Updated on 2025/10/30

写真a

 
ASAKO, Yasushi
 
Affiliation
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, School of Political Science and Economics
Job title
Associate Professor
Degree
Ph.D. in Economics ( University of Wisconsin-Madison )
Profile
Yasushi Asako is an Associate Professor of Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University. Prior to joining Waseda, he was an Economist at IMES, the Bank of Japan. He is a scholar of formal political theory and applied game theory, and his research interests include electoral competitions, legislative bargaining, and economic bubbles. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, an M.S. in Economics from Hitotsubashi University, and a B.A. in Economics, summa cum laude, from Keio University.

Research Experience

  • 2015.09
    -
    Now

    Waseda University   Faculty of Political Science and Economics   Associate professor

  • 2012.04
    -
    2015.08

    Waseda University   Faculty of Political Science and Economics   Assistant Professor

  • 2009.10
    -
    2012.08

    Bank of Japan   Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies   Economist

Education Background

  • 2004.09
    -
    2009.08

    University of Wisconsin-Madison   Graduate School of Economics  

  • 2001.04
    -
    2003.03

    Hitotsubashi University   Graduate School of Economics  

  • 1997.04
    -
    2001.03

    Keio University   Department of Economics  

Professional Memberships

  •  
     
     

    日本政治学会

  •  
     
     

    日本経済学会

  •  
     
     

    公共選択学会

Research Areas

  • Economic theory / Politics / Money and finance / Public economics and labor economics

Research Interests

  • applied game theory

  • formal political theory

  • public choice

  • political economy

 

Papers

  • Asymmetric Information Bubbles: Survey

    Asako Yasushi

      71 ( 1 ) 49 - 62  2020.01  [Refereed]  [Invited]

     View Summary

    This article reviews past game-theoretical and experimental studies on economic bubbles. The first part of this article introduces several important game-theoretical analyses such as the riding-bubble model,which postulates that asymmetric information is an important cause of the emergence of bubbles. The second part mainly reviews past experimental studies. Although the majority of early studies show that bubbles can emerge as a disequilibrium phenomenon, recent studies show that bubbles can also arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. This article concludes that it is important to compare and understand “equilibrium bubbles” and “disequilibrium bubbles” in detail.

    DOI CiNii

  • (A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence

    Yasushi Asako, Yukihiko Funaki, Kozo Ueda, Nobuyuki Uto

    Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control   110   103744 - 103744  2020.01  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Asymmetric information has explained the existence of a bubble in extant theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders’ choices with and without asymmetric information based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders tend to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric, information. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case bubbles do not arise with symmetric information. By contrast, the size of the bubble is stable in a market with asymmetric information.

    DOI

    Scopus

    6
    Citation
    (Scopus)
  • Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

    Yasushi Asako

    Journal of Theoretical Politics   31 ( 4 ) 626 - 641  2019.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized.

    DOI

    Scopus

    5
    Citation
    (Scopus)
  • Legislative Term Limits and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States

    Yasushi Asako, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda

    B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY   16 ( 3 ) 1501 - 1538  2016.07  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    What are the fiscal consequences of legislative term limits? To answer this question, we first develop a legislative bargaining model that describes negotiations over the allocation of distributive projects among legislators with different levels of seniority. Building on several predictions from the model, we develop two hypotheses for empirical testing. First, the adoption of term limits that results in a larger reduction in the variance of seniority within a legislature increases the amount of government spending. Second, legislatures that adopt stricter term limits increase the amount of government spending, while legislatures that adopt moderate term limits show no change in the amount. We provide evidence for these hypotheses using panel data for 49 US state legislatures between 1980 and 2010.

    DOI

    Scopus

    3
    Citation
    (Scopus)
  • Buisiness Cycle and the Entry of Third-party Candidates in the US State-level Elections

    Yasushi Asako

    Japanese Political Science Review   3   43 - 65  2016  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This study offers a new explanation of why third-party and independent candidates, with a marginal probability of winning, run for U.S. state-level elections. We argue that the economic benefits of holding an office is what motivates amateur politicians to run, and predict that amateur politicians find this particularly attractive when the private sector is struggling. This is because, during a recession, amateur politicians view an elected office as a more attractive source of income than private jobs, and they pursue political power to change economic prospects by adopting new policies. Building on this argument, we hypothesize that as the unemployment rate increases, the number of third-party and independent candidates increases. Our analysis of panel data of state house, state senate, and gubernatorial elections in 48 U.S. states between 1980 and 2010 reveals that the hypothesized relationship existed only for state legislative elections. To explain why these candidates run, despite their very small probability of winning, we argue that these candidates may overestimate their probability of winning.

    DOI

  • Campaign promises as an imperfect signal: How does an extreme candidate win against a moderate candidate?

    Yasushi Asako

    JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS   27 ( 4 ) 613 - 649  2015.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This study develops a political competition model in which campaign platforms are partially binding. A candidate who implements a policy that differs from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also assume that voters are uncertain about candidates' policy preferences. If voters believe that a candidate is likely to be extreme, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium: an extreme candidate imitates a moderate candidate, with some probability, and approaches the median policy with the remaining probability. Although an extreme candidate will implement a more extreme policy than a moderate candidate, regardless of imitation or approach, partial pooling ensures that voters prefer an extreme candidate who does not pretend to be moderate over an uncertain candidate who announces an extreme platform. As a result, a moderate candidate never has a higher probability of winning than an extreme candidate.

    DOI

    Scopus

    4
    Citation
    (Scopus)
  • Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal

    Yasushi Asako

    JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW   66 ( 3 ) 322 - 353  2015.09  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyse endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent's policy approach his/her own policy.

    DOI

    Scopus

    4
    Citation
    (Scopus)
  • One-Sided Games in a War of Attrition

    Yasushi Asako

    B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS   15 ( 2 ) 313 - 331  2015.07  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This study develops a war-of-attrition model with the asymmetric feature that one player can be defeated by the other but not vice versa; that is, only one player has an exogenous probability of being forced to capitulate. With complete information, the equilibria are almost identical to the canonical war-of-attrition model. On the other hand, with incomplete information on a player's robustness, a war where both players fight for some duration emerges. Moreover, a player who is never defeated may capitulate in equilibrium, and this player will give in earlier if the other player's fighting costs are greater.

    DOI

    Scopus

    4
    Citation
    (Scopus)
  • Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan

    Yasushi Asako, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda

    JAPANESE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE   16 ( 1 ) 5 - 32  2015.03  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Dynastic politicians, defined as those whose family members have also served in the same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of offices in many parts of the world. We develop a model of how dynastic politicians with inherited political advantages affect electoral outcomes and policy choices. Our model predicts that, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts, despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. We test the implications of the model using data from Japan between 1997 and 2007.

    DOI

    Scopus

    53
    Citation
    (Scopus)
  • THE BOY WHO CRIED BUBBLE: PUBLIC WARNINGS AGAINST RIDING BUBBLES

    Yasushi Asako, Kozo Ueda

    ECONOMIC INQUIRY   52 ( 3 ) 1137 - 1152  2014.07  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Attempts by governments to stop bubbles by issuing warnings seem unsuccessful. This article examines the effects of public warnings using a simple model of riding bubbles. We show that public warnings against a bubble can stop it if investors believe that a warning is issued in a definite range of periods commencing around the starting period of the bubble. If a warning involves the possibility of being issued too early, regardless of the starting period of the bubble, it cannot stop the bubble immediately. Bubble duration can be shortened by a premature public warning, but lengthened if it is late.(JEL D82, E58, G18)

    DOI

    Scopus

    4
    Citation
    (Scopus)
  • 政治経済学の新展開:中位投票者定理を巡って

    浅古泰史

    金融研究   30 ( 4 ) 83 - 124  2011

     View Summary

    コレクション : 国立国会図書館デジタルコレクション > 電子書籍・電子雑誌 > その他

    CiNii

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Books and Other Publications

  • 数理とデータで読み解く日本政治

    浅古, 泰史, 善教, 将大

    日本評論社  2025.09 ISBN: 9784535540835

  • この社会の「なぜ?」をときあかせ!謎解きゲーム理論 (未来のわたしにタネをまこう)

    浅古泰史( Part: Sole author)

    大和書房  2024.02 ISBN: 4479394222

    ASIN

  • 活かすゲーム理論

    浅古, 泰史, 図斎, 大, 森谷, 文利( Part: Joint author)

    有斐閣  2023.03 ISBN: 9784641200050

  • Analyzing electoral promises with game theory

    Asako, Yasushi( Part: Sole author)

    Routledge  2021 ISBN: 9780367444242

  • ゲーム理論で考える政治学 : フォーマルモデル入門

    浅古泰史

    有斐閣  2018.12 ISBN: 9784641149281

  • 政治の数理分析入門

    浅古泰史

    木鐸社  2016.06 ISBN: 9784833224949

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Research Projects

  • 権威主義における制度形成と個人への権力集中に関するゲーム理論分析

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業

    Project Year :

    2025.04
    -
    2030.03
     

    浅古 泰史

  • A study on political polarization

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research

    Project Year :

    2020.04
    -
    2024.03
     

    Kume Ikuo

     View Summary

    This study conceptualizes political polarization in contemporary democratic countries as "polarization of the party system." It hypothesizes a causal flow where voter preferences are mediated by political institutions to determine "polarization of the party system." The study examines the factors and mechanisms that determine the degree of polarization using various approaches. As a result, it was shown that the intensification of competition among opposition parties in electoral districts leads to increased polarization of policy preferences among candidates and voters. On the other hand, the mitigation of competition through the unification of candidates promotes the moderation of candidates' policy positions. Furthermore, at the voter level, while partisanship influences the choice of conversation partners, it was found that continuous observation of others' behaviors helps prevent polarization.

  • 議院内閣制の政治経済学:内閣不信任決議と議会解散権を分析する理論的枠組みの構築

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業

    Project Year :

    2020.04
    -
    2024.03
     

    浅古 泰史

     View Summary

    政治経済学・公共選択論の主な数理モデルは、米国の政治制度を強く意識したものが多い。しかし、二大政党制や大統領制など、米国の政治制度は欧州やアジアの民主主義国から見れば特殊なものである。政治制度の在り方が政策の意思決定過程に与える影響を考えるうえで、米国以外の政治制度を想定した研究が必須であると言える。そこで本研究では、日本や欧州などの議院内閣制を分析する理論的枠組みを構築していくことを目的とする。特に、議院内閣制の特徴の1つである内閣不信任決議、および首長が有している議会解散権に着目する

  • Political Economy of Cabinet Termination: Political Agency Problem under the Parliamentary System

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research

    Project Year :

    2017.04
    -
    2021.03
     

    Asako Yasushi

     View Summary

    This project investigates the effect of a possible risk of cabinet termination on political agency problem (moral hazard and adverse selection). First, the possibility of cabinet termination can incentivize a prime minister or government to increase their efforts. Consequently, this may reduce the related moral hazard problems. Second, the possibility of cabinet termination can improve the quality of governance. This is because a prime minister or government exhibiting undesirable characteristics such as low competence to their voters should be dismissed through the cabinet termination. Thus, a more competent government is more likely to survive.

  • The Effect of Campaign Promises in Political Competition:

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research

    Project Year :

    2014.04
    -
    2017.03
     

    Asako Yasushi

     View Summary

    This study develops a formal model in which a candidate strategically decides both a campaign platform and a policy to be implemented while most of past studies consider only one of them. Especially, this study supposes that a candidate who implements a policy that differs from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal. The model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, candidates who prefer an extreme policy won some elections. Moreover, this study also shows some difficulties to explain why candidates announce ambiguous platforms

  • Dynastic Politicians, Seniority, and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from Japan and the United States

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research

    Project Year :

    2012.08
    -
    2014.03
     

    ASAKO Yasushi

     View Summary

    This research investigates the effect of political dynasty and seniority of politicians on government spending by using formal models and data of Japan and the US. First, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. Second, the amount of spending decreases as the average seniority of a legislature increases from low to moderate, while it increases as the average seniority increases from moderate to high. Third, the adoption of term limits that dramatically reduces average seniority increases the amount of spending

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Misc

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Syllabus

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Internal Special Research Projects

  • 「曖昧な公約」に関するゲーム理論的分析の枠組構築

    2017  

     View Summary

    Politicians prefer to use vague words andoutline several policies in their electoral promises, which is termed as"political ambiguity." It is reasonable to interpret politicalambiguity as a lottery, that is, a probability distribution on policies, in thefollowing manner: Candidates announce a lottery, and a voter chooses acandidate who announces a better lottery for themselves. However, it is stilldifficult to explain why politicians prefer to use vague promises (i.e., alottery) based on a rational-choice model.To understand the difficulties in thisregard, we should begin by locating a Condorcet winner that allows politicalambiguity. Black (1948) shows that if we suppose that voters can choose only asingle policy, a unique Condorcet winner is at the median policy (i.e., themedian voter's preferred policy). On the other hand, my work supposes a lotteryinstead of a single policy, which is called a Condorcet winning lottery: Alottery that defeats or ties with all other lotteries in pairwise elections. Insummary, the unique Condorcet winning lottery is the median policy when votersare risk-averse or risk-neutral, while its existence is not ensured when votersare risk-loving.

  • 出馬の政治経済学:立候補の意思決定に関する実証分析

    2014   松林哲也

     View Summary

    This projectoffers a new explanation for the entry of third-party and independentcandidates into the US state-level elections. We argue that the economicbenefits of holding an office is what motivates amateur politicians to run,predicting that amateur politicians find holding an elected office particularlyattractive when the private sector is struggling. This is because, during therecession, amateur politicians view that an elected office is a more attractivesource of income as compared to private jobs, while pursuing political power tochange the economic prospect by adopting a new policy. Building on thisargument, we hypothesize that as the unemployment rate increases, the number ofthird-party and independent candidates increases. Our analysis with panel dataof state house, state senate, and gubernatorial elections in 48 US statesbetween 1980 and 2010 reveals that the hypothesized relationship existed onlyfor state legislative elections. To explain why these candidates run, despitetheir very small probability of winning, we extend the prospect theory tosuggest that these candidates may overestimate their probability of winning.