We examine how international transfers affect the welfare levels of a donor with a higher marginal propensity to save and a recipient with a lower marginal propensity to save when both countries adopt a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system using a one-sector overlapping generations model. We demonstrate that in a dynamically efficient economy, except at the golden rule, when a per capita PAYG pension contribution of either a donor or a recipient increases marginally, the effect of the transfer on the donor’s welfare can be reduced, whereas whether the effect of the transfer on the recipient’s welfare is reduced is ambiguous. These results imply that the existence of a PAYG pension might hinder the effectiveness of the transfer on the donor’s welfare, and the adoption of a PAYG pension system is likely to cause a weak transfer paradox in which both a donor and a recipient immiserize. Our results also suggest that the introduction of a PAYG pension system, which is used as a domestic policy instrument for intergenerational income redistribution, reduces the donor’s incentive to make an international transfer to a recipient, which is a form of international income redistribution.

We investigate the transfer problem between two countries in the steady state in a one-sector overlapping generations model and explain how transfers should be shared between the young and old generations of the donor country and allocated across the generations of the recipient country. Except at the golden rule of capital accumulation, the ratios of the burden and distribution of transfers between the young and old generations affect welfare. We obtain the following results. First, the sharing of the transfer burden in the donor country depends on the relative size of two effects, namely, a negative direct effect and a positive indirect effect. If the former exceeds the latter, it is preferable for the donor country to allocate all of the transfer burden to the old generation and vice versa. Second, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization, it is preferable for the recipient country to distribute all of the transfers to the young generation. In contrast to the existing literature, these results suggest that the setting whereby the young generation of the donor country defrays all transfer costs may not be justifiable from the viewpoint of donor welfare maximization.

In this paper, we incorporate an endogenous fertility decision into De la Croix's (1996) bequeathed tastes model under a log-linear utility function and an -type production function, following Romer (1989). We show that the presence of bequeathed tastes can explain the decline of the fertility rate that has occurred in developed economies.

This paper examines the effect of a consumption tax on economic growth using an overlapping generations (OLG) model with money holdings. We show that the neutrality of the consumption tax does not hold in the money-in-the-utility-function model, because a change in consumption taxation induces the substitution of money holdings for consumption, and the money is the net wealth within the OLG structure. An increase in the consumption tax rate lowers (raises) the growth rate under a low (high) monetary expansion rate. On the other hand, in the cash-in-advance model and the money-in-the-production-function model, the neutrality of consumption taxation holds even within the OLG structure, because in these models there is no substitution of consumption and money holdings.

This paper constructs a small economy version of dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models with overlapping generations and analyzes effects of capital income taxation on the specialization pattern of the country. It is shown that once international asset trade is allowed, in the presence of international technological asymmetries, a small country eventually leads to perfect specialization in our overlapping generations model. It is also shown that the residence-based tax has no effect on the specialization pattern while the source-based tax has a negative effect on capital accumulation and thereby it can affect the specialization pattern of the small country. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

We analyze the determinants of the trade pattern in a two-country growing economy. The long-run trade pattern depends on the structure of the absolute advantage as well as the comparative advantage, because the absolute advantage determines the terms of trade and the value of the marginal product of capital which affect the growth rate in our model. Moreover, we find that opening trade reduces or removes the difference in the growth rates of the two countries when the country lagging in the growth rate has a comparative advantage in a consumption commodity.

By incorporating human capital accumulation into a dynamic trade model, we examine the relationship between the growth rate and the specialization pattern of a growing economy. We found that as long as its autarky price differs from the world price, a small open-economy eventually specializes completely. Furthermore, the impact of the terms of trade on the growth rate depends on the trade pattern. Specifically, if a country specializes in a capital commodity, the growth rate is unaffected by the terms of trade. If it specializes in a consumption commodity, its growth rate is significantly influenced by the terms of trade. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.