2022/01/19 更新

写真a

ヴェステグ ロベルト フェレンツ
ヴェステグ ロベルト フェレンツ
所属
政治経済学術院 政治経済学部
職名
教授
メールアドレス
メールアドレス

兼担

  • 社会科学総合学術院   社会科学部

  • 政治経済学術院   大学院政治学研究科

  • 政治経済学術院   大学院経済学研究科

学歴

  •  
    -
    2004年

    その他(海外の大学等)   経済学研究科  

学位

  • 博士

経歴

  • 2019年04月
    -
    継続中

    早稲田大学   政治経済楽部   Professor

  • 2010年09月
    -
    2019年04月

    早稲田大学   政治経済楽部   Associate Professor

  • 2009年01月
    -
    2010年08月

    Universidad Carlos III de Madrid   Department of Economics   Visiting Professor

  • 2008年09月
    -
    2009年01月

    大阪大学   社会経済研究所   Assistant Professor

  • 2007年10月
    -
    2008年09月

    Universidad del País Vasco   Department of Economics I   Assistant Professor

  • 2004年09月
    -
    2007年09月

    Universidad de Navarra   Department of Economics   Assistant Professor

  • 2002年09月
    -
    2004年08月

    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona   Department of Economics and Economic History   Assistant Professor

  • 1999年09月
    -
    2002年08月

    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona   Department of Economics and Economic History   Teaching Assistant

  • 1998年09月
    -
    1999年08月

    Budapest Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem   Department of Operations Research   Teaching Assistant

▼全件表示

所属学協会

  •  
     
     

    European Economic Association

  •  
     
     

    Economic Science Association

 

研究分野

  • 理論経済学

研究キーワード

  • microeconomics

  • game theory

  • experimental economics

論文

  • Acute stress does not affect economic behavior in the experimental laboratory

    Róbert F. Veszteg, Kaori Yamakawa, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda

    PLOS ONE   16 ( 1 ) e0244881 - e0244881  2021年01月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 責任著者

     概要を見る

    We report statistical results from a laboratory experiment in which participants were required to make decisions with monetary consequences in several solitary and interactive situations under acute stress. Our study follows the tradition of behavioral and experimental economics in selecting the experimental situations and incorporates elements from medical and psychological research in the way stress is induced and measured. It relies on a larger sample, with 192 volunteers, than previous studies to achieve higher statistical power. The main conclusion, drawn from binary comparisons between the treatment and reference groups, is that acute stress does not have a significant impact on cognitive skills, strategic sophistication, risk attitudes, altruism, cooperativeness, or nastiness. Regression analysis, controlling for psycho-social characteristics, corroborates these findings, while also suggesting that acute stress significantly decreases men’s risk aversion (as measured by a lottery-choice risk-elicitation task).

    DOI PubMed

  • Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets

    Pablo Guillen, Róbert F. Veszteg

    Experimental Economics    2020年08月  [査読有り]

    担当区分:責任著者

    DOI

  • On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining

    Noemi Navarro, Robert F. Veszteg

    Games and Economic Behavior   121   117 - 145  2020年05月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]  [国際共著]

     概要を見る

    We report experimental results and test axiomatic models of unstructured bargaining by checking the empirical relevance of the underlying axioms. Our data support strong efficiency, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives and monotonicity, and reject scale invariance. Individual rationality and midpoint domination are violated by a significant fraction of agreements that implement equal division in highly unequal circumstances. Two well-known bargaining solutions that satisfy the confirmed properties explain the observed agreements reasonably well. The most frequent agreements in our sample are the ones suggested by the equal-division solution. In terms of the average Euclidean distance, the theoretical solution that best explains the data is the deal-me-out solution (Sutton, 1986; Binmore et al., 1989, Binmore et al., 1991). Popular solutions that satisfy scale invariance, individual rationality, and midpoint domination, as the well-known Nash or Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, perform poorly in the laboratory.

    DOI

  • Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment

    Joana Pais, Ágnes Pintér, Róbert F. Veszteg

    Experimental Economics   23 ( 1 ) 212 - 239  2020年03月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]  [国際共著]

    担当区分:責任著者

     概要を見る

    In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.

    DOI

  • Monetary payoffs and utility in laboratory experiments

    Róbert F. Veszteg, Yukihiko Funaki

    Journal of Economic Psychology   65   108 - 121  2018年04月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]

    担当区分:筆頭著者

     概要を見る

    Experimental research in economics relies on performance-dependent monetary incentives to implement theoretical games in the laboratory. While the set of players and the set of strategies of those games are unambiguously defined and controlled by the experimenter, utility is typically either assumed to coincide with monetary payoffs or is estimated ex post based on observed actions. We follow a different path and discuss results from an experiment on simple 2-person games in which participants were repeatedly asked to report their expectations on the opponent's behavior and their own level of satisfaction for each possible outcome of the game. This approach allows us to reflect on experimental methodology by directly comparing monetary incentives with (perceived and declared) utility. We find that, albeit helpful, repetition and experience are unable to completely align utility with monetary incentives. While most participants (57%) seek to maximize money earnings in the experimental laboratory and tend to perceive the games in the intended way, a small – yet non-negligible – fraction (27%) of the subject pool consistently interprets the game and, therefore, acts in an unexpected way.

    DOI

  • Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule

    Yukihiko Funaki, Jiawen Li, Róbert F. Veszteg

    Games   8 ( 4 ) 52  2017年12月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]

     概要を見る

    We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.

    DOI

  • Context-dependent cheating: Experimental evidence from 16 countries

    David Pascual-Ezama, Toke R. Fosgaard, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Praveen Kujal, Robert Veszteg, Beatriz Gil-Gomez de Liano, Brian Gunia, Doris Weichselbaumer, Katharina Hilken, Armenak Antinyan, Joyce Delnoij, Antonios Proestakis, Michael D. Tira, Yulius Pratomo, Tarek Jaber-Lopez, Pablo Branas-Garza

    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization   116   379 - 386  2015年08月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]  [国際共著]

     概要を見る

    Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their institutions. However, no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across countries. This paper explores the honesty among citizens across 16 countries with 1440 participants. We employ a very simple task where participants face a trade-off between the joy of eating a fine chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. Despite the incentives to cheat, we find that individuals are mostly honest. Further, international indices that are indicative of institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens' honesty for our sample countries. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

    DOI

  • Linking Decisions with Standardization

    Róbert F. Veszteg

    Studies in Microeconomics   3 ( 1 ) 35 - 48  2015年06月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]

     概要を見る

    This article proposes a simple mechanism that can be operated without monetary transfers in situations where a group of agents have to decide over a series of common projects and they are not informed about each other’s valuations. It is shown that efficient public decisions can be made by aggregating the standardized values of the declared individual valuations if the number of agents and the number of decision problems are sufficiently large.

    DOI

  • The impact of the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami on social capital in Japan: Trust before and after the disaster

    Robert F. Veszteg, Yukihiko Funaki, Aiji Tanaka

    International Political Science Review   36 ( 2 ) 119 - 138  2015年03月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 責任著者

     概要を見る

    We report empirical results related to trust and trustworthiness based on a representative web survey carried out in March 2011 in Japan. Although it initially was intended as a pilot, our survey is unique and unrepeatable because the massive Tohoku earthquake that hit Japan in spring 2011 occurred during the data-collection process and created a natural experiment. Apart from exploring changes originated by the disaster, the novelty of our approach lies in using a multipurpose questionnaire assembled by researchers with diverse interests from different academic areas that allows for exploring political and other social correlates of the economic concepts of trust and trustworthiness as measured by the game-theoretical trust game.

    DOI

  • On "lab rats"

    Pablo Guillen, Robert F. Veszteg

    Journal of Socio-Economics   41 ( 5 ) 714 - 720  2012年10月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    Experimental subjects usually self-select to the laboratory and this may introduce a bias to the conclusions derived from observing their behavior. We analyze data stored by a subject-pool management program at an experimental laboratory and speculate ate about the effect of individual decisions on returning. Specifically, we test whether experience and earnings in previous sessions together with demographic variables explain the decision to return to the laboratory. We find that males and (in monetary terms) well-performing subjects are more likely to participate in experiments again. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • On mu from the logistic quantal-response equilibrium

    Robert F. Veszteg

    Economics Bulletin   31 ( 1 ) 102 - 111  2012年01月  [査読有り]  [国際誌]

     概要を見る

    This note reflects on the key parameter of the popular logistic quantal-response equilibrium in order to set some common guidelines on its empirical interpretation. It is stressed that the estimated model must be in harmony with the experimental design, because the estimation results on mu prove to be sensitive to changes in the strategy sets of players even if those are unimportant from a game-theoretic point of view. It is also shown that a simple post-estimation correction of mu can help inter-game comparisons, while pre-estimation treatments of the data may introduce unwanted biases.

  • Demonstrations of power: Experimental results on bilateral bargaining

    Noemi Navarro, Robert F. Veszteg

    Journal of Economic Psychology   32 ( 5 ) 762 - 772  2011年11月  [査読有り]

    DOI

  • College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study

    Joana Pais, Agnes Pinter, Robert F. Veszteg

    International Economic Review   52 ( 3 ) 713 - 737  2011年08月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    Three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale-Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.

    DOI

  • My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms

    Brice Corgnet, Angela Sutan, Robert F. Veszteg

    Journal of Socio-Economics   40 ( 4 ) 347 - 355  2011年08月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role. The inability of high-ability individuals to claim a large share of the joint profits makes the dissolution of inefficient teams difficult, and results in unprofitable cooperation. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Minority vs. majority: An experimental study of standardized bids

    Agnes Pinter, Robert F. Veszteg

    European Journal of Political Economy   26 ( 1 ) 36 - 50  2010年03月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    Due to its simplicity, the plurality voting system is frequently used to choose a common representative or project. Nevertheless, it may fail to provide a socially efficient decision as the majority can outvote any minority, even if the majority's gain does not compensate the loss suffered by the minority. In this paper, we propose and study a voting mechanism that allows voters to reveal more information about their preferences than the plurality voting system. In the standardized bids mechanism voters report a bid for all available projects that are standardized before being aggregated to choose the winning project. The standardization of bids ensures the existence of an equilibrium, and delivers incentives to overcome the problem of positive and negative exaggeration. Our experimental results show that the standardized bids mechanism performs well in the laboratory as it chooses the efficient project in almost 70% of the cases, and induces truthful reports of project rankings in approximately 90% of the cases. It also reduces the tension between the majority and the minority. (c) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Public good games and the Balinese

    Erita Narhetali, Robert F. Veszteg

    International Journal of Social Economics   37 ( 9 ) 660 - 675  2010年

  • Mon équipe et moi: une expérience sur les normes d'équité et égalité

    Brice Corgnet, Angela Sutan, Robert F. Veszteg

    Revue economique   61 ( 4 ) 771 - 782  2010年

  • Regressão quantílica com correção para a seletividade amostral: estimativa dos retornos educacionais e diferenciais raciais na distribuição de salários das mulheres no Brasil

    Danilo Coelho, Fabio Veras Soares, Robert F. Veszteg

    Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico   40 ( 1 ) 85 - 102  2010年

  • Sustainability of collusion: Evidence from the late 19th century Basque iron and steel industry

    Pedro Mendi, Robert F. Veszteg

    Investigaciones Economicas   33 ( 3 ) 385 - 404  2009年09月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    We examine the minutes of the executive committees of two Basque firms in the iron and steel industry, Altos Hornos de Bilbao and Vizcaya, to discuss the relevance of different factors on the survival and failure of the collusive agreements reached in the industry from 1886 to 1901. We observe intense communication among colluding parties during and after collusive arrangements. Collusion seems to be more likely to break down in periods of falling demand, while strong demand provides these agreements with stability. Additionally, the presence of centralized sales agencies, and similar degrees of vertical integration among colluding firms facilitate collusion.

  • Multibidding game under uncertainty

    Robert F. Veszteg

    Review of Economic Design   14 ( 3-4 ) 311 - 329  2009年

  • Information and prospects: Investment opportunities in small-cap segment

    German Lopez-Espinosa, Robert F. Veszteg

    Revista de Economía Financiera   ( 16 ) 52 - 77  2008年

  • Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism

    David Perez-Castrillo, Robert F. Veszteg

    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization   63 ( 3 ) 394 - 411  2007年07月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    [Perez-Castrillo, D., Wettstein, D., 2002. Choosing wisely: a multibidding approach. American Economic Review 5, 1577-1587.] and [Veszteg, R.F., 2004. Multibidding game under uncertainty. Working paper 14/04. Universidad de Navarra.] propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results that test the practical tractability and effectiveness of multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory, providing the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to theoretical bidding behavior. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Profitable mergers with endogenous tariffs

    Pedro Mendi, Robert F. Veszteg

    Economics Bulletin   12 ( 23 ) 1 - 8  2007年

▼全件表示

その他

  • steering committee member

    2010年
    -
    継続中

     概要を見る

    2010 -
    member of the steering committee for the English-based degree program at the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University

  • program director

    2016年
    -
    2018年

     概要を見る

    2016 - 2018
    director of the English-based degree program at the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University

  • secretary

    2005年
    -
    2007年

     概要を見る

    2005 - 2007
    secretary to the Department of Economics at Universidad de Navarra

受賞

  • Waseda Teaching Award

    2016年   Microeconomics A  

    受賞者: ヴェステグ ロベルト フェレンツ

共同研究・競争的資金等の研究課題

  • The experimental economics of decentralization

    研究期間:

    2020年04月
    -
    2023年03月
     

     概要を見る

    I seek to analyze decentralized human interaction in the experimental laboratory and test key assumptions behind the prevailing model in economics. By observing decision-makers in controlled settings resembling real-life problems, I study social interaction in the absence of a central authority

  • 協力ゲームにおける提携形成と利得分配の実験と新しい理論構築

    研究期間:

    2017年04月
    -
    2022年03月
     

  • Better foundations for better social institutions - theory and experiments

    研究期間:

    2017年04月
    -
    2020年03月
     

  • ゲーム構造に対する認識の実験研究

    研究期間:

    2014年04月
    -
    2017年03月
     

     概要を見る

    本研究は、所与のゲーム構造に対する人々の認識を、主として実験手法によって研究したものである。ゲームモデルに直面した人々の選択行動を調べ、さらにその評価を尋ねることによって、モデルに対する認識と人々の行動基準を明らかにした。研究成果として、個人の認識に基づく社会的効用を含めた誘因と個人の獲得金銭最大化の誘因の意思決定への影響が、ゲーム構造や個人によって大きく異なることが判明した。相手のもつ誘因に対する予想や判断に関しての分析を現在、続行中である。これらの研究成果は論文2編としてまとめられ査読付き国際学術誌に投稿準備中である。 関連する理論研究についても5編以上が査読付き国際誌に出版決定した

  • 排除可能な公共財供給メカニズムと供給者間競争に関する実験を含めた総合研究

    科学研究費助成事業(早稲田大学)  科学研究費助成事業(基盤研究(C))

    研究期間:

    2011年
    -
    2013年
     

     概要を見る

    本研究では、Kosfeld, Okada, Ridle(2009)の公共財供給モデルを修正し、組織の形成が可能であり、そのメンバーは組織における決定に従った投入を行わなければならないとしたとき、その組織が形成され、公共財が供給されるかどうかを実験によって検証した。組織における投入量の決定を多数決によって行ったときに、公共財へ投入が順調に行われることがわかった。この投入が成功する要因は、初回に投入しなかったプレイヤーが、その後、投入を始めることによる。その他の結果として、2択の投入レベルがある処理ではかなりうまく公共財が供給されたが、3択の投入レベルがある処理では、あまりうまくいかなかった。

講演・口頭発表等

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特定課題研究

  • Behavioral models of decentralization

    2020年   Noemi Navarro

     概要を見る

    We have collected and analyzed experimental data in two waves (January 2020 and January 2021) at LEEP (Paris, France). We have created four treatments to study unstructured bilateral bargaining.Our preliminary findings suggest that the amount of information available regarding the opponent's preferences has a significant impact on the bargaining outcome if earnings are deterministic: with full information there is a tendency to equalize monetary earnings, while with partial  information it is simply the number of objects that guides the negotiation. Interestingly,  probabilistic earnings (which are in line with theoretical models) lead to similar outcomes independently of the amount of information. As a consequence, the well-known Nash bargaining solution is a poor predictor in the "full information" + "deterministic earnings" setting (which often appears in empirical work), but performs much better in the other three environments that we have considered. An important conclusion of our study is that empirical tests (in the laboratory or outside) of bargaining theory should be carried out under a tight control of the decision-makers'  preferences. Otherwise, bargaining could be happening in units that differ from the theoretical ones and the ones assumed by the experimenter.

  • Quantum models for economic behavior

    2019年   Zsombor Méder

     概要を見る

    We analyse human decision-making in incentivized laboratory settings to answer fundamental questions about how people think about the conflict situations they face and to better understand their behavior. We complement the results presented by Veszteg and Funaki (2018) by using a broader and more systematic selection of symmetric situations.Our preliminary results, based on data gathered at Waseda SPSE in January 2020, point to the following directions.* The largest differences between induced and perceived conflicts (i.e., monetary incentives and utility) appear in situations known as battle of the sexes, anti-battle of the sexes, and coordination games.* Rationality (both based on monetary gains and declared satisfaction levels) ranges from 17% to 97% across situations. The lowest "performing" ones (in terms of both) are the prisoner's dilemma (43%), chicken (33%, 23%), battles of the sexes (40%, 33%) and anti-battle of the sexes (17%, 23%). These are also the ones with the least number of equilibrium strategy choices (below 63%).* There is no significant correlation between game-theoretical rationality and the decision-maker's social-value orientation, nor maximization score.* The occurence of mixed strategies is 24% across all situations, and 36% in those with an equilibrium in mixed strategies.

  • An Experimental Approach to Cultural Comparisons

    2014年   Subhasish Dugar

     概要を見る

    During the past academic year I undertook a research program together with Subhasish Dugar (University of Calgary, Canada). We designed a laboratory experiment to investigate the causal relation between group membership andopportunistic behaviour in a context that is ridden with informational asymmetry. We have collected data from two experimental sessions, and currently working on the related research paper.The context we focus on, otherwise known as an adverse selection problem,deals with two economic actors (a principal and an agent) who face a potentialcollaboration on a mutually beneficial project. If the principal decides to workwith the agent, she may offer a contract that specifies a wage forthe agent in exchange of which the agent is believed to put in work effort thatbenefits principal’s payoff. However, the agent could be a high calibre or a lowcalibre agent, and while that characteristic has an important impact on the results/outcome the agent is able to produce, it constitutes private information for the agent. Standard, neoclassical economic theory suggests that in our framework no interaction (between the principal and the agent) will take place. With the help of our experiments we would like to test a behavioural model which incorporates group identity and suggests a possible solution to the above-described adverse-selection problem. Simply put, we ask: what happens if both the principal and agent are from thesame group?  

海外研究活動

  • Better foundations for better social institutions-theory and experiments

    2019年04月
    -
    2020年03月

    Spain   Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

 

現在担当している科目

▼全件表示

担当経験のある科目(授業)

  • Experimental Economics

    Waseda University  

  • Spatial Economics

    Universidad del País Vasco  

  • Environmental Economics

    Universidad del País Vasco  

  • Econometrics (1/2)

    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona  

  • Economics of Information

    Waseda University, Osaka University  

  • Introduction to Game Theory

    Waseda University  

  • Introduction to Economics

    Waseda University, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid  

  • Intermediate Microeconomics (1/2)

    Waseda University, Universidad de Navarra, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Universidad del País Vasco  

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