2023/12/01 更新

写真a

カワムラ コウヘイ
河村 耕平
所属
政治経済学術院 政治経済学部
職名
教授
学位
DPhil ( 2007年 University of Oxford )

経歴

  • 2016年
    -
    継続中

    早稲田大学   政治経済学術院   教授

  • 2014年
    -
    2016年

    University of Edinburgh   School of Economics   Senior Lecturer in Economics

  • 2007年
    -
    2014年

    University of Edinburgh   School of Economics   Lecturer in Economics (テニュア付)

研究分野

  • 理論経済学
 

論文

  • News credibility and the quest for clicks

    Kohei Kawamura, Mark T. Le Quement

    JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS   227   105005 - 105005  2023年11月  [査読有り]

    DOI

    Scopus

  • Strategic central bank communication: Discourse analysis of the Bank of Japan's Monthly Report

    Kawamura Kohei, Kobashi Yohei, Shizume Masato, Ueda Kozo

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL   100   230 - 250  2019年03月  [査読有り]

    DOI

    Scopus

    4
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • Expert information and majority decisions

    Kohei Kawamura, Vasileios Vlaseros

    JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS   147   77 - 88  2017年03月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    This paper shows experimentally that hearing expert opinions can be a double-edged sword for collective decision making. We present a majoritarian voting game of common interest where committee members receive not only private information, but also expert information that is more accurate than private information and observed by all members. In theory, there are Bayesian Nash equilibria where the committee members' voting strategy incorporates both types of information and access to expert information enhances the efficiency of the majority decision. However, in the laboratory, expert information had excessive influence on the voting behaviour and prevented efficient aggregation of individual information. We find a large efficiency loss due to the presence of expert information especially when the committee size is large. Using an incentivized questionnaire, we find that many subjects seVerely underestimate the efficiency gain from information aggregation and they follow expert information Much more frequently than efficiency requires. This suggests that those who understand the efficiency gain from information aggregation and perceive the game correctly might nonetheless be "stuck" in an inefficient outcome. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

    Scopus

    12
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • Confidence and competence in communication

    Kohei Kawamura

    THEORY AND DECISION   78 ( 2 ) 233 - 259  2015年02月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    This paper studies information transmission between an uninformed decision maker (receiver) and an informed agent (sender) who have asymmetric beliefs ("confidence") on the sender's ability ("competence") to observe the state of nature. We find that even when the material payoffs of the players are perfectly aligned, the sender's over- and underconfidence on his information give rise to information loss in communication, although they do not by themselves completely eliminate information transmission in equilibrium. However, an underconfident sender may prefer no communication to informative communication. We also show that when the sender is biased, overconfidence can lead to more information transmission and welfare improvement.

    DOI

    Scopus

    4
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • SPILLOVERS OF EQUAL TREATMENT IN WAGE OFFERS

    Kohei Kawamura, Jozsef Sakovics

    SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY   61 ( 5 ) 487 - 501  2014年11月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    We analyse a labour-matching model with wage posting, where - reflecting institutional constraints - firms cannot differentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage offers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers who receive personalized offers.

    DOI

    Scopus

  • Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents

    Kohei Kawamura, Ines Moreno de Barreda

    ECONOMICS LETTERS   123 ( 2 ) 240 - 243  2014年05月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    This note shows that when the designer of a contest wishes the winner have high ability, she is better off giving a head start to one of the contestants even if they are ex-ante identical. If the contestants are ex-ante asymmetric, the designer should give a head start to the one who is more likely to have high ability. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

    Scopus

    12
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • Eliciting information from a large population

    Kohei Kawamura

    JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS   103   44 - 54  2013年07月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    This paper studies information transmission in social surveys where a welfare maximizing decision maker communicates with a random sample of individuals from a large population who have heterogeneous preferences. The population distribution of preferences is unknown and has to be estimated, based on answers from the respondents. The decision maker cannot identify the true distribution of preferences even if the sample size becomes arbitrarily large, since the respondents have incentive to "exaggerate" their preferences especially as the sample size becomes larger and each respondent has weaker influence on the decision. The quality of communication with each respondent may improve as the sample size becomes smaller, and thus we identify the trade-off between the quality and quantity of communication. We show that the decision maker may prefer to sample a smaller number of individuals when the prior is weaker. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

    Scopus

    5
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • A Model of Public Consultation: Why is Binary Communication so Common?

    Kohei Kawamura

    ECONOMIC JOURNAL   121 ( 553 ) 819 - 842  2011年06月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    This article studies information transmission between multiple agents with heterogeneous preferences and a welfare maximising decision maker who chooses the quality or quantity of a public good (e.g. size of a public project; pace of lectures in a classroom; government regulation) that is consumed by all of them. As the number of agents becomes larger, the quality of information transmission diminishes. The use of binary messages (e.g. 'yes or no' ) is shown to be a robust mode of communication even when the preferences and policy space are non-binary.

    DOI

    Scopus

    14
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • Noisy Talk

    Kohei Kawamura

    THEORETICAL ECONOMICS   2 ( 4 ) 395 - 440  2007年12月  [査読有り]

  • Managerial control inside the firm

    Shinichi Hirota, Kohei Kawamura

    JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES   21 ( 3 ) 324 - 335  2007年09月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    This paper proposes an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the firm. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it beneficial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue the long-term viability of a firm. When the firm is in a stable environment, this implicit control mechanism may not contradict shareholder value maximization. However, when the firm needs restructuring, this mechanism diminishes firm value. We discuss when external governance is desirable, and when it is not. Our model also offers economic explanations for some related issues in managerial behavior, such as restructuring aversion, survival motive, and excessive risk aversion.

    DOI

    Scopus

    8
    被引用数
    (Scopus)

▼全件表示

 

現在担当している科目

 

他学部・他研究科等兼任情報

  • 商学学術院   大学院商学研究科

  • 社会科学総合学術院   大学院社会科学研究科

  • 商学学術院   商学部

学内研究所・附属機関兼任歴

  • 2019年
    -
     

    産業経営研究所   兼任研究所員

特定課題制度(学内資金)

  • チープトークによる内生的な複数回コンサルテーションの分析

    2016年  

     概要を見る

    引き続き共同研究者との頻繁なやり取りを通して、基礎モデルの特に3つのセットアップについて分析を進め、1つについて均衡および比較静学の導出を行った。残りの2つにセットアップについては、計算・証明作業を続行中である。