Updated on 2021/12/08

写真a

 
ASAKO, Yasushi
 
Affiliation
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, School of Political Science and Economics
Job title
Associate Professor
Profile
Yasushi Asako is an Associate Professor of Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University. Prior to joining Waseda, he was an Economist at IMES, the Bank of Japan. He is a scholar of formal political theory and applied game theory, and his research interests include electoral competitions, legislative bargaining, and economic bubbles. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, an M.S. in Economics from Hitotsubashi University, and a B.A. in Economics, summa cum laude, from Keio University.

Education

  • 2004
    -
    2009

    University of Wisconsin-Madison   Graduate School of Economics  

  • 2001
    -
    2003

    Hitotsubashi University   Graduate School of Economics  

  • 1997
    -
    2001

    Keio University   Department of Economics  

Degree

  • University of Wisconsin-Madison   Ph.D. in Economics

Research Experience

  • 2015
    -
     

    Waseda University   Faculty of Political Science and Economics   Associate professor

  • 2012
    -
    2015

    Waseda University   Faculty of Political Science and Economics   Assistant Professor

  • 2009
    -
    2012

    Bank of Japan   Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies   Economist

 

Research Areas

  • Economic theory

  • Politics

  • Money and finance

  • Public economics and labor economics

Research Interests

  • applied game theory

  • formal political theory

  • public choice

  • political economy

Papers

  • (A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence

    Yasushi Asako, Yukihiko Funaki, Kozo Ueda, Nobuyuki Uto

    Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control   110   103744 - 103744  2020.01  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Asymmetric information has explained the existence of a bubble in extant theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders’ choices with and without asymmetric information based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders tend to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric, information. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case bubbles do not arise with symmetric information. By contrast, the size of the bubble is stable in a market with asymmetric information.

    DOI

  • Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

    Yasushi Asako

    Journal of Theoretical Politics   31 ( 4 ) 626 - 641  2019.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized.

    DOI

  • 無投票選挙の数理政治学

    浅古泰史

    都市問題   110 ( 7 ) 10 - 14  2019.07

  • 理論的貢献と実証的貢献のトレードオフ:数理政治学の視点から

    浅古泰史

    公共選択   67   66 - 84  2017  [Invited]

  • Legislative Term Limits and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States

    Yasushi Asako, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda

    B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY   16 ( 3 ) 1501 - 1538  2016.07  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    What are the fiscal consequences of legislative term limits? To answer this question, we first develop a legislative bargaining model that describes negotiations over the allocation of distributive projects among legislators with different levels of seniority. Building on several predictions from the model, we develop two hypotheses for empirical testing. First, the adoption of term limits that results in a larger reduction in the variance of seniority within a legislature increases the amount of government spending. Second, legislatures that adopt stricter term limits increase the amount of government spending, while legislatures that adopt moderate term limits show no change in the amount. We provide evidence for these hypotheses using panel data for 49 US state legislatures between 1980 and 2010.

    DOI

  • Buisiness Cycle and the Entry of Third-party Candidates in the US State-level Elections

    Yasushi Asako

    Japanese Political Science Review   3   43 - 65  2016  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This study offers a new explanation of why third-party and independent candidates, with a marginal probability of winning, run for U.S. state-level elections. We argue that the economic benefits of holding an office is what motivates amateur politicians to run, and predict that amateur politicians find this particularly attractive when the private sector is struggling. This is because, during a recession, amateur politicians view an elected office as a more attractive source of income than private jobs, and they pursue political power to change economic prospects by adopting new policies. Building on this argument, we hypothesize that as the unemployment rate increases, the number of third-party and independent candidates increases. Our analysis of panel data of state house, state senate, and gubernatorial elections in 48 U.S. states between 1980 and 2010 reveals that the hypothesized relationship existed only for state legislative elections. To explain why these candidates run, despite their very small probability of winning, we argue that these candidates may overestimate their probability of winning.

    DOI

  • Campaign promises as an imperfect signal: How does an extreme candidate win against a moderate candidate?

    Yasushi Asako

    JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS   27 ( 4 ) 613 - 649  2015.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This study develops a political competition model in which campaign platforms are partially binding. A candidate who implements a policy that differs from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also assume that voters are uncertain about candidates' policy preferences. If voters believe that a candidate is likely to be extreme, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium: an extreme candidate imitates a moderate candidate, with some probability, and approaches the median policy with the remaining probability. Although an extreme candidate will implement a more extreme policy than a moderate candidate, regardless of imitation or approach, partial pooling ensures that voters prefer an extreme candidate who does not pretend to be moderate over an uncertain candidate who announces an extreme platform. As a result, a moderate candidate never has a higher probability of winning than an extreme candidate.

    DOI

  • Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal

    Yasushi Asako

    JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW   66 ( 3 ) 322 - 353  2015.09  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyse endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent's policy approach his/her own policy.

    DOI

  • One-Sided Games in a War of Attrition

    Yasushi Asako

    B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS   15 ( 2 ) 313 - 331  2015.07  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This study develops a war-of-attrition model with the asymmetric feature that one player can be defeated by the other but not vice versa; that is, only one player has an exogenous probability of being forced to capitulate. With complete information, the equilibria are almost identical to the canonical war-of-attrition model. On the other hand, with incomplete information on a player's robustness, a war where both players fight for some duration emerges. Moreover, a player who is never defeated may capitulate in equilibrium, and this player will give in earlier if the other player's fighting costs are greater.

    DOI

  • Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan

    Yasushi Asako, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda

    JAPANESE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE   16 ( 1 ) 5 - 32  2015.03  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Dynastic politicians, defined as those whose family members have also served in the same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of offices in many parts of the world. We develop a model of how dynastic politicians with inherited political advantages affect electoral outcomes and policy choices. Our model predicts that, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts, despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. We test the implications of the model using data from Japan between 1997 and 2007.

    DOI

  • THE BOY WHO CRIED BUBBLE: PUBLIC WARNINGS AGAINST RIDING BUBBLES

    Yasushi Asako, Kozo Ueda

    ECONOMIC INQUIRY   52 ( 3 ) 1137 - 1152  2014.07  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Attempts by governments to stop bubbles by issuing warnings seem unsuccessful. This article examines the effects of public warnings using a simple model of riding bubbles. We show that public warnings against a bubble can stop it if investors believe that a warning is issued in a definite range of periods commencing around the starting period of the bubble. If a warning involves the possibility of being issued too early, regardless of the starting period of the bubble, it cannot stop the bubble immediately. Bubble duration can be shortened by a premature public warning, but lengthened if it is late.(JEL D82, E58, G18)

    DOI

  • 政治経済学の新展開:中位投票者定理を巡って

    浅古泰史

    金融研究   30 ( 4 ) 83 - 124  2011

▼display all

Books and Other Publications

Research Projects

  • A study on political polarization

    Project Year :

    2020.04
    -
    2024.03
     

  • 議院内閣制の政治経済学:内閣不信任決議と議会解散権を分析する理論的枠組みの構築

    Project Year :

    2020.04
    -
    2024.03
     

     View Summary

    政治経済学・公共選択論の主な数理モデルは、米国の政治制度を強く意識したものが多い。しかし、二大政党制や大統領制など、米国の政治制度は欧州やアジアの民主主義国から見れば特殊なものである。政治制度の在り方が政策の意思決定過程に与える影響を考えるうえで、米国以外の政治制度を想定した研究が必須であると言える。そこで本研究では、日本や欧州などの議院内閣制を分析する理論的枠組みを構築していくことを目的とする。特に、議院内閣制の特徴の1つである内閣不信任決議、および首長が有している議会解散権に着目する

  • 倒閣の政治経済学:議院内閣制下の政治的エージェンシー問題

    Project Year :

    2017.04
    -
    2021.03
     

     View Summary

    本研究の目的は、議院内閣制下における2つの政治的エージェンシー問題(政治家が有権者の好む政策を実行しないモラルハザード問題と、好ましくない性質を有する政治家が当選してしまう逆選択問題)を分析するモデルの基本的枠組みを提示することにある。議院内閣制において、総理大臣は倒閣により辞職を余儀なくされるリスクを有している。本研究では特に、その倒閣されるリスクが、両政治的エージェンシー問題に与える影響を考察する。<BR>平成29年度に引き続き、平成30年度でも倒閣リスクが政治家のモラルハザードに与える影響を考えてきた。倒閣リスクは総理大臣(政府・内閣)の業績と相関しており、政策の失敗があった場合には、倒閣リスクが増大すると考えるべきだろう。よって、倒閣されることを避けるために、総理大臣がより一層の努力をする可能性が考えられるため、(大統領制に比して)総理大臣の努力量が高まる可能性が指摘できる。<BR>平成30年度では、モラルハザードの問題だけではなく、逆選択の問題も同時に分析できるモデルの構築を目指した。倒閣リスクが現職の総理大臣だけではなく、総理大臣になろうとする候補者の質に対して与える影響も重要であるからだ。倒閣が総理大臣の業績にもとづいておこなわれる場合、能力が低いなど、有権者に好ましくない性質を有する総理大臣は辞職を余儀なくされる。よって、支持率を低下させず倒閣されないような有能な総理大臣のみが生き残ることになる。しかし、倒閣が無作為に生じるなど、有能でも倒閣されてしまう可能性が高い場合には、有能な政治家のみを残せるわけではなくなる。平成29年度より考えているモラルハザードの問題と、この逆選択の問題は、共に倒閣リスクの重要な影響を与えるため、同時に考察できるモデルの構築は必須であると考える。当初より平成30年度は対外発表を行いつつ、研究に対するコメントを集め、モデルの構築を行っていく期間と位置付けていた。実際に、数回の対外発表を行うこともでき、モデルの構築を進めることができている。また、平成29年度の研究準備の段階で行った過去の研究のサーベイは、30年度に公刊した著書の中に反映することができた。以上から、おおむね順調に進展していると評価できる。今後はモデルの構築を行った上で、論文を執筆し公刊を目指していく。そこでは、総理大臣の任命を行う政権政党の存在も重要になる。<BR>政権政党は費用を払った上で、総理大臣候補者の資質を事前に調査する。大統領制では、一度大統領となってしまえば任期を満了するまで基本的に辞職しない。そのため、能力が低く国民にとって好ましくない性質を有する政治家を選択してしまうことによる費用は(政党にとっても)極めて高い。よって、大統領制下では長い時間をかけ候補者の選定を行う傾向があるはずだ。一方で、任期満了前に倒閣することができる議院内閣制の場合、政党が十分に吟味せずに能力の低い人間を誤って総理大臣に任命したとしても、倒閣し変更することができる。そのため、総理大臣候補者の質を吟味する必要性は大統領制ほど高くない。その結果、倒閣リスクの存在は総理大臣の質を低下させてしまう可能性もある。<BR>上記の点も踏まえつつ、研究を進めていく

  • The Effect of Campaign Promises in Political Competition:

    Project Year :

    2014.04
    -
    2017.03
     

     View Summary

    This study develops a formal model in which a candidate strategically decides both a campaign platform and a policy to be implemented while most of past studies consider only one of them. Especially, this study supposes that a candidate who implements a policy that differs from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal. The model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, candidates who prefer an extreme policy won some elections. Moreover, this study also shows some difficulties to explain why candidates announce ambiguous platforms

  • Dynastic Politicians, Seniority, and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from Japan and the United States

    Project Year :

    2012.08
    -
    2014.03
     

     View Summary

    This research investigates the effect of political dynasty and seniority of politicians on government spending by using formal models and data of Japan and the US. First, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. Second, the amount of spending decreases as the average seniority of a legislature increases from low to moderate, while it increases as the average seniority increases from moderate to high. Third, the adoption of term limits that dramatically reduces average seniority increases the amount of spending

Specific Research

  • 「曖昧な公約」に関するゲーム理論的分析の枠組構築

    2017  

     View Summary

    Politicians prefer to use vague words andoutline several policies in their electoral promises, which is termed as"political ambiguity." It is reasonable to interpret politicalambiguity as a lottery, that is, a probability distribution on policies, in thefollowing manner: Candidates announce a lottery, and a voter chooses acandidate who announces a better lottery for themselves. However, it is stilldifficult to explain why politicians prefer to use vague promises (i.e., alottery) based on a rational-choice model.To understand the difficulties in thisregard, we should begin by locating a Condorcet winner that allows politicalambiguity. Black (1948) shows that if we suppose that voters can choose only asingle policy, a unique Condorcet winner is at the median policy (i.e., themedian voter's preferred policy). On the other hand, my work supposes a lotteryinstead of a single policy, which is called a Condorcet winning lottery: Alottery that defeats or ties with all other lotteries in pairwise elections. Insummary, the unique Condorcet winning lottery is the median policy when votersare risk-averse or risk-neutral, while its existence is not ensured when votersare risk-loving.

  • 出馬の政治経済学:立候補の意思決定に関する実証分析

    2014   松林哲也

     View Summary

    This projectoffers a new explanation for the entry of third-party and independentcandidates into the US state-level elections. We argue that the economicbenefits of holding an office is what motivates amateur politicians to run,predicting that amateur politicians find holding an elected office particularlyattractive when the private sector is struggling. This is because, during therecession, amateur politicians view that an elected office is a more attractivesource of income as compared to private jobs, while pursuing political power tochange the economic prospect by adopting a new policy. Building on thisargument, we hypothesize that as the unemployment rate increases, the number ofthird-party and independent candidates increases. Our analysis with panel dataof state house, state senate, and gubernatorial elections in 48 US statesbetween 1980 and 2010 reveals that the hypothesized relationship existed onlyfor state legislative elections. To explain why these candidates run, despitetheir very small probability of winning, we extend the prospect theory tosuggest that these candidates may overestimate their probability of winning.

 

Syllabus

▼display all