Updated on 2022/05/17

写真a

 
VESZTEG, Robert Ferenc
 
Affiliation
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, School of Political Science and Economics
Job title
Professor
Mail Address
メールアドレス

Concurrent Post

  • Faculty of Social Sciences   School of Social Sciences

  • Faculty of Political Science and Economics   Graduate School of Political Science

  • Faculty of Political Science and Economics   Graduate School of Economics

Education

  •  
    -
    2004

    Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona   Graduate School, Division of Economics  

Degree

  • 博士

Research Experience

  • 2019.04
    -
    Now

    Waseda University   Faculty of Political Science and Economics   Professor

  • 2010.09
    -
    2019.04

    Waseda University   Faculty of Political Science and Economics   Associate Professor

  • 2009.01
    -
    2010.08

    Universidad Carlos III de Madrid   Department of Economics   Visiting Professor

  • 2008.09
    -
    2009.01

    Osaka University   Institute of Social and Economic Research   Assistant Professor

  • 2007.10
    -
    2008.09

    Universidad del País Vasco   Department of Economics I   Assistant Professor

  • 2004.09
    -
    2007.09

    Universidad de Navarra   Department of Economics   Assistant Professor

  • 2002.09
    -
    2004.08

    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona   Department of Economics and Economic History   Assistant Professor

  • 1999.09
    -
    2002.08

    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona   Department of Economics and Economic History   Teaching Assistant

  • 1998.09
    -
    1999.08

    Budapest Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem   Department of Operations Research   Teaching Assistant

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Professional Memberships

  •  
     
     

    European Economic Association

  •  
     
     

    Economic Science Association

 

Research Areas

  • Economic theory

Research Interests

  • microeconomics

  • game theory

  • experimental economics

Papers

  • Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes

    Ai Takeuchi, Róbert F. Veszteg, Yoshio Kamijo, Yukihiko Funaki

    Games and Economic Behavior   ( 134 ) 169 - 198  2022.07  [Refereed]

    Authorship:Corresponding author

  • Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets

    Pablo Guillen, Róbert F. Veszteg

    Experimental Economics   ( 24 ) 650 - 668  2021.06  [Refereed]

    Authorship:Corresponding author

    DOI

  • Acute stress does not affect economic behavior in the experimental laboratory

    Róbert F. Veszteg, Kaori Yamakawa, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda

    PLOS ONE   16 ( 1 ) e0244881 - e0244881  2021.01  [Refereed]  [International journal]

    Authorship:Lead author, Corresponding author

     View Summary

    We report statistical results from a laboratory experiment in which participants were required to make decisions with monetary consequences in several solitary and interactive situations under acute stress. Our study follows the tradition of behavioral and experimental economics in selecting the experimental situations and incorporates elements from medical and psychological research in the way stress is induced and measured. It relies on a larger sample, with 192 volunteers, than previous studies to achieve higher statistical power. The main conclusion, drawn from binary comparisons between the treatment and reference groups, is that acute stress does not have a significant impact on cognitive skills, strategic sophistication, risk attitudes, altruism, cooperativeness, or nastiness. Regression analysis, controlling for psycho-social characteristics, corroborates these findings, while also suggesting that acute stress significantly decreases men’s risk aversion (as measured by a lottery-choice risk-elicitation task).

    DOI PubMed

  • On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining

    Noemi Navarro, Robert F. Veszteg

    Games and Economic Behavior   121   117 - 145  2020.05  [Refereed]  [International journal]  [International coauthorship]

     View Summary

    We report experimental results and test axiomatic models of unstructured bargaining by checking the empirical relevance of the underlying axioms. Our data support strong efficiency, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives and monotonicity, and reject scale invariance. Individual rationality and midpoint domination are violated by a significant fraction of agreements that implement equal division in highly unequal circumstances. Two well-known bargaining solutions that satisfy the confirmed properties explain the observed agreements reasonably well. The most frequent agreements in our sample are the ones suggested by the equal-division solution. In terms of the average Euclidean distance, the theoretical solution that best explains the data is the deal-me-out solution (Sutton, 1986; Binmore et al., 1989, Binmore et al., 1991). Popular solutions that satisfy scale invariance, individual rationality, and midpoint domination, as the well-known Nash or Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, perform poorly in the laboratory.

    DOI

  • Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment

    Joana Pais, Ágnes Pintér, Róbert F. Veszteg

    Experimental Economics   23 ( 1 ) 212 - 239  2020.03  [Refereed]  [International journal]  [International coauthorship]

    Authorship:Corresponding author

     View Summary

    In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.

    DOI

  • Monetary payoffs and utility in laboratory experiments

    Róbert F. Veszteg, Yukihiko Funaki

    Journal of Economic Psychology   65   108 - 121  2018.04  [Refereed]  [International journal]

    Authorship:Lead author

     View Summary

    Experimental research in economics relies on performance-dependent monetary incentives to implement theoretical games in the laboratory. While the set of players and the set of strategies of those games are unambiguously defined and controlled by the experimenter, utility is typically either assumed to coincide with monetary payoffs or is estimated ex post based on observed actions. We follow a different path and discuss results from an experiment on simple 2-person games in which participants were repeatedly asked to report their expectations on the opponent's behavior and their own level of satisfaction for each possible outcome of the game. This approach allows us to reflect on experimental methodology by directly comparing monetary incentives with (perceived and declared) utility. We find that, albeit helpful, repetition and experience are unable to completely align utility with monetary incentives. While most participants (57%) seek to maximize money earnings in the experimental laboratory and tend to perceive the games in the intended way, a small – yet non-negligible – fraction (27%) of the subject pool consistently interprets the game and, therefore, acts in an unexpected way.

    DOI

  • Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule

    Yukihiko Funaki, Jiawen Li, Róbert F. Veszteg

    Games   8 ( 4 ) 52  2017.12  [Refereed]  [International journal]

     View Summary

    We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.

    DOI

  • Context-dependent cheating: Experimental evidence from 16 countries

    David Pascual-Ezama, Toke R. Fosgaard, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Praveen Kujal, Robert Veszteg, Beatriz Gil-Gomez de Liano, Brian Gunia, Doris Weichselbaumer, Katharina Hilken, Armenak Antinyan, Joyce Delnoij, Antonios Proestakis, Michael D. Tira, Yulius Pratomo, Tarek Jaber-Lopez, Pablo Branas-Garza

    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization   116   379 - 386  2015.08  [Refereed]  [International journal]  [International coauthorship]

     View Summary

    Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their institutions. However, no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across countries. This paper explores the honesty among citizens across 16 countries with 1440 participants. We employ a very simple task where participants face a trade-off between the joy of eating a fine chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. Despite the incentives to cheat, we find that individuals are mostly honest. Further, international indices that are indicative of institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens' honesty for our sample countries. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

    DOI

  • Linking Decisions with Standardization

    Róbert F. Veszteg

    Studies in Microeconomics   3 ( 1 ) 35 - 48  2015.06  [Refereed]  [International journal]

     View Summary

    This article proposes a simple mechanism that can be operated without monetary transfers in situations where a group of agents have to decide over a series of common projects and they are not informed about each other’s valuations. It is shown that efficient public decisions can be made by aggregating the standardized values of the declared individual valuations if the number of agents and the number of decision problems are sufficiently large.

    DOI

  • The impact of the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami on social capital in Japan: Trust before and after the disaster

    Robert F. Veszteg, Yukihiko Funaki, Aiji Tanaka

    International Political Science Review   36 ( 2 ) 119 - 138  2015.03  [Refereed]  [International journal]

    Authorship:Lead author, Corresponding author

     View Summary

    We report empirical results related to trust and trustworthiness based on a representative web survey carried out in March 2011 in Japan. Although it initially was intended as a pilot, our survey is unique and unrepeatable because the massive Tohoku earthquake that hit Japan in spring 2011 occurred during the data-collection process and created a natural experiment. Apart from exploring changes originated by the disaster, the novelty of our approach lies in using a multipurpose questionnaire assembled by researchers with diverse interests from different academic areas that allows for exploring political and other social correlates of the economic concepts of trust and trustworthiness as measured by the game-theoretical trust game.

    DOI

  • On "lab rats"

    Pablo Guillen, Robert F. Veszteg

    Journal of Socio-Economics   41 ( 5 ) 714 - 720  2012.10  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Experimental subjects usually self-select to the laboratory and this may introduce a bias to the conclusions derived from observing their behavior. We analyze data stored by a subject-pool management program at an experimental laboratory and speculate ate about the effect of individual decisions on returning. Specifically, we test whether experience and earnings in previous sessions together with demographic variables explain the decision to return to the laboratory. We find that males and (in monetary terms) well-performing subjects are more likely to participate in experiments again. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • On mu from the logistic quantal-response equilibrium

    Robert F. Veszteg

    Economics Bulletin   31 ( 1 ) 102 - 111  2012.01  [Refereed]  [International journal]

     View Summary

    This note reflects on the key parameter of the popular logistic quantal-response equilibrium in order to set some common guidelines on its empirical interpretation. It is stressed that the estimated model must be in harmony with the experimental design, because the estimation results on mu prove to be sensitive to changes in the strategy sets of players even if those are unimportant from a game-theoretic point of view. It is also shown that a simple post-estimation correction of mu can help inter-game comparisons, while pre-estimation treatments of the data may introduce unwanted biases.

  • Demonstrations of power: Experimental results on bilateral bargaining

    Noemi Navarro, Robert F. Veszteg

    Journal of Economic Psychology   32 ( 5 ) 762 - 772  2011.11  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study

    Joana Pais, Agnes Pinter, Robert F. Veszteg

    International Economic Review   52 ( 3 ) 713 - 737  2011.08  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale-Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.

    DOI

  • My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms

    Brice Corgnet, Angela Sutan, Robert F. Veszteg

    Journal of Socio-Economics   40 ( 4 ) 347 - 355  2011.08  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role. The inability of high-ability individuals to claim a large share of the joint profits makes the dissolution of inefficient teams difficult, and results in unprofitable cooperation. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Minority vs. majority: An experimental study of standardized bids

    Agnes Pinter, Robert F. Veszteg

    European Journal of Political Economy   26 ( 1 ) 36 - 50  2010.03  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    Due to its simplicity, the plurality voting system is frequently used to choose a common representative or project. Nevertheless, it may fail to provide a socially efficient decision as the majority can outvote any minority, even if the majority's gain does not compensate the loss suffered by the minority. In this paper, we propose and study a voting mechanism that allows voters to reveal more information about their preferences than the plurality voting system. In the standardized bids mechanism voters report a bid for all available projects that are standardized before being aggregated to choose the winning project. The standardization of bids ensures the existence of an equilibrium, and delivers incentives to overcome the problem of positive and negative exaggeration. Our experimental results show that the standardized bids mechanism performs well in the laboratory as it chooses the efficient project in almost 70% of the cases, and induces truthful reports of project rankings in approximately 90% of the cases. It also reduces the tension between the majority and the minority. (c) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Public good games and the Balinese

    Erita Narhetali, Robert F. Veszteg

    International Journal of Social Economics   37 ( 9 ) 660 - 675  2010

  • Mon équipe et moi: une expérience sur les normes d'équité et égalité

    Brice Corgnet, Angela Sutan, Robert F. Veszteg

    Revue economique   61 ( 4 ) 771 - 782  2010

  • Regressão quantílica com correção para a seletividade amostral: estimativa dos retornos educacionais e diferenciais raciais na distribuição de salários das mulheres no Brasil

    Danilo Coelho, Fabio Veras Soares, Robert F. Veszteg

    Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico   40 ( 1 ) 85 - 102  2010

  • Sustainability of collusion: Evidence from the late 19th century Basque iron and steel industry

    Pedro Mendi, Robert F. Veszteg

    Investigaciones Economicas   33 ( 3 ) 385 - 404  2009.09  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We examine the minutes of the executive committees of two Basque firms in the iron and steel industry, Altos Hornos de Bilbao and Vizcaya, to discuss the relevance of different factors on the survival and failure of the collusive agreements reached in the industry from 1886 to 1901. We observe intense communication among colluding parties during and after collusive arrangements. Collusion seems to be more likely to break down in periods of falling demand, while strong demand provides these agreements with stability. Additionally, the presence of centralized sales agencies, and similar degrees of vertical integration among colluding firms facilitate collusion.

  • Multibidding game under uncertainty

    Robert F. Veszteg

    Review of Economic Design   14 ( 3-4 ) 311 - 329  2009

  • Information and prospects: Investment opportunities in small-cap segment

    German Lopez-Espinosa, Robert F. Veszteg

    Revista de Economía Financiera   ( 16 ) 52 - 77  2008

  • Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism

    David Perez-Castrillo, Robert F. Veszteg

    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization   63 ( 3 ) 394 - 411  2007.07  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    [Perez-Castrillo, D., Wettstein, D., 2002. Choosing wisely: a multibidding approach. American Economic Review 5, 1577-1587.] and [Veszteg, R.F., 2004. Multibidding game under uncertainty. Working paper 14/04. Universidad de Navarra.] propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results that test the practical tractability and effectiveness of multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory, providing the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to theoretical bidding behavior. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Profitable mergers with endogenous tariffs

    Pedro Mendi, Robert F. Veszteg

    Economics Bulletin   12 ( 23 ) 1 - 8  2007

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Other

  • steering committee member

    2010
    -
    Now

     View Summary

    2010 -
    member of the steering committee for the English-based degree program at the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University

  • program director

    2016
    -
    2018

     View Summary

    2016 - 2018
    director of the English-based degree program at the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University

  • secretary

    2005
    -
    2007

     View Summary

    2005 - 2007
    secretary to the Department of Economics at Universidad de Navarra

Awards

  • Waseda Teaching Award

    2016   Microeconomics A

    Winner: VESZTEG, Róbert Ferenc

Research Projects

  • The experimental economics of decentralization

    Project Year :

    2020.04
    -
    2023.03
     

     View Summary

    I seek to analyze decentralized human interaction in the experimental laboratory and test key assumptions behind the prevailing model in economics. By observing decision-makers in controlled settings resembling real-life problems, I study social interaction in the absence of a central authority

  • New Theory and Experiment of Coalition formation and Payoff Allocation in Cooperative Game

    Project Year :

    2017.04
    -
    2022.03
     

  • Better foundations for better social institutions - theory and experiments

    Project Year :

    2017.04
    -
    2020.03
     

  • Experimental research on recognition of game structure

    Project Year :

    2014.04
    -
    2017.03
     

     View Summary

    The aim of this research is to study players' recognition of a game structure. We investigate this by using laboratory experimental method. We examine participants' behavior faced on some non-cooperative matrix games in a laboratory, and ask their subjective evaluations on outcomes. Through this study, we found their real perceptions on the game situations. This induces an analysis of standard of human behavior.The summary of the results of this research is that incentives based on individual perceptions, social preferences and monetary incentives strongly affect their decision makings, and this effect is very different among individuals. An analysis on the evaluation and the expectation of the opponents in games are still continuing. These results are summarized into two articles and they will be submitted to some international refereed journals very soon. More than 5 papers on related theory are accepted in several international refereed journals

  • Comprehensive Research for a competition of suppliers and an exclusive public goods provision mechanism

    Project Year :

    2011
    -
    2013
     

     View Summary

    This research treats an experimental study of voluntary contribution to public goods provision with endogenous institution formation. The main focus is on exploring alternative institution formation mechanism that further improves the overall efficiency. We found that the voluntary participation of institution and a plurality voting rule within the institution to decide among multiple available contribution levels generates a satisfying results. Comparing to other mechanisms, the improvement is mainly due to a increased contribution from players who do not join the institution in the first place.

Presentations

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Specific Research

  • Behavioral models of decentralization

    2020   Noemi Navarro

     View Summary

    We have collected and analyzed experimental data in two waves (January 2020 and January 2021) at LEEP (Paris, France). We have created four treatments to study unstructured bilateral bargaining.Our preliminary findings suggest that the amount of information available regarding the opponent's preferences has a significant impact on the bargaining outcome if earnings are deterministic: with full information there is a tendency to equalize monetary earnings, while with partial  information it is simply the number of objects that guides the negotiation. Interestingly,  probabilistic earnings (which are in line with theoretical models) lead to similar outcomes independently of the amount of information. As a consequence, the well-known Nash bargaining solution is a poor predictor in the "full information" + "deterministic earnings" setting (which often appears in empirical work), but performs much better in the other three environments that we have considered. An important conclusion of our study is that empirical tests (in the laboratory or outside) of bargaining theory should be carried out under a tight control of the decision-makers'  preferences. Otherwise, bargaining could be happening in units that differ from the theoretical ones and the ones assumed by the experimenter.

  • Quantum models for economic behavior

    2019   Zsombor Méder

     View Summary

    We analyse human decision-making in incentivized laboratory settings to answer fundamental questions about how people think about the conflict situations they face and to better understand their behavior. We complement the results presented by Veszteg and Funaki (2018) by using a broader and more systematic selection of symmetric situations.Our preliminary results, based on data gathered at Waseda SPSE in January 2020, point to the following directions.* The largest differences between induced and perceived conflicts (i.e., monetary incentives and utility) appear in situations known as battle of the sexes, anti-battle of the sexes, and coordination games.* Rationality (both based on monetary gains and declared satisfaction levels) ranges from 17% to 97% across situations. The lowest "performing" ones (in terms of both) are the prisoner's dilemma (43%), chicken (33%, 23%), battles of the sexes (40%, 33%) and anti-battle of the sexes (17%, 23%). These are also the ones with the least number of equilibrium strategy choices (below 63%).* There is no significant correlation between game-theoretical rationality and the decision-maker's social-value orientation, nor maximization score.* The occurence of mixed strategies is 24% across all situations, and 36% in those with an equilibrium in mixed strategies.

  • An Experimental Approach to Cultural Comparisons

    2014   Subhasish Dugar

     View Summary

    During the past academic year I undertook a research program together with Subhasish Dugar (University of Calgary, Canada). We designed a laboratory experiment to investigate the causal relation between group membership andopportunistic behaviour in a context that is ridden with informational asymmetry. We have collected data from two experimental sessions, and currently working on the related research paper.The context we focus on, otherwise known as an adverse selection problem,deals with two economic actors (a principal and an agent) who face a potentialcollaboration on a mutually beneficial project. If the principal decides to workwith the agent, she may offer a contract that specifies a wage forthe agent in exchange of which the agent is believed to put in work effort thatbenefits principal’s payoff. However, the agent could be a high calibre or a lowcalibre agent, and while that characteristic has an important impact on the results/outcome the agent is able to produce, it constitutes private information for the agent. Standard, neoclassical economic theory suggests that in our framework no interaction (between the principal and the agent) will take place. With the help of our experiments we would like to test a behavioural model which incorporates group identity and suggests a possible solution to the above-described adverse-selection problem. Simply put, we ask: what happens if both the principal and agent are from thesame group?  

Overseas Activities

  • Better foundations for better social institutions-theory and experiments

    2019.04
    -
    2020.03

    Spain   Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

 

Syllabus

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Teaching Experience

  • Experimental Economics

    Waseda University  

  • Spatial Economics

    Universidad del País Vasco  

  • Environmental Economics

    Universidad del País Vasco  

  • Econometrics (1/2)

    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona  

  • Economics of Information

    Waseda University, Osaka University  

  • Introduction to Game Theory

    Waseda University  

  • Introduction to Economics

    Waseda University, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid  

  • Intermediate Microeconomics (1/2)

    Waseda University, Universidad de Navarra, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Universidad del País Vasco  

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