We analyze the connectivity of equity investments to the firms in the global ownership network that are reported as non-compliant with Environment, Social, and Government (ESG) benchmarks. We find that a large number of shareholders have ownership linkages to non-ESG firms, most commonly with three or four degrees of separation. Analyzing the betweenness centrality for shareholders connecting the ultimate owners and non-ESG firms, we find that the investment management companies play important roles in channeling the investment money into non-ESG firms, where largest American asset managers commonly have one to two degrees of separation on their ownership linkages to those problematic firms. Since asset managers collect capital from investors by running the equity funds, we analyze the ownership stakes and the associated voting rights attributable to the equity funds investors. We estimate the distribution of the power of corporate control over non-ESG firms among specific asset managers (such as BlackRock and Fidelity) and among different types of the equity funds (such as mutual funds and exchanged-traded funds), and explores how investing in the equity funds rather than ownership investing may have shifted the distribution of the power to control those non-ESG firms.

約6600万ノード（企業とその株主）で構成されるグローバルな株所有ネットワークに，約80万種の投資ファンドを結合する．投資運用会社は，投資家の投資ファンドを運用することにより多くの企業の直接的または間接的な株主になり，収益を得る．そして，株主として企業を支配する．我々は，複雑でグローバルな株所有ネットワークを紐解き，社会的責任を伴うESGの投資ファンドとヴァイス企業（たばこ，軍需産業など）とを繋げる経路が存在することを指摘する．投資をやめれば，ヴァイス企業からの収益はなくなるが，支配することができず野放しになる．一方で，投資をおこなえば，ヴァイス企業からの収益を受け取ることになる．このジレンマは，グローバル株所有ネットワークで線形におこなわれる収益の配分と，多数決を通じて非線形におこなわれる支配力の配分を定量化し，収益と支配力とのバランスで投資の可否を決断することにより解決できる．

Extending the Shapley-Shubik power index to networks, we propose a new measure and numerical method to calculate the indirect influence of investors on companies: Network power index (NPI). While the original index, reflecting the characteristics of majority vote in a shareholders meeting, measures the direct voting power of a shareholder, NPI captures not only an investor’s direct influence over a company but also indirect influence over this company’s subsidiary. Since NPI is often incalculable in a large network, we present a new method to numerically compute NPI: label propagation. Applying this method to the global shareholding networks in 2016, we find NPIs and raw vote shares dramatically diverge for some investors and this discrepancy suggests the difference in investment strategies between governments and private financial institutions.

グローバルな株式所有関係により、企業は間接的に外国政府や企業の支配下に置かれることがある。例えば、中国政府は国有企業を通じて外国の電力会社や港湾事業者に間接的な影響を及ぼしていると言われている。そこで報告者たちは昨年、こうした間接的支配を定量化するNetwork Power Index (NPI) およびその計算アルゴリズムを発表した。本報告では株式ネットワークの変化によるNPIの変化に焦点を当てる。具体的には香港が中国の完全な支配下に置かれた場合と中国から独立した場合のシミュレーションを行う。NPIは株主の議決権比率それ自体ではなく株主間の議決権比率の分布によって決定されるため、中国と香港の間の政治的対立が第三国に波及することが考えられる。本研究のシミュレーションにより、それぞれのシナリオにおいて得をする国と損をする国が明らかにした。興味深いことに、日本は香港の地位がどのようになったとしても影響力を低下させることが分かった。このような株式関係の変化が第三者に与える影響は効果的な株式投資にも役立つものだと考えられる。

This study contrasts the rationalist and psychologist approaches to information failure as the cause of crisis escalation and war. Building on the psychological insights on misperception, it presents a simple game-theoretic model of crisis bargaining, where signals are subject to perceptual errors and thereby multiple interpretations. The model allows us to analyze the interplay between the problem of misrepresentation in sending signals and the problem of misperception in forming beliefs. The analysis offers a rationalist logic of signaling and perception, which links Bayesian learning, incentive problems, misperception, and war. The analysis also shows that misperception generates more than pathologies in crisesmisperception, under the right condition, makes signals fully informative, reduces the risk of war, and attenuates the adverse impact of incomplete information on the risk of crisis escalation and war.

Selection effects in crisis bargaining make it difficult to directly measure audience costs because state leaders have an incentive to avoid incurring audience costs. We overcome this inferential problem of selection bias by using a structural statistical model. This approach allows us to estimate the size of audience costs, both incurred and not incurred, in international crises. We show that although audience costs exist for state leaders of various regime types, democratic leaders face larger audience costs than nondemocratic leaders do. Audience costs can be so large that war might be preferable to concessions, especially for leaders of highly democratic states. Audience costs also increase a state's bargaining leverage in crises because the target state is more likely to acquiesce if the challenge carries larger audience costs. We also find evidence that audience costs generate selection effects.

This paper explores when and why private communication works in crisis diplomacy. Conventional audience-cost models suggest that state leaders must go public with their threats in international crises because leaders cannot tie their hands if signals are issued privately. I present a crisis bargaining game where both the sender and the receiver of signals have a domestic audience. The equilibrium analysis demonstrates that a private threat, albeit of limited credibility, can be equally compelling as a fully credible public threat. The analysis suggests that secrecy works in crisis diplomacy despite its informational inefficacy. Secrecy insulates leaders from domestic political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid risking unwarranted war. The logic of efficient secrecy helps shed light on the unaccounted history of private diplomacy in international crises. The Alaska Boundary Dispute illustrates this logic.