ヴェステグ ロベルト フェレンツ (ヴェステグ ロベルト フェレンツ)

写真a

所属

政治経済学術院 政治経済学部

職名

教授

メールアドレス

メールアドレス

ホームページ

http://sites.google.com/site/rveszteg/

兼担 【 表示 / 非表示

  • 社会科学総合学術院   社会科学部

  • 政治経済学術院   大学院政治学研究科

  • 政治経済学術院   大学院経済学研究科

学歴 【 表示 / 非表示

  •  
    -
    2004年

    その他(海外の大学等)   経済学研究科  

学位 【 表示 / 非表示

  • 博士

経歴 【 表示 / 非表示

  • 2019年04月
    -
    継続中

    早稲田大学   政治経済楽部   Professor

  • 2010年09月
    -
    2019年04月

    早稲田大学   政治経済楽部   Associate Professor

  • 2009年01月
    -
    2010年08月

    Universidad Carlos III de Madrid   Department of Economics   Visiting Professor

  • 2008年09月
    -
    2009年01月

    大阪大学   社会経済研究所   Assistant Professor

  • 2007年10月
    -
    2008年09月

    Universidad del País Vasco   Department of Economics I   Assistant Professor

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所属学協会 【 表示 / 非表示

  •  
     
     

    European Economic Association

  •  
     
     

    Economic Science Association

 

研究分野 【 表示 / 非表示

  • 理論経済学

研究キーワード 【 表示 / 非表示

  • microeconomics

  • game theory

  • experimental economics

論文 【 表示 / 非表示

  • Acute stress does not affect economic behavior in the experimental laboratory

    Róbert F. Veszteg, Kaori Yamakawa, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda

    PLOS ONE   16 ( 1 ) e0244881 - e0244881  2021年01月  [査読有り]

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 責任著者

     概要を見る

    We report statistical results from a laboratory experiment in which participants were required to make decisions with monetary consequences in several solitary and interactive situations under acute stress. Our study follows the tradition of behavioral and experimental economics in selecting the experimental situations and incorporates elements from medical and psychological research in the way stress is induced and measured. It relies on a larger sample, with 192 volunteers, than previous studies to achieve higher statistical power. The main conclusion, drawn from binary comparisons between the treatment and reference groups, is that acute stress does not have a significant impact on cognitive skills, strategic sophistication, risk attitudes, altruism, cooperativeness, or nastiness. Regression analysis, controlling for psycho-social characteristics, corroborates these findings, while also suggesting that acute stress significantly decreases men’s risk aversion (as measured by a lottery-choice risk-elicitation task).

    DOI

  • Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets

    Pablo Guillen, Róbert F. Veszteg

    Experimental Economics    2020年08月  [査読有り]

    担当区分:責任著者

    DOI

  • On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining

    Noemi Navarro, Robert F. Veszteg

    Games and Economic Behavior   121   117 - 145  2020年05月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]  [国際共著]

     概要を見る

    We report experimental results and test axiomatic models of unstructured bargaining by checking the empirical relevance of the underlying axioms. Our data support strong efficiency, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives and monotonicity, and reject scale invariance. Individual rationality and midpoint domination are violated by a significant fraction of agreements that implement equal division in highly unequal circumstances. Two well-known bargaining solutions that satisfy the confirmed properties explain the observed agreements reasonably well. The most frequent agreements in our sample are the ones suggested by the equal-division solution. In terms of the average Euclidean distance, the theoretical solution that best explains the data is the deal-me-out solution (Sutton, 1986; Binmore et al., 1989, Binmore et al., 1991). Popular solutions that satisfy scale invariance, individual rationality, and midpoint domination, as the well-known Nash or Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, perform poorly in the laboratory.

    DOI

  • Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment

    Joana Pais, Ágnes Pintér, Róbert F. Veszteg

    Experimental Economics   23 ( 1 ) 212 - 239  2020年03月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]  [国際共著]

    担当区分:責任著者

     概要を見る

    In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.

    DOI

  • Monetary payoffs and utility in laboratory experiments

    Róbert F. Veszteg, Yukihiko Funaki

    Journal of Economic Psychology   65   108 - 121  2018年04月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]

    担当区分:筆頭著者

     概要を見る

    Experimental research in economics relies on performance-dependent monetary incentives to implement theoretical games in the laboratory. While the set of players and the set of strategies of those games are unambiguously defined and controlled by the experimenter, utility is typically either assumed to coincide with monetary payoffs or is estimated ex post based on observed actions. We follow a different path and discuss results from an experiment on simple 2-person games in which participants were repeatedly asked to report their expectations on the opponent's behavior and their own level of satisfaction for each possible outcome of the game. This approach allows us to reflect on experimental methodology by directly comparing monetary incentives with (perceived and declared) utility. We find that, albeit helpful, repetition and experience are unable to completely align utility with monetary incentives. While most participants (57%) seek to maximize money earnings in the experimental laboratory and tend to perceive the games in the intended way, a small – yet non-negligible – fraction (27%) of the subject pool consistently interprets the game and, therefore, acts in an unexpected way.

    DOI

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その他 【 表示 / 非表示

  • steering committee member

    2010年
    -
    継続中

     概要を見る

    2010 -
    member of the steering committee for the English-based degree program at the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University

  • program director

    2016年
    -
    2018年

     概要を見る

    2016 - 2018
    director of the English-based degree program at the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University

  • secretary

    2005年
    -
    2007年

     概要を見る

    2005 - 2007
    secretary to the Department of Economics at Universidad de Navarra

受賞 【 表示 / 非表示

  • Waseda Teaching Award

    2016年   Microeconomics A  

    受賞者: ヴェステグ ロベルト フェレンツ

共同研究・競争的資金等の研究課題 【 表示 / 非表示

  • The experimental economics of decentralization

    研究期間:

    2020年04月
    -
    2023年03月
     

     概要を見る

    I seek to analyze decentralized human interaction in the experimental laboratory and test key assumptions behind the prevailing model in economics. By observing decision-makers in controlled settings resembling real-life problems, I study social interaction in the absence of a central authority

  • 協力ゲームにおける提携形成と利得分配の実験と新しい理論構築

    研究期間:

    2017年04月
    -
    2022年03月
     

  • Better foundations for better social institutions - theory and experiments

    研究期間:

    2017年04月
    -
    2020年03月
     

  • ゲーム構造に対する認識の実験研究

    研究期間:

    2014年04月
    -
    2017年03月
     

     概要を見る

    本研究は、所与のゲーム構造に対する人々の認識を、主として実験手法によって研究したものである。ゲームモデルに直面した人々の選択行動を調べ、さらにその評価を尋ねることによって、モデルに対する認識と人々の行動基準を明らかにした。研究成果として、個人の認識に基づく社会的効用を含めた誘因と個人の獲得金銭最大化の誘因の意思決定への影響が、ゲーム構造や個人によって大きく異なることが判明した。相手のもつ誘因に対する予想や判断に関しての分析を現在、続行中である。これらの研究成果は論文2編としてまとめられ査読付き国際学術誌に投稿準備中である。 関連する理論研究についても5編以上が査読付き国際誌に出版決定した

  • 排除可能な公共財供給メカニズムと供給者間競争に関する実験を含めた総合研究

    基盤研究(C)

    研究期間:

    2011年
    -
    2013年
     

     概要を見る

    本研究では、Kosfeld, Okada, Ridle(2009)の公共財供給モデルを修正し、組織の形成が可能であり、そのメンバーは組織における決定に従った投入を行わなければならないとしたとき、その組織が形成され、公共財が供給されるかどうかを実験によって検証した。組織における投入量の決定を多数決によって行ったときに、公共財へ投入が順調に行われることがわかった。この投入が成功する要因は、初回に投入しなかったプレイヤーが、その後、投入を始めることによる。その他の結果として、2択の投入レベルがある処理ではかなりうまく公共財が供給されたが、3択の投入レベルがある処理では、あまりうまくいかなかった。

講演・口頭発表等 【 表示 / 非表示

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特定課題研究 【 表示 / 非表示

  • Behavioral models of decentralization

    2020年   Noemi Navarro

     概要を見る

    We have collected and analyzed experimental data in two waves (January 2020 and January 2021) at LEEP (Paris, France). We have created four treatments to study unstructured bilateral bargaining.Our preliminary findings suggest that the amount of information available regarding the opponent's preferences has a significant impact on the bargaining outcome if earnings are deterministic: with full information there is a tendency to equalize monetary earnings, while with partial  information it is simply the number of objects that guides the negotiation. Interestingly,  probabilistic earnings (which are in line with theoretical models) lead to similar outcomes independently of the amount of information. As a consequence, the well-known Nash bargaining solution is a poor predictor in the "full information" + "deterministic earnings" setting (which often appears in empirical work), but performs much better in the other three environments that we have considered. An important conclusion of our study is that empirical tests (in the laboratory or outside) of bargaining theory should be carried out under a tight control of the decision-makers'  preferences. Otherwise, bargaining could be happening in units that differ from the theoretical ones and the ones assumed by the experimenter.

  • Quantum models for economic behavior

    2019年   Zsombor Méder

     概要を見る

    We analyse human decision-making in incentivized laboratory settings to answer fundamental questions about how people think about the conflict situations they face and to better understand their behavior. We complement the results presented by Veszteg and Funaki (2018) by using a broader and more systematic selection of symmetric situations.Our preliminary results, based on data gathered at Waseda SPSE in January 2020, point to the following directions.* The largest differences between induced and perceived conflicts (i.e., monetary incentives and utility) appear in situations known as battle of the sexes, anti-battle of the sexes, and coordination games.* Rationality (both based on monetary gains and declared satisfaction levels) ranges from 17% to 97% across situations. The lowest "performing" ones (in terms of both) are the prisoner's dilemma (43%), chicken (33%, 23%), battles of the sexes (40%, 33%) and anti-battle of the sexes (17%, 23%). These are also the ones with the least number of equilibrium strategy choices (below 63%).* There is no significant correlation between game-theoretical rationality and the decision-maker's social-value orientation, nor maximization score.* The occurence of mixed strategies is 24% across all situations, and 36% in those with an equilibrium in mixed strategies.

  • An Experimental Approach to Cultural Comparisons

    2014年   Subhasish Dugar

     概要を見る

    During the past academic year I undertook a research program together with Subhasish Dugar (University of Calgary, Canada). We designed a laboratory experiment to investigate the causal relation between group membership andopportunistic behaviour in a context that is ridden with informational asymmetry. We have collected data from two experimental sessions, and currently working on the related research paper.The context we focus on, otherwise known as an adverse selection problem,deals with two economic actors (a principal and an agent) who face a potentialcollaboration on a mutually beneficial project. If the principal decides to workwith the agent, she may offer a contract that specifies a wage forthe agent in exchange of which the agent is believed to put in work effort thatbenefits principal’s payoff. However, the agent could be a high calibre or a lowcalibre agent, and while that characteristic has an important impact on the results/outcome the agent is able to produce, it constitutes private information for the agent. Standard, neoclassical economic theory suggests that in our framework no interaction (between the principal and the agent) will take place. With the help of our experiments we would like to test a behavioural model which incorporates group identity and suggests a possible solution to the above-described adverse-selection problem. Simply put, we ask: what happens if both the principal and agent are from thesame group?  

海外研究活動 【 表示 / 非表示

  • Better foundations for better social institutions-theory and experiments

    2019年04月
    -
    2020年03月

    Spain   Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

 

現在担当している科目 【 表示 / 非表示

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担当経験のある科目(授業) 【 表示 / 非表示

  • Experimental Economics

    Waseda University  

  • Spatial Economics

    Universidad del País Vasco  

  • Environmental Economics

    Universidad del País Vasco  

  • Econometrics (1/2)

    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona  

  • Economics of Information

    Waseda University, Osaka University  

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