Updated on 2021/12/08

写真a

 
OWAN, Hideo
 
Affiliation
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, School of Political Science and Economics
Job title
Professor

Concurrent Post

  • Faculty of Social Sciences   School of Social Sciences

Research Institute

  • 2019
    -
    2023

    組織経済実証研究所   プロジェクト研究所所長

Education

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    The University of Tokyo   Faculty of Science   Department of Mathematics  

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    スタンフォード大学ビジネススクール   博士プログラム   (経済学専攻)修了  

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    Columbia University  

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    The University of Tokyo   Faculty of Science  

Degree

  • スタンフォード大学   Ph.D.(経済学)

Research Experience

  • 2018.04
    -
     

    Waseda University   Faculty of Political Science and Economics

  • 2010.04
    -
    2018.03

    The University of Tokyo   Institute of Social Science

  • 2013.05
    -
     

    (独)経済産業研究所   ファティカル・フェロー

  • 2011.03
    -
    2012.03

    スタンフォード大学   経営大学院   客員研究員

  • 2008.05
    -
    2011.03

    Hitotsubashi University   Institute of Innovation Research

  • 2009.09
    -
    2010.03

    The University of Tokyo   Institute of Social Science

  • 2006.04
    -
    2009.08

    Aoyama Gakuin University

  • 2007.04
    -
    2008.03

    Hitotsubashi University   Institute of Economic Research

  • 2007
    -
    2008

    Hitotsubashi University   Institute of Economic Research

  • 1997.07
    -
    2006.03

    ワシントン大学   John M. Olin 経営大学院   助教授

  • 1986.04
    -
    1993.06

    野村総合研究所   研究員、エコノミスト

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Professional Memberships

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    組織学会

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    Informs(Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences)

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    Econometric Society

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    Society of Labor Economists

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    American Economic Association

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    日本経済学会

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    Informs(Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences)

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    Econometric Society

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    Society of Labor Economists

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    American Economic Association

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Research Areas

  • Business administration   Human Resource Management

  • Economic policy   Labor Economics

  • Economic policy   Labor Economics

Papers

  • 「ソフトウェア開発における早期すり合わせの効果と働き方改革への示唆」

    水上祐治, 大湾秀雄

    経済研究    2018.01  [Refereed]

  • Incentives and gaming in a nonlinear compensation scheme: Evidence from North American auto dealership transaction data

    Hideo Owan, Tsuyoshi Tsuru, Katsuhito Uehara

    Evidence-based HRM   3 ( 3 ) 222 - 243  2015.12  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Purpose – Under a discontinuous and nonlinear compensation scheme, which is prevalent among car dealerships, the amount of a salesperson’s expected daily commission depends primarily on his position in the pay schedule on the day he makes a sale. Salespeople thus vary their efforts and adopt a different pricing strategy week by week, or even day by day. The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive effect of such a nonlinear scheme and provide the evidence that salespeople’s behavior is consistent with the theory. Design/methodology/approach – The authors conduct regression analyses using the transaction data provided by two North American auto dealerships. The authors construct a daily measure of varying incentive intensity and evaluate its impact on the distribution of individual daily sales and the dealership’s gross profit rate. Findings – The authors find that the daily measure of varying incentive intensity has a positive effect on the distribution of individual daily sales and a negative impact on the dealership’s gross profit rate. The results suggest that: salespeople adjust their effort levels in response to the intensity of incentives
    and they game the system by lowering the prices when the marginal return to doing so is high. Research limitations/implications – The study shows that there is a high cost associated with the discontinuous nonlinear pay scheme, raising the question of why many auto dealerships use it. Originality/value – This paper sheds light on the undesirable aspects of discontinuous and nonlinear incentive schemes, varied performance and gaming, by quantifying the effects of the worker’s behavior.

    DOI

  • The Impact of Group Contract and Governance Structure on Performance-Evidence from College Classrooms

    Zeynep K. Hansen, Hideo Owan, Jie Pan, Shinya Sugawara

    JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION   30 ( 3 ) 463 - 492  2014.08  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    In this article, we empirically analyze the effect of team characteristics on a team's choice of group contract type (its governance structure) and examine the combined impact of team characteristics and the group contract choice on group and individual performance in a classroom setting. We utilize endogenous dummy variable models in both group-level and individual-level analyses due to the expected endogeneity of the contract choice. The estimation results confirm a statistically significant positive effect of a governance structure, democratic contract that includes a mechanism to punish free-riders on both group and individual performance. We also estimate switching regression models to account for the possible heterogeneous treatment effects but do not find any significant difference between the treated and the nontreated in the effect of the democratic contract option implying that the contract choice is not necessarily motivated by its performance-enhancing effect.

    DOI

  • "Front-Loading Development and Market Defect Density Decrease by Concurrent Software Development Methodology into In-vehicle Embedded Software Development Project"

    Yuji Mizukami, Masayuki Ida, Hideo Owan

       2014.03  [Refereed]

  • 「店長は重要か? —大手自動車販売会社の人事・製品取引データによる計量的事例研究—」

    上原克仁, 大湾秀雄, 高橋新, 都留康

    経済研究    2013.06  [Refereed]

  • “Authority, Conformity, and Organizational Learning”

    Nobuyuki Hanaki, Hideo Owan

    Administrative Sciences    2013.05  [Refereed]

  • "Diversity and Productivity in Production Teams"

    Barton H. Hamilton, Jack A. Nickerson, Hideo Owan

    Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms    2012.12  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • “Seller-Buyer Ethnic Matches : The Case of Car Transactions at Two North American Auto Dealerships”

    Hideo Owan, Tsuyoshi Tsuru, Katsuhito Uehara

    Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics    2012.06  [Refereed]

  • Market characteristics, intra-firm coordination, and the choice of human resource management systems: Theory and evidence

    Takao Kato, Hideo Owan

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION   80 ( 3 ) 375 - 396  2011.12  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This paper begins by constructing a team-theoretical model of organizational adaptation and coordination with three distinct task coordination modes: vertical control, horizontal coordination, and hybrid coordination. The model is then used to provide fresh insights on complementarities involving team work organization, communication channels, training and hiring, and other human resource management practices, and illustrate how such choice of practices is affected by the firm's output market conditions. Our econometric analysis of new data from japan which provide up-to-date information on the adoption of new team-based instruments for a horizontal coordination system (cross-functional problem solving project teams and Self-Managed Teams) yields results that are broadly consistent with the theory. First, new team-based instruments are more likely to be adopted by firms with well-established formal shop-floor-based communication channels (such as shopfloor committees), while they are much less likely to be adopted by firms with well-established information sharing institutions such as joint labor-management committees, which presumably enhance the efficiency of the vertical control system by minimizing labor-management communication errors. Finally, firms in more competitive markets and those with a higher concentration of sales among a small number of customers are more likely to adopt both types of team, whereas firms facing more erratic price movement tend not to adopt Self-Managed Teams. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • “Specialization, Multiskilling and Allocation of Decision Rights”

    OWAN, Hideo

    Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor- Managed Firms    2011.12  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • 「非線形報酬制度のインセンティブ効果とエスニシティの影響―北米自動車販売会社の取引データに基づく実証分析」

    都留康, 大湾秀雄, 上原克仁

    経済研究    2007.04  [Refereed]

  • Strategic management of R&D pipelines with cospecialized investments and technology markets

    Tat Chan, Jack A. Nickerson, Hideo Owan

    MANAGEMENT SCIENCE   53 ( 4 ) 667 - 682  2007.04  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    The theoretical literature on managing R&D pipelines is largely based on real option theory making decisions about undertaking, continuing, or terminating projects. The theory typically assumes that each project or causally related set of projects is independent. However, casual observation suggests that firms expend much effort on managing and balancing their R&D pipelines, where managing appears to be related to the choice of R&D selection thresholds, project risk, and whether to buy or sell projects to fill the pipeline. Not only do these policies appear to differ across firms, they also appear to vary over time for the same firm. Changes in management policies suggest that the choice of R&D selection thresholds is a time-varying strategic decision and there may be some type of vertical interdependency among R&D projects in different stages. In this paper we develop a model using dynamic-programming techniques that explain why firms vary in their R&D project-management policies. The novelty and value of our model derives from the central insight that some firms invest in downstream cospecialized activities that would incur substantial adjustment costs if R&D efforts are unsuccessful whereas other firms have no such investment. If transaction costs in technology markets are positive, which implies that accessing the market for projects is costly, these investments lead to state-contingent project-selection rules that create a dynamic and vertical interdependency among R&D activities and product mix. We describe how choices of R&D selection thresholds, preferences over project risk, and use of technology markets for the buying and selling of projects differ by the state of the firm's pipeline, the magnitude of transaction costs in the adjustment market, and the magnitude of technology costs. These results yield interesting managerial and public policy implications.

    DOI CiNii

  • “Promotion, Turnover, Earnings and Firm-Sponsored Training”

    OWAN, Hideo

    Journal of Labor Economics    2004.10  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • Internal Organization, Bargaining and Human Capital.

    OWAN, Hideo

    Stanford University    1999.05

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Books and Other Publications

  • 日本の労働市場

    大湾秀雄, 佐藤香織( Part: Contributor, 第1章「日本的人事の変容と内部労働市場」)

    有斐閣  2017.11

  • 日本の人事を科学する―因果推論に基づくデータ活用

    大湾 秀雄( Part: Sole author)

    日本経済新聞出版社  2017.06

  • 企業統治の法と経済

    大湾 秀雄( Part: Contributor, 第2章「中間管理職の役割と人事評価システム」)

    有斐閣  2015.03

  • 企業の経済学

    大湾 秀雄( Part: Contributor, 第12章「製品市場と職場組織ー理論と実証」)

    有斐閣  2014.09

  • 企業統治と成長戦略

    大湾秀雄, 加藤隆夫, 宮島英昭( Part: Contributor, 第3章「従業員持株会は機能するか」)

Works

  • 組織と人事諸制度の間の補完性と組織変革(単独)

    2006
    -
    2007

  • 組織と人事諸制度の間の補完性と組織変革(単独)

    2006
    -
    2007

Research Projects

  • 日本企業の研究開発の構造的特徴について―発明者サーベイを使った研究

    Project Year :

    2007
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  • イノベーションを支える組織―組織内コーディネーションの役割

    Project Year :

    2007
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  • インセンティブスキームと従業員の行動―米国自動車ディーラーのパーフォーマンスデータを使った分析

    Project Year :

    2007
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  • 組織と人事制度の構成要素間の補完性に関する研究

    Project Year :

    2006
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Presentations

  • 拡大する人事データを用いた実証分析―企業内男女格差の多面的評価

    大湾 秀雄  [Invited]

    日本経済学会秋季大会 

    Presentation date: 2017.09

  • Does Employee Stock Ownership Work? Evidence from publicly-traded firms in Japan

    OWAN, Hideo  [Invited]

    IEA World Congress 

    Presentation date: 2017.06

  • Does Employee Stock Ownership Work? Evidence from publicly-traded firms in Japan

    OWAN, Hideo  [Invited]

    INCAS Annual Conference 

    Presentation date: 2017.05

  • 働き方改革と女性のエンパワメント

    大湾 秀雄  [Invited]

    日本経済学会秋季大会 

    Presentation date: 2016.09

Specific Research

  • 健康経営が生産性に与える効果

    2019   黒田祥子, 奥平寛子

     View Summary

    健康経営施策の効果検証を行うプロジェクトである。化学メーカー1社の協力を得て、慶應義塾大学の中室牧子先生と共同で実施した禁煙支援プログラムのフィールド実験は、2019年度12~3月に第1回目の介入実験を行ったが、参加者が50名弱と予定よりも大幅に少なかったため、第2回目を2020年度に行うこととした。第一期のみのデータでは、禁煙は、たばこ休憩時間削減とプレゼンティズム改善により労働時間を減少させ、健康問題を理由とする欠勤日数も有意に減少させた。研究支援体制作りのため、公益財団法人 日本生産性本部、(株)イーウェル社、同志社大学奥平寛子准教授と共に、「健康と生産性」研究会を立ち上げ、参加企業の募集を開始した。

  • 企業内データを活用した組織や人事制度の国際比較研究ネットワークの構築

    2018  

     View Summary

    フランクフルト大学のGuido Friebel教授を1月に招聘し、人事経済学に関するセミナーを早稲田大学と東大で行った他、ドイツのアウグスブルグで開かれた人事経済学のコンファレンスに参加し、欧州の研究者との連携を図った。昨年度の主な研究成果としては以下のものがある。4月までの(経済産業研究所)ディスカッションペーパー発行予定・Muroga, Kiho and Hideo Owan, “How Informative Is Three Hundred Sixty Degree Evaluation?”・Nakamuro, Owan and Sato, ”The Effect of Firm-Sponsored Interpersonal Skills Training on Worker’s Performance”・Shangguan, Ruo and Hideo Owan, "How Good Managers Steer Their Projects: Using Value-Added Measures of Manager Quality" 投稿中・Sato, Kaori, Yuki Hashimoto and Hideo Owan “Gender Differences in Career,” accepted conditional on minor revision by Journal of the Japanese and International Economies  ・Sato, Kaori, Sachiko Kuroda, and Hideo Owan, “Mental Health Effects of Long Work Hours, Night and Weekend Work, and Quick Return”, submitted to Social Science and Medicine 国際会議での発表  ・Hideo Owan, "How Good Managers Steer Their Projects: Using Value-Added Measures of Manager Quality", The 12th Annual Organizational Economics Workshop, Australian National University (Australia), November 29, 2018.    ・Hideo Owan, "How Good Managers Steer Their Projects: Using Value-Added Measures of Manager Quality", The 22nd Colloquium on Personnel Economics, University of Augsburg (Germany), March 14, 2019.  

 

Syllabus

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Teaching Experience

  • Economics of the Organization

    Washington University  

  • Incentives and Compensation

    Washington University  

  • Managerial Statistics

    Washington University  

  • The Economics of \human Resource Management

    Washington University  

  • Individual in a Managerial Environment

    Washington University  

  • 人事システムの設計

    青山学院大学  

  • 産業組織と市場戦略

    青山学院大学  

  • 組織の戦略的設計

    青山学院大学  

  • 組織と人事制度の経済

    東京大学  

  • Designing Organizations and HRM systems Strategically - Economics Approach

    早稲田大学  

  • Personnel Economics

    早稲田大学  

  • Microeconomics A

    早稲田大学  

  • 人事経済学

    早稲田大学  

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