ITOH, Hideshi



Faculty of Commerce, Graduate School of Business and Finance

Job title


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Education 【 display / non-display

  • 1984.09

    Stanford University   Graduate School of Business   (Decision Sciences)  

  • 1982.04

    Hitotsubashi University   Graduate School of Commerce  

  • 1978.04

    Hitotsubashi University   Faculty of Commerce   Department of Management  

Degree 【 display / non-display

  • Stanford University   Ph.D.

Research Experience 【 display / non-display

  • 2017.04

    Waseda University   Graduate School of Business & Finance   Professor

  • 2000.04

    Hitotsubashi University   Graduate School of Commerce & Management   Professor

  • 2004.03

    University of Munich   Center for Economic Studies (CES)   Visiting Researcher

  • 1996.04

    Osaka University   Institute of Social & Economic Research   Assistant Professor

  • 1998.01

    Columbia University   Department of Economics   Visiting Associate Professor

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Professional Memberships 【 display / non-display


    Econometric Society


    Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics (SIOE)


    Law and Economics Association


    European Economic Association


    Japanese Economic Association

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Research Areas 【 display / non-display

  • Economic theory

  • Public economics and labor economics

  • Economic policy

  • Business administration

Research Interests 【 display / non-display

  • 組織の経済学

  • 契約理論

  • 行動経済学

  • インセンティブ

  • organization

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Papers 【 display / non-display

  • Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect

    Hideshi Itoh, Hodaka Morita

    AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS   7 ( 3 ) 318 - 346  2015.08  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We investigate whether formal contracts can help in resolving the holdup problem by studying repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer. Contrary to previous findings, we demonstrate that a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. Furthermore, we show that focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force is a possibility that the relation-specific investment decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very plausible, has been largely ignored in previous analyses of the holdup problem.


  • Moral hazard and other-regarding preferences

    H Itoh

    JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW   55 ( 1 ) 18 - 45  2004.03  [Refereed]  [Invited]

     View Summary

    The paper aims at obtaining new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding preferences, in particular inequity aversion theory. The principal is in general worse off, as the agent cares more about the wellbeing of the principal. When there are multiple symmetric agents who care about each other's wellbeing, the principal can optimally exploit their other-regarding nature by designing an appropriate interdependent contract such as a "fair" team contract or a relative performance contract. The approach taken in this paper can shed light on issues on endogenous preferences within organizations.


  • Moral hazard and renegotiation with multiple agents

    S Ishiguro, H Itoh

    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES   68 ( 1 ) 1 - 20  2001.01  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We investigate the effects of contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk-averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after the agents observe a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. We show that renegotiation with multiple agents reduces the cost of implementing any implementable action profile down to the first best level, even though the principal cannot observe the agents' actions. Moreover, it is sufficient for the principal to use a "simple" initial contract, in the sense that it consists of no more than a single sharing scheme for each agent and the total payments to the agents are the same regardless of the realised state. An important implication is that decentralization, in the sense of delegated negotiation and proposals from the agents, can be as effective as centralized schemes that utilize revelation mechanisms in unrestricted ways.

    DOI CiNii


    H ITOH

    EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW   38 ( 3-4 ) 691 - 700  1994.04  [Refereed]  [Invited]

     View Summary

    This paper analyzes how tasks are assigned in organizations. Tasks can be allocated vertically between a principal and an agent, or laterally among agents. The resulting organizational job design determines how many tasks are delegated to agents, and how the agents' tasks are divided among them. In the framework of the standard principal-agent relationship with moral hazard, it is shown that (i) an incentive consideration causes the principal to group a broad range of tasks into an agent's job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of them specialize in just one task; and (ii) the principal may choose to delegate all the tasks in order to mitigate a conflicting incentive problem with agents.


  • Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing

    H ITOH

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY   60 ( 2 ) 410 - 427  1993.08  [Refereed]  [International journal]

     View Summary

    This paper analyzes the effects of coalitional behavior in principal–multiagent relationships with moral hazard and identifies cases where the principal prefers agents to form a coalition via side contracting. It is shown that the principal can implement given efforts, via non-individualistic incentive contracts, at a lower cost when the agents can monitor each other′s efforts perfectly and hence coordinate their effort choice than when the agents behave independently. Permitting the principal to utilize more complex communication mechanisms does not alter the result, for there is no coalition-proof revelation mechanism improving the principal′s welfare.


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Books and Other Publications 【 display / non-display

  • Organizational Economics

    ITOH Hideshi, KOBAYASHI Hajime, MIYAHARA Yasuyuki( Part: Joint author)

    2019.12 ISBN: 9784641165502

  • コーポレート・ガバナンス改革の提言――企業価値向上・経済活性化への道筋

    宍戸善一, 後藤元( Part: Contributor)

    商事法務  2016.12 ISBN: 9784785724832

  • フロンティア実験社会科学4 社会関係資本の機能と創出:効率的な組織と社会

    西條辰義, 清水和巳, 磯辺剛彦( Part: Contributor)

    勁草書房  2015.10 ISBN: 9784326349142

  • Enterprise Law: Contracts, Markets, and Laws in the US and Japan

    Zenichi Shishido, ed( Part: Contributor)

    Edward Elgar  2014 ISBN: 9781781004449

  • 日本企業研究のフロンティア 9号

    一橋大学日本企業研究センター( Part: Contributor)

    有斐閣  2013.04 ISBN: 9784641299559

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Misc 【 display / non-display

  • 連載 関係的契約の経済学――長期継続的関係が支える自己規律のメカニズム 第6回 レントと後払い報酬

    石原章史, 伊藤秀史

    経済セミナー   ( 721 ) 61 - 72  2021.08  [Invited]

    Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media)  

  • 連載 関係的契約の経済学――長期継続的関係が支える自己規律のメカニズム 第5回 主観的業績評価

    石原章史, 伊藤秀史

    経済セミナー   ( 719 ) 85 - 94  2021.04  [Invited]

    Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media)  

  • 連載 関係的契約の経済学――長期継続的関係が支える自己規律のメカニズム 第4回 公式契約と関係的契約の相互作用

    石原章史, 伊藤秀史

    経済セミナー   ( 718 ) 90 - 99  2021.02  [Invited]

    Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media)  

  • 連載 関係的契約の経済学――長期継続的関係が支える自己規律のメカニズム 第3回 関係的契約下での競争と協調

    石原章史, 伊藤秀史

    経済セミナー   ( 717 ) 115 - 125  2020.12  [Invited]

    Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media)  

  • 連載 関係的契約の経済学――長期継続的関係が支える自己規律のメカニズム 第2回 関係的契約でのインセンティブの与え方

    石原章史, 伊藤秀史

    経済セミナー   ( 716 ) 99 - 108  2020.10  [Invited]

    Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media)  

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Awards 【 display / non-display

  • Nakahara Prize

    2003   Japanese Economic Association  

Research Projects 【 display / non-display

  • The Frontier of Contract Theory and Organizational Economics

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)

    Project Year :


  • 新たな視点からの産業組織論分析 : 「ヒト」に光をあてる


    Project Year :


    森田 穂高, 神林 龍, 都留 康, 石川 城太, 伊藤 秀史, TANG Cheng-Tao

  • Relational Incentive Contract Theory and Its Applications

    Project Year :


    Hideshi Itoh, Trond E. Olsen

    Authorship: Principal investigator

  • Economics of Contracts and Organizations

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)

    Project Year :


    Itoh Hideshi, KOJIMA Kenta, MORIYA Fumitoshi, MUROOKA Takeshi, KAWAMURA Kohei, SANO Ryuji, HORI Kazumi, DAIDO Kohei, NAKAMURA Tomoya, SHIMIZU Takashi, MIURA Shintaro, ISHIHARA Akifumi

     View Summary

    We contributed to the development of basic and applied research in the field of contract theory and organizational economics (2016 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to two contributors in this field) and the formation of inter-university research network at the level of the international standard, through the following workshops, conferences, and academic presentations: (1) Regular forty workshops (CTW) during the five years, including sixteen talks by researchers from abroad; (2) Summer conferences held every August; (3) International conferences joint with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other Asian and Pacific nations held every December; (4) Workshops (CTWE) held in Tokyo, including twelve talks by researchers from abroad; and (5) Forty-seven academic presentations and interactions at domestic and international conferences and thirty-one academic articles.

  • Role of experiments in social sciences

    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Priority Areas

    Project Year :


    IWASA Yoh, AOYAGI Maki, ITOH Hideshi, INOUE Tatsuo

     View Summary

    We explored the importance and the role of experimental approaches in social sciences from diverse and broad viewpoints. First, we succeeded in clarifying the relationship between many different concepts in different fields of sciences: e.g. law and social norm in ethics and legal philosophy, institutions to foster efficient society in economics theory, mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary biology, and the physchological mechanisms identified in brain sciences. Second, many game theory models have been developed to understand diverse aspects and mechanisms to foster the cooperation among people. Finally the demogracy can be viewed as "social experiments" in which tries and errors were performed.

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Presentations 【 display / non-display

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Specific Research 【 display / non-display

  • 自己イメージ選好を持つメンバーからなるチームのインセンティブ:理論と応用


     View Summary

    各メンバーが他の複数のメンバーの「目」を気にするという自己イメージ選好を持つメンバーから成るチームにおけるインセンティブ問題を定式化し,理論的分析を行った.第1に,チームの規模 (人数) とインセンティブとの関係を考察し,チームの平均努力水準がチーム規模の増加関数となるための条件を明らかにした.第2に,自己イメージ選好についてメンバー間の異質性を導入し,誰の「目」を気にするかという問題を考察した.この分析結果を応用して,取締役会に過半数に満たない独立取締役を導入することや,外部から新しい社長を迎える (新しい「血」を組織に導入する) ことがプラスの効果を生み出す条件を明らかにした.


Syllabus 【 display / non-display

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