

    日本経済研究   ( 34 ) 89 - 117  1997  [Refereed]

    CiNii

  • 日本企業の分社化戦略と権限委譲:アンケート調査による分析

    伊藤秀史, 菊谷達弥, 林田 修

    通産研究レビュー   ( 10 ) 24 - 63  1997  [Invited]

    CiNii

  • 序列トーナメント理論による昇進パターンの分析例

    伊藤秀史

    オペレーションズ・リサーチ   41 ( 12 ) 677 - 682  1996  [Invited]

    CiNii

  • エージェンシー・コスト・アプローチについての一考察――所有と経営の分離，および親子会社関係への応用を中心に――

    伊藤秀史

    商事法務   1401 ( 1401 ) 15 - 19  1995  [Invited]

    CiNii

  • Incentives and the Japanese Employment "System"

    ITOH Hideshi

    Business review   40 ( 4 ) 12 - 20  1993  [Invited]

    CiNii

  • Intermediate Organization and Internal Organization--A Contract Theory Approach to Efficient Transaction Design

    ITOH Hideshi, HAYASHIDA Osamu, YUMOTO Yuji

    Business review   39 ( 4 ) 34 - 48  1992  [Invited]

    CiNii

  • Social Relations and Incentive Contracts

    Hideshi Itoh

    Kyoto University Economic Review   41 ( 1 ) 35 - 55  1991  [Invited]

    CiNii

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Books and Other Publications

  • 組織の経済学

    伊藤秀史, 小林創, 宮原泰之( Part： Joint author)

    有斐閣  2019.12 ISBN: 9784641165502

  • コーポレート・ガバナンス改革の提言――企業価値向上･経済活性化への道筋

    宍戸善一, 後藤元( Part： Contributor)

    商事法務  2016.12 ISBN: 9784785724832

  • フロンティア実験社会科学4 社会関係資本の機能と創出：効率的な組織と社会

    西條辰義, 清水和巳, 磯辺剛彦( Part： Contributor)

    勁草書房  2015.10 ISBN: 9784326349142

  • Enterprise Law: Contracts, Markets, and Laws in the US and Japan

    Zenichi Shishido, ed( Part： Contributor)

    Edward Elgar  2014 ISBN: 9781781004449

  • 日本企業研究のフロンティア 9号

    一橋大学日本企業研究センター( Part： Contributor)

    有斐閣  2013.04 ISBN: 9784641299559

  • ひたすら読むエコノミクス : read me 1st

    伊藤秀史( Part： Sole author)

    有斐閣  2012.04 ISBN: 9784641163973

  • 日本企業研究のフロンティア 7号

    一橋大学日本企業研究センター( Part： Contributor)

    有斐閣  2011.03 ISBN: 9784641299276

  • 比較制度分析・入門

    中林真幸, 石黒真吾( Part： Contributor)

    有斐閣  2010.12 ISBN: 9784641163645

  • 現代経済学の潮流2009

    池田新介, 市村英彦, 伊藤秀史( Part： Joint editor)

    東洋経済新報社  2009.09 ISBN: 9784492314012

  • 現代の経営理論

    伊藤秀史, 沼上幹, 田中一弘, 軽部大( Part： Joint editor)

    有斐閣  2008.11 ISBN: 9784641163249

  • 現代経済学の潮流2008

    浅子和美, 池田新介, 市村英彦, 伊藤秀史( Part： Joint editor)

    東洋経済新報社  2008.08 ISBN: 9784492313930

  • 日本企業研究のフロンティア 4号

    一橋大学日本企業研究センター( Part： Contributor)

    有斐閣  2008.03 ISBN: 9784641163171

  • 日本企業の東アジア戦略――欧米アジア企業との国際比較

    深尾京司, 日本経済研究センタ( Part： Contributor)

    日本経済新聞社  2008.02 ISBN: 9784532133405

  • 現代経済学の潮流2007

    市村英彦, 伊藤秀史, 小川一夫, 二神孝一( Part： Joint editor)

    東洋経済新報社  2007.08 ISBN: 9784492313794

  • Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity

    Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson, Hideaki Miyajima, eds( Part： Contributor)

    Oxford University Press  2007 ISBN: 9780199284511

  • リーディングス日本の企業システム 第II期 第1巻 組織とコーディネーション

    伊丹敬之, 藤本隆宏, 岡崎哲二, 伊藤秀史, 沼上幹( Part： Joint editor)

    有斐閣  2006.05 ISBN: 464105391X

  • リーディングス日本の企業システム 第II期 第4巻 組織能力・知識・人材

    伊丹敬之, 藤本隆宏, 岡崎哲二, 伊藤秀史, 沼上幹( Part： Joint editor)

    有斐閣  2006.05 ISBN: 4641053944

  • リーディングス日本の企業システム 第II期 第3巻 戦略とイノベーション

    伊丹敬之, 藤本隆宏, 岡崎哲二, 伊藤秀史, 沼上幹( Part： Joint editor)

    有斐閣  2006.01 ISBN: 4641053936

  • リーディングス日本の企業システム 第II期 第5巻 企業と環境

    伊丹敬之, 藤本隆宏, 岡崎哲二, 伊藤秀史, 沼上幹( Part： Joint editor)

    有斐閣  2006.01 ISBN: 4641053952

  • リーディングス日本の企業システム 第II期 第2巻 企業とガバナンス

    伊丹敬之, 藤本隆宏, 岡崎哲二, 伊藤秀史, 沼上幹( Part： Joint editor)

    有斐閣  2005.12 ISBN: 4641053928

  • 日本企業研究のフロンティア 1号

    伊丹敬之, 一橋大学日本企業研究センター( Part： Contributor)

    有斐閣  2005.06 ISBN: 4641162468

  • 現代経済学の潮流2004

    岩田規久男, 岩本康志, 本多祐三, 松井彰彦( Part： Contributor)

    東洋経済新報社  2004.10 ISBN: 9784492313435

  • インセンティブ設計の経済学 : 契約理論の応用分析

    伊藤秀史, 小佐野広( Part： Joint editor)

    勁草書房  2003.12 ISBN: 4326502436

  • コーポレート・ガバナンスの経済分析――変革期の日本と金融危機後の東アジア

    花崎正晴, 寺西重郎( Part： Contributor)

    東京大学出版会  2003.09

  • 契約の経済理論

    伊藤秀史( Part： Sole author)

    有斐閣  2003.05 ISBN: 464116181X

  • 現代経済学の潮流2002

    大塚啓二郎, 中山幹夫, 福田慎一, 本多祐三( Part： Contributor)

    東洋経済新報社  2002.10 ISBN: 9784492313121

  • 日本企業変革期の選択

    伊藤秀史( Part： Edit)

    東洋経済新報社  2002.09 ISBN: 4492521305

  • ゲーム理論の新展開

    今井晴雄, 岡田章( Part： Contributor)

    勁草書房  2002.04 ISBN: 9784326502271

  • 日本経済 21世紀への課題

    小宮隆太郎, 奥野正寛( Part： Contributor)

    東洋経済新報社  1998.10 ISBN: 9784492392775

  • Internal Labour Market, Incentives and Employment

    Isao Ohashi, Toshiaki Tachibanaki, eds( Part： Contributor)

    Palgrave Macmillan  1998 ISBN: 9780312211936

  • Who Runs Japanese Business?: Management and Motivation in the Firm

    Toshiaki Tachibanaki, ed( Part： Contributor)

    Edward Elgar  1998

  • リーディングスサプライヤー・システム : 新しい企業間関係を創る

    藤本隆宏, 西口敏宏, 伊藤秀史( Part： Joint editor)

    有斐閣  1998.01 ISBN: 4641160252

  • Economics, Organization and Management

    Paul Milgrom, John Roberts( Part： Joint translator)

    NTT Publication  1997.11 ISBN: 4871885364

  • 日本の企業システム

    伊藤秀史( Part： Edit)

    東京大学出版会  1996.06 ISBN: 9784130401524

  • Games, Strategies, and Managers

    John McMillan( Part： Joint translator)

    Yuhikaku  1995.08 ISBN: 4641067546

  • 「昇進」の経済学―なにが「出世」を決めるのか

    橘木俊詔, 連合総合生活開発研究所編( Part： Contributor)

    東洋経済新報社  1995.06 ISBN: 9784492260500

  • The Japanese Firm : The Sources of Competitive Strength

    Masahiko Aoki, Ronald Dore, eds( Part： Contributor)

    Oxford University Press  1994 ISBN: 9780198292159

  • 日本の企業システム 第1巻 企業とは何か

    伊丹敬之, 加護野忠男, 伊藤元重( Part： Contributor)

    有斐閣  1993.01

  • 査定，昇進，賃金決定

    橘木俊詔( Part： Contributor)

    有斐閣  1992.09 ISBN: 4641066205

▼display all

Presentations

  • The Allocation of Decision Authority Revisited

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Economic Theory Workshop in Memory of Dr Makoto SHIMOJI  (Waseda University) 

    Presentation date： 2024.06

  • Delegation and Decision Process in Organisations

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    University of York Department of Economics and Related Studies Workshop 

    Presentation date： 2023.03

  • Delegation and Decision Process in Organisations

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    University of Glasgow Microtheory Seminar 

    Presentation date： 2023.03

  • Presidential Address: What Do Formal Contracts Do?

    Itoh, Hideshi  [Invited]

    2022 Autumn Meeting of Japanese Economic Association  (Keio University)  Japanese Economic Association

    Presentation date： 2022.10

    Event date：
    2022.10
    　
    　

  • A Theory of Teams Based on Image Concerns

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Microeconomics Workshop, Keio University 

    Presentation date： 2022.05

  • A Theory of Teams Based on Image Concerns

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    2021 Organisational Economics Workshop in Oz (OEW '21) 

    Presentation date： 2021.12

    Event date：
    2021.12
    　
    　

  • Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting

    ITOH Hideshi  [Invited]

    QED Microeconomics Workshop  (Queen's Universiy)  Economics Department, Queen's University

    Presentation date： 2019.09

  • Changing Japanese Contracting Practices Meet Theories of Relational Incentive Contracts

    ITOH Hideshi

    Annual Meeting of Japan Law and Economics Association 

    Presentation date： 2019.07

  • A Theory of Turnover and Team Incentives Based on Image Concerns

    ITOH Hideshi  [Invited]

    Erasmus University Rotterdam/Tinbergen Institute Seminar 

    Presentation date： 2019.07

  • Image Concerns in Teams

    ITOH Hideshi  [Invited]

    Waseda Organizational and Financial Economics Seminar 

    Presentation date： 2019.05

  • Image Concerns in Teams

    ITOH Hideshi  [Invited]

    Workshop on Behavioral Contract Theory 

    Presentation date： 2019.04

  • Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    WINPEC-CPPE Microeconomics Workshop  (Waseda University) 

    Presentation date： 2018.11

  • Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Japanese-German Workshop on Contracts and Incentives  (Kwansei Gakuin University Osaka Umeda Campus) 

    Presentation date： 2018.09

  • Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Keio University Microeconomics Workshop  (Keio University)  Keio University

    Presentation date： 2018.07

  • Image Concerns in Teams

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    University of Hong Kong Economics Seminar  (University of Hong Kong)  University of Hong Kong

    Presentation date： 2018.07

  • Image Concerns in Teams

    Hideshi Itoh

    22nd Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics  (HEC Montreal)  The Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE)

    Presentation date： 2018.06

  • Image Concerns in Teams

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Kwansei Gakuin University IO Workshop  (Kwansei Gakuin University) 

    Presentation date： 2018.04

  • Image Concerns in Teams

    Hideshi Itoh

    The 21st Colloquium on Personnel Economics  (LMU Munich)  The Colloquium on Personnel Economics

    Presentation date： 2018.03

  • Image Concerns in Teams

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    CBE Seminar  (Norwegian School of Economics (NHH))  Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)

    Presentation date： 2018.02

  • Image Concerns in Teams

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    OEIO Spring 2018 Tokyo Conference  (University of Tokyo)  The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations (OEIO)

    Presentation date： 2018.02

  • Comments from Contracts and Organizational Economists

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    2017 Meetings of Japan Association of Private Law  (Kwansei Gakuin University)  Japan Association of Private Law

    Presentation date： 2017.10

  • Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting

    Hideshi Itoh

    3rd Annual Workshop on Relational Contracts  (Northwestern University)  Workshop on Relational Contracts

    Presentation date： 2017.09

  • Organizing for Change: The Optimality of Pro-Changer Organization

    Hideshi Itoh

    21st Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics  (Columbia University)  The Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics

    Presentation date： 2017.06

  • A Retrospective: The Contributions of David Kreps to Organizational Economics

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Symposium on the Scholarly Contributions of David M. Kreps and Celebration of David's 65th Birthday  (Stanford University)  Stanford University

    Presentation date： 2016.09

  • Organizing for Change: The Optimality of Pro-Changer Organizations

    Hideshi Itoh

    The 43nd Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics  (Nova School of Business and Economics)  The European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE)

    Presentation date： 2016.08

  • Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Microeconomics Workshop  (University of Tokyo)  Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo

    Presentation date： 2016.04

  • Organizing for Change: The Optimality of Pro-Changer Organizations

    Hideshi Itoh

    Kyoto University Applied Micro Seminar  (Kyoto University)  Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University

    Presentation date： 2016.03

  • Organizing for Change: The Optimality of Pro-Changer Organizations

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Kwansei Gakuin University Industrial Organization Workshop Mini-Conference  (Kwansei Gakuin University)  Department of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

    Presentation date： 2016.03

  • Organizing for Change: Preference Diversity, Effort Incentives, and Separation of Decision and Execution

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    2015 Japanese Economic Association Autumn Meeting  (Sophia University)  Japanese Economic Association

    Presentation date： 2015.10

  • Aoki's Theory of the Firm: Diversity and Universality

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Symposium in Memory of Professor Masahiko Aoki - The Ever Changing Three Decades: Japan's course from the perspective of comparative institutional analysis  (Iino Hall and Conference Center)  Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI)

    Presentation date： 2015.10

  • Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations

    Hideshi Itoh

    The 42nd Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics  (Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munchen)  The European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE)

    Presentation date： 2015.08

  • Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations

    Hideshi Itoh

    The 11th World Congress of the Econometric Society  (Palais des congr?s de Montr?al)  The Econometric Society

    Presentation date： 2015.08

  • Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations

    Hideshi Itoh

    19th Annual Conference of The International Society for New Institutional Economics  (Harvard Law School)  The International Society for New Institutional Economics (ISNIE)

    Presentation date： 2015.06

  • 日本の経済学術誌の将来性―編集長の視点―

    伊藤秀史  [Invited]

    日本経済学会2013.年度秋季大会  (神奈川大学)  日本経済学会

    Presentation date： 2013.09

  • 法と経済学で，今後どのような研究テーマが重要か

    伊藤秀史  [Invited]

    法と経済学会2013年度 (第11回) 全国大会  (北海道大学)  法と経済学会

    Presentation date： 2013.07

  • Writing Legally Unenforceable Contracts to Facilitate Relationships

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Conference on Law and Economics of Contracts  (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH))  Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH)

    Presentation date： 2011.06

  • What Do Formal Contracts Do?

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Symposium in honor of Oliver E. Williamson: Defining the agenda for the next decade of research on economic governance  (Gakushuin University)  Gakushuin University

    Presentation date： 2010.10

  • Writing Legally Unenforceable Contracts to Facilitate Relationships

    Hideshi Itoh

    International Conference ``Contracts, Procurement, and Public-Private Arrangements''  (University of Stirling)  The International Society for New Institutional Economics (ISNIE)

    Presentation date： 2010.06

  • Writing Legally Unenforceable Contracts to Facilitate Relationships

    Hideshi Itoh

    14th Annual Conference of The International Society for New Institutional Economics  (University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne)  Chaire EPPP

    Presentation date： 2010.06

  • Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

    Hideshi itoh

    Conference on Relational Contracts, National Bureau of Economic Research  (National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER))  National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

    Presentation date： 2009.11

  • Writing Legally Unenforceable Contracts to Facilitate Relationships

    Japan-UNSW Applied Microeconomics Workshop 

    Presentation date： 2009

  • Writing Legally Unenforceable Contracts to Facilitate Relationships

    Accounting and Management Science Seminars, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 

    Presentation date： 2009

  • Writing Legally Unenforceable Contracts to Facilitate Relationships

    Seminars in Economics and Finance at University of Stavanger 

    Presentation date： 2009

  • Lectures on Relational Contracting

    Center for Institution and Behavior Studies, RCHSS, Academia Sinica 

    Presentation date： 2008

  • The Pygmalion and Galatea Effects: An Agency Model with Reference-Dependent Preferences and Applications to Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

    Zhejiang University Research Seminar 

    Presentation date： 2007

  • Complementarities among Authority, Responsibility, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups

    Hideshi Itoh

    The 20th Annual NBER-CEPR-TCER TRIO Conference  (Hitotsubashi University)  NBER-CEPR-TCER

    Presentation date： 2006.12

  • The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences

    Hideshi Itoh

    CESifo Area Conference on Applied Microeconomics  (CESifo)  CESifo

    Presentation date： 2006.03

  • Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Chinese University of Hong Kong Department of Economics Seminar  (University of Bristol)  University of Bristol

    Presentation date： 2005.08

  • Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

    Hideshi Itoh

    Institute of Economics Research Seminar, Academia Sinica  (Amsterdam)  European Economic Association

    Presentation date： 2005.08

  • Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

    Hideshi Itoh

    Econometric Society World Congress  (University College London)  The Econometric Society

    Presentation date： 2005.08

  • Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    CMPO Joint Seminar, University of Bristol  (Academia Sinica)  Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica

    Presentation date： 2005.03

  • Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Economics Department Seminar  (Chinese University of Hong Kong)  Chinese University of Hong Kong

    Presentation date： 2005.02

  • The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences

    Annual Congress of the European Economic Association 

    Presentation date： 2005

  • The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences

    ChengChi University Research Seminar 

    Presentation date： 2005

  • Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Staff Seminar, School of Economics, University of New South Wales  (University of New South Wales)  School of Economics, University of New South Wales

    Presentation date： 2004.09

  • Complementarities among Authority, Responsibility, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Visitor Seminar, School of Economics, University of New South Wales  (University of New South Wales)  School of Economics, University of New South Wales

    Presentation date： 2004.08

  • Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Economics Seminar, University of Nuremberg  (University of Munich)  University of Munich

    Presentation date： 2004.04

  • Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Hans-Moeller Seminar, Department of Economics, University of Munich  (University of Nuremberg)  University of Nuremberg

    Presentation date： 2004.04

  • Explicit Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Osaka University Thursday Workshop  (Osaka University)  Osaka University

    Presentation date： 2003.12

  • Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    日本経済学会2003年度秋季大会  (明治大学)  日本経済学会

    Presentation date： 2003.10

  • Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Microeconomics Workshop  (University of Tokyo)  University of Tokyo

    Presentation date： 2003.09

  • Complementarities among Authority, Responsibility, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    ISER Seminar  (ISER, Osaka University)  ISER, Osaka University

    Presentation date： 2002.03

  • Corporate Restructuring in Japan: Part I. Can M-Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    日本経済学会2001年度秋季大会  (一橋大学)  日本経済学会

    Presentation date： 2001.10

  • Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    TCER定例研究会  (早稲田大学)  東京経済研究センター (TCER)

    Presentation date： 2000.05

  • The Firm as Legal Entity:Its Importance and Implications for Corporate Restructuring in Japan

    Hideshi Itoh

    1999 Autumn Meeting of the Japanese Economic Association  (University of Tokyo)  Japanese Economic Association

    Presentation date： 1999.10

  • Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents

    Hideshi Itoh

    North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society  (University of Wisconsin Madison)  The Econometric Society

    Presentation date： 1999.06

  • Delegation of Authority: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups

    Hideshi Itoh

    Harvard/MIT Organizational Economics Seminar  (MIT)  Harvard University/MIT

    Presentation date： 1998.10

  • Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Economics Department Seminar  (Ohio State University)  Ohio State University

    Presentation date： 1998.10

  • 分社化と権限委譲―不完備契約アプローチ

    Hideshi Itoh

    理論計量経済学会年次大会  (学習院大学)  理論計量経済学会

    Presentation date： 1995.09

  • Job Design, Delegation, and Cooperation: A Principal-Agent Analysis

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    The Eighth Annual Congress of the European Economic Association  (University of Helsinki)  European Economic Association

    Presentation date： 1993.08

  • Japanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive Theory

    Hideshi Itoh  [Invited]

    Current Topics on the Japanese Economy  (University of Venice)  University of Venice

    Presentation date： 1991.12

  • Collusion, Incentives, and Risk Sharing

    Hideshi Itoh

    The 6th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association  (University of Cambridge)  European Economic Association

    Presentation date： 1991.09

  • Japanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive Theory

    Hideshi Itoh

    理論計量経済学会西部部会  (甲南大学)  理論計量経済学会

    Presentation date： 1991.06

  • Collusion, Incentives, and Risk Sharing

    Hideshi Itoh

    理論計量経済学会年次大会  (関西学院大学)  理論計量経済学会

    Presentation date： 1990.10

  • Collusion, Incentives, and Risk Sharing

    Hideshi Itoh

    The 6th World Congress of The Econometric Society  (Barcelona Congress Hall)  The Econometric Society

    Presentation date： 1990.08

  • Collusion, Incentives, and Risk Sharing

    Hideshi Itoh

    Research Seminar  Yale School of Management

    Presentation date： 1990.03

  • Collusion, Incentives, and Risk Sharing

    Hideshi Itoh

    Economics Department Seminar  (University of Pennsylvania)  University of Pennsylvania

    Presentation date： 1990.03

  • Collusion, Incentives, and Risk Sharing

    Hideshi Itoh

    Economics Department Seminar  (MIT)  MIT Department of Economics

    Presentation date： 1990.03

▼display all

Research Projects

  • The Frontier of Contract Theory and Organizational Economics

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)

    Project Year :

    2018.04
    -
    2023.03
     

  • 新たな視点からの産業組織論分析 : 「ヒト」に光をあてる

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業 国際共同研究加速基金(帰国発展研究)

    Project Year :

    2018
    -
    2020
     

    森田 穂高, 神林 龍, 都留 康, 石川 城太, 伊藤 秀史, TANG Cheng-Tao

    　View Summary

    産業組織論の主要テーマである企業間競争と企業の境界に関して、新たな視点から分析することが本研究の課題である。令和３年度は、長引く新型コロナの影響による遅れが避けられなかったものの、目的達成に向けての分析が進み，成果の取りまとめが進んだ。森田（研究代表者）が佐藤（研究分担者）および研究協力者であるGhosh（UNSW）と共同で進める製品市場と労働市場の相互連関分析に関しては、特定モデルを用いることのない一般的なモデル分析が可能であることがわかり、企業の部分的結合への応用を含めてその方向での分析が進んだ。森田が Tang(研究分担者)と共同で進める労働市場での企業間競争に資産の企業特殊性を取り入れる分析については、人的資本の企業特殊性との関連をより明示的に取り入れたモデルが有効であることがわかり、分析が進んだ。森田は研究協力者であるServatka（Macquarie Univ.）、Zhang（Macquarie Univ.）と共同で、仕事の割り当てと公平感の関係、およびアイデンティティが企業組織において果たす役割に関する実験結果を踏まえて論文を書き進めた。海外直接投資と品質を向上させるような技術伝播との関係に関する論文については森田を中心に仕上げが完了、また、国際寡占モデルに輸送セクターを明示的に導入し、輸入関税や輸入割当といった保護主義的な通商政策の効果に関する分析が石川（研究分担者）を中心に進み、それぞれ査読付き国際学術雑誌に公刊された。ワークライフバランスに関するデータセットの分析、および企業活動基本調査と賃金構造基本統計調査のマッチングデータを用いた企業間賃金格差とワークライフバランス施策との関連について、神林（研究分担者）を中心に考察が進んだ。

  • Relational Incentive Contract Theory and Its Applications

    Nomura Foundation  Grants for Social Science Research (first half of 2019)

    Project Year :

    2019.07
    　
    　
     

    Hideshi Itoh, Trond E. Olsen

  • Economics of Contracts and Organizations

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)

    Project Year :

    2013.04
    -
    2018.03
     

    Itoh Hideshi, KOJIMA Kenta, MORIYA Fumitoshi, MUROOKA Takeshi, KAWAMURA Kohei, SANO Ryuji, HORI Kazumi, DAIDO Kohei, NAKAMURA Tomoya, SHIMIZU Takashi, MIURA Shintaro, ISHIHARA Akifumi

    　View Summary

    We contributed to the development of basic and applied research in the field of contract theory and organizational economics (2016 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to two contributors in this field) and the formation of inter-university research network at the level of the international standard, through the following workshops, conferences, and academic presentations: (1) Regular forty workshops (CTW) during the five years, including sixteen talks by researchers from abroad; (2) Summer conferences held every August; (3) International conferences joint with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other Asian and Pacific nations held every December; (4) Workshops (CTWE) held in Tokyo, including twelve talks by researchers from abroad; and (5) Forty-seven academic presentations and interactions at domestic and international conferences and thirty-one academic articles.

  • Role of experiments in social sciences

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Priority Areas

    Project Year :

    2007
    -
    2012
     

    IWASA Yoh, AOYAGI Maki, ITOH Hideshi, INOUE Tatsuo

    　View Summary

    We explored the importance and the role of experimental approaches in social sciences from diverse and broad viewpoints. First, we succeeded in clarifying the relationship between many different concepts in different fields of sciences: e.g. law and social norm in ethics and legal philosophy, institutions to foster efficient society in economics theory, mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary biology, and the physchological mechanisms identified in brain sciences. Second, many game theory models have been developed to understand diverse aspects and mechanisms to foster the cooperation among people. Finally the demogracy can be viewed as "social experiments" in which tries and errors were performed.

  • Synthetic Studies on Business Cycle and Economic Growth-Construction of Business Cycle Models and Empirical Analysis of Japanese Economy

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S)

    Project Year :

    2006
    -
    2010
     

    ASAKO Kazumi, ITOH Hideshi, ITOH Takatoshi, KANOH Satoru, MIYAGAWA Tsutomu, WATANABE Toshiaki

    　View Summary

    We attempted to establish a system with which we monitor the real time Japanese economy both quickly and precisely and utilize it for an appropriate policy management. More concretely we conducted positive analyses of the Japanese economy from the view point of business cycle phase judgment and, based on the historical path of economic institutions, we also studied a possibility of medium-to long-term improvement of economic performances by activating technological innovations and altering the industry structure. We also pursued theoretical investigations of the business cycle mechanism and developed new statistical and econometrical models.

  • Economic Theories of Contracts and Organizations

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)

    Project Year :

    2007
    -
    2008
     

    HIDESHI Itoh, HIROSHI Osano, KEIZO Mizuno, SHINSUKE Kanbe, SHINGO Ishiguro, MAKOTO Hanazono, YOICHIRO Hizen, HIROSHI Osano, KEIZO Mizuno, SHINSUKE Kanbe, SHINGO Ishiguro, JUNICHIRO Ishida, MAKOTO Hanazono, YOICHIRO Hizen

  • The Dynamic Analysis of Corporate Governance in East Asia and Japan

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)

    Project Year :

    2006
    -
    2008
     

    WIWATTANAKANTANG Yupana, ASAKO Kazumi, KITAMURA Yukinobu, ODAGIRI Hiroyuki, OKAMURO Hiroyuki, TERANISHI Juro, ITOH Hideshi, FUKUDA Shinichi, OBATA Seki, KUBO Katsuyuki

  • Empirical Analysis of Contracts

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)

    Project Year :

    2005
    -
    2008
     

    OKAZAKI Tetsuji, MATSUSHIMA Hitoshi, SAWADA Yasuyuki, NAKAMURA Naofumi, NAKABAYASHI Masaki, KUROSAKI Takashi, ITOH Hideshi, HASHINO Tomoko, OTSUKA Keijiro, KAGAMI Akira

  • Economic Analysis of Decision Making and Organization Based on Other-Regarding Preferences

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

    Project Year :

    2001
    -
    2002
     

    ITOH Hideshi

    　View Summary

    In this research I attempt to obtain new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding (inequity averse or status-seeking) preferences, that are consistent with many experimental results. In the benchmark principal-agent model, the principal and the agent are both risk neutral, while the agent is wealth constrained, and hence the basic tradeoff between incentives and rent extraction arises. I show that other-regarding preferences interact with incentives in nontrivial ways. In particular, the principal is in general worse off as the agent cares more about the well-being of the principal. I then extend the analysis to a multi-agent setting. When each agent cares about the well-being of the other agent, either a team contract or a relative performance contract is optimal even though there is no technological externality nor correlation. The extreme team contract is "fair" and more likely to be optimal as actions become mutually observable. However, team contracts are never optimal when the agents are competitive or status-seeking. I also show that the information structure also affects the optimal contract. Another important result I obtain is that the optimal contract for self-interest agents changes drastically when a small degree of other-regarding preferences is introduced. Under the technological assumption of the model, if the agents are self-interested, there is an optimal independent contract in which the payment scheme for each agent depends only on the outcome of his project. However, when the agents become other-regarding, however small the changes are, no independent contract is optimal any longer and the optimal contract is generically unique.

  • Comparative Study of Hiving Off Strategy and the Delegation of Authority

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

    Project Year :

    1997
    -
    1999
     

    KIKUTANI Tatsuya, HAYASHIDA Osamu, ITOH Hideshi

    　View Summary

    1. Making a Commitment Model of Delegation : Separating of an operating division from the main corporate body, called "hiving off", is an important organizational strategy. Why do companies take such a strategy? Why can not the same benefits as the case of hiving off be achieved within the existing organization, such as by adding a new business division? We regard it as a device for a corporation to commit herself to the delegation of authority to its subsidiaries or affiliates. We therefore made a commitment model of delegation to which the theory of incomplete contract was applied.
    2. Empirical Analysis of the Theory of Incomplete Contract : We conducted empirical analysis of the commitment model using probit statistical model with questionnaire data. At that time we adopted the method of comparing it to an alternative agency model. As a result of it, the commitment model was mostly supported.
    3. Interview of Foreign Corporations in Japan : It gave us the standard model on which we compare characteristics of the delegation of authority to divisions in Japanese firms with ones in Americans.
    4. Interview of Japanese Corporations : We interviewed four Japanese corporations on the topic of delegation to in-house and out-house divisions of business unit. This illuminates the comparative characteristics and limits in Japanese firms with ones in Americans.
    5. Plan of Future Research : We will have (1) to revise estimations of commitment model to resolve the problems in explanatory variables, (2) to develop more the study of management strategy of business group, which includes hiving off, from a viewpoint of comparative study, and (3) to do a new questionnaire research on the whole subsidiaries and affiliates of a few American corporations.

  • システムとしての日本型雇用慣行と労働市場の研究

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業 奨励研究(A)

    Project Year :

    1995
    　
    　
     

    伊藤 秀史

    　View Summary

    本研究の目的は,日本において典型的に観察される雇用慣行の「システム効果」を明らかにしようとするものである.前半に理論モデルの構築と分析を行い,後半に日本にある外資系企業の人事システムを対象として実証研究を行うことを,本年度の研究実施計画としていた。
    まず理論研究については,当初の計画で想定していた「企業内部の昇進パターンと外部労働市場の競争性」とはやや焦点が異なるが、「人事部の集権化と分権化」をテーマとした研究論文を完成させた.(この対象の変化は、実証研究の対象である外資系企業の歴史分析から生じたものである.)日本企業は欧米企業と比べて人事部が集権化しているといわれるが,このような人事の集権・分権を理論的に厳密に分析した研究はない.本研究では,不完備契約アプローチに基づいて,人事が集権化している場合には「過剰」な介入が生じて,組織全体のパフォーマンスが低下すること,及び,人事を分権化することによって非効率な意思決定のコストが生じるという問題があるが,人事部の過剰介入の問題が緩和されるという利点が生まれることを証明した.そして最適な形態が集権か分権かを決定する要因を分析し,日本の他の雇用慣行とのシステム効果を考察した.
    実証研究については,すでに選定されていた外資系企業の人事担当者とのインタビューを行い,データの収集を継続中である.歴史的にこの企業が人事の集権化,分権化を何度か行なっていることが明らかになり,理論分析のための視点を提供してくれている.この集権化、分権化と雇用慣行との関係を詳しく探るために人事データの収集を開始したが、企業が新しい情報システムを構築中で、そのシステムがスタートしなければ必要なデータを得ることができず,研究は大幅な遅れを生じることになった。本年3月にようやくシステムがスタートしたため,実証研究はこれからの展開に期待することになった,

  • Promotion and Wage Determination in the Japanese Firms

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Co-operative Research (A)

    Project Year :

    1993
    -
    1995
     

    TACHIBANAKI Toshiaki, TERUYAMA Hiroshi, ITOH Hideshi

    　View Summary

    We found the following points.
    (1) The most important element which determines the promotion in the Japanese firms is individual performance. The followings are luck, full, and schoolong.
    (2) Seniority system in Japan worked fairly well.
    (3) Corporate governance in Japan suggests that firms in Japan can be judged as labor managed firms because employers attempt to keep employees' employment.
    (4) "What university he graduated" is important to determine promotion.
    (5) It is desirable to determine promotion based on individual performance, and to treat engineers more favorably.
    (6) Professional workers should be treated equally as managerial workers.

  • 会社法のパラダイム転換と国際的理論交流の企画

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業 総合研究(B)

    Project Year :

    1994
    　
    　
     

    森 淳二朗, 尾崎 安央, 川浜 昇, 胥 鵬, 伊藤 秀史, 吉本 健一

    　View Summary

    1 新会社支配理論を用いて、会社法の新たな一般理論を構成しようとする本研究の目的はほぼ達成された。すなわち、伝統的理論は、株主の所有を中心とした理論であるが、新理論は、株式会社において支配の制度(資本多数決制度)が内在的に貫徹していると把握し、株式会社制度を所有の制度と支配の制度とに峻別し、両者の相互関係を論理化することで、株式会社の機構、株主権などを再構成するものとなった。
    2 伝統的理論の側の新たな試み、すなわち、(1)イギリスにおける自主ルール、(2)市場メカニズムによる企業統制、(3)機関投資家と信託法理、(4)企業ファイナンスとコ-ポレート・ガバナンス、などに関して、新しい知見が示された。とくに、(3)の議論は、新会社支配理論をさらに展開させた。
    3 法と経済学派の会社法理論、および、経済学における企業理論について、理解を深めた。とくに、これまでの会社法学にはインセンティブ概念が欠落しており、また従来エイジェンシー・コストばかりが重視されてきたが、今後はコミットメント概念が重要なキーワードになるというきわめて重要な知見をえた。
    4 新会社支配理論は、このインセンティブおよびコミットメント概念と親和性を有しており、会社法学と経済学の連係を可能にすることが指摘された。
    5 今後、新一般理論を肉付けし具体的な会社法モデルを作成すれば、会社法学と企業経済学の両面から、国際的な理論交流は十分実現できる見通しがたった。その実現のために、全員研究の継続を切望している。
    6 会社法に焦点を当て、徹底的な学際研究を行った点に本研究の特色があるが、きわめて刺激的で啓発に富んだ研究企画となった。現段階での成果公表も、学術振興上少なからざる意義を有すると考える。

  • The Japanese Firm as a System

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Co-operative Research (A)

    Project Year :

    1993
    -
    1994
     

    ASANUMA Banri, SUEHIRO Hideo, SAIJO Tatsuyoshi, ITOH Hideshi, IKEO Kazuhito, TACHIBANAKI Toshiaki

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    The purpose of this research was to study various aspects of the Japanese firm, such as corporate governance, internal organization, inter-firm relationship, and firm-government relationship, as well as the systematic effects of those aspects, by organizing the 32nd and 33rd TCER Hakone conferences. Based on the research results from the 1993 conference(held at Odakyu Yama No Hotel in Hakone, March 28-30,1994), the program committee planed publishing the conference volume in Japanese. In order to make the relationships among the papers more explicit and secure, the authors held frequent meetings. The 33rd conference was held, as originally planned, in Hakone on March 27-29,1995. Eleven papers were presented, followed by extensive discussions by two discussants and the audience. The grant was utilized as meeting and travel expenses for the program committee and the conference.
    The conference volume entitled The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm as a System will be published from the University of Tokyo Press in September 1995. It is quite likely that the volume will become the standard reference of the analysis of Japanese firms via modern economic techniques.

  • インセンティブとラーニングのシステムとしての給与・昇進体系の理論的・実証的研究

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業 奨励研究(A)

    Project Year :

    1992
    　
    　
     

    伊藤 秀史

  • Game Theoretic Analyses of Social Institutions and Environments for an Economic System

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Co-operative Research (A)

    Project Year :

    1991
    -
    1992
     

    FUJIWARA Masahiro, OKADA Akira, ITOH Hideshi, KAWAMATA Kunjo, SUZUMURA Kotaro, UZAWA Hirofumi

    　View Summary

    In this research, we attempted to construct new analytical frameworks to examine desirable social institutions as well as environments, such as organizational forms, social customs and global environments, in an economic system using game theory and dynamic economic system theory.
    1. We undertook a game theoretic research to examine decentralized resource allocation under different social institutions and environment so that we can design a desirable institutions and environments. In particular, we analyzed significance and effects of introducing lotteries in implementing social decision function in decentralized manner, tradeoffs between liberty and efficiency in restricting strategy sets of each individual within a society. We also showed, using evolutionary game theory approach with bounded rational players, the importance of the role of custom in inducting coordination among players, and, using experimental game theory, the role of social norms in human decision making.
    2. We analyzed how the extent of authority delegations, wage structure and promotion system within an organization affect the degree of cooperation and information exchange among employees, and characterized the Japanese organizational structure compared with those in other countries.
    3. We characterized the desirable properties of carbon tax, in view of dynamic efficiency as well as international equity, as a measure against global warming. We also analyzed the mechanism of how the business cycle diffuses dynamically and internationally using non-linear dynamics, and examined how asymmetric information affects macro-economic behavior through investment using monopolistic competition models.

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Research Institute

  • 2019
    -
    　

    Research Institute of Business Administration   Concurrent Researcher

Internal Special Research Projects

  • 自己イメージ選好を持つメンバーからなるチームのインセンティブ：理論と応用

    2017  

    　View Summary

    各メンバーが他の複数のメンバーの「目」を気にするという自己イメージ選好を持つメンバーから成るチームにおけるインセンティブ問題を定式化し，理論的分析を行った．第1に，チームの規模 (人数) とインセンティブとの関係を考察し，チームの平均努力水準がチーム規模の増加関数となるための条件を明らかにした．第2に，自己イメージ選好についてメンバー間の異質性を導入し，誰の「目」を気にするかという問題を考察した．この分析結果を応用して，取締役会に過半数に満たない独立取締役を導入することや，外部から新しい社長を迎える (新しい「血」を組織に導入する) ことがプラスの効果を生み出す条件を明らかにした．