Updated on 2021/12/08

写真a

 
SUZUKI, Ayako
 
Affiliation
Faculty of International Research and Education, School of International Liberal Studies
Job title
Associate Professor

Research Institute

  • 2019
    -
     

    産業経営研究所   兼任研究所員

Education

  •  
     
     

    Glasgow University   Department of Accounting and Finance   International Finance  

  •  
     
     

    Johns Hopkins University   Department of Economics  

Degree

  • Keio University   BA in Economics

  • Glasgow University   MPhil in International Finance

  • Johns Hopkins University   PhD in Economics

Research Experience

  • 2014.04
    -
     

    Waseda University   School of International Liberal Studies   Associate Professor

  • 2008.08
    -
    2014.03

    Waseda University   School of International Liberal Studies   Assistant Professor

  • 2006.08
    -
    2008.07

    Osaka University   Institute of Social and Economic Research   Assistant Professor

  • 2004
    -
    2006

    World Bank   DECRG   Consultant

 

Research Areas

  • Economic policy

Research Interests

  • Industrial Organization, Antitrust, Regulation

Papers

  • Investigating Pure Bundling in Japan’s Electricity Procurement Auctions

    Ayako Suzuki

    Mathematics   9 ( 14 ) 1622 - 1622  2021.07  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This study investigates the effect of bundling contracts on electricity procurement auctions in Tokyo. We conduct structural estimations that include elements of asymmetry between the incumbent and the new entrant firms and that endogenize the participation of bidders, and investigate the effect of bundling on the costs of firms, competition between the incumbent and the new firms, and auction outcomes. The results first confirm that bundling contracts raises the cost of firms, increases the asymmetry between incumbent and new firms and helps exclude new firms from auctions. We find the negative effect increasing the costs of firms is somewhat mitigated by a larger scale of bundling, but that the negative effect on participation is scarcely offset by scale. The payment of the auctioneer may decline if bundling results in a large-sized auction, but the profit of the winner is always found to be lower in bundled auctions, presumably because firms bid more aggressively owing to the smaller dispersion of the opponents’ cost distributions.

    DOI

  • 談合の実証分析

    鈴木 彩子

    経済セミナー 増刊   Chapter 12  2020.04

  • 独占禁止法を理解する上での経済学

    鈴木 彩子

    公正取引   No. 834   20 - 28  2020.04

  • The Effect of Bundling Several Contracts on Electricity Procurement Auctions

    Ayako Suzuki

    Waseda Global Forum   14   23 - 39  2018.03

  • 自動認可運賃と監督官庁による指導

    大久保直樹, 鈴木彩子

    岡田羊祐・川濱昇・林秀弥編「独禁法審判決の法と経済学」    2017.01

  • Does Managerial Experience in a Target Firm Matter for the Retention of Managers after M&As?

    Kenjiro Hirata, Ayako Suzuki, Katsuya Takii

    TCER Working Paper E-108    2016.05

  • 情報の非対称性のもとでのインセンティブ規制についての考察

    鈴木彩子

    吉野直行ほか編著「日本経済の課題と針路 経済政策の理論・実証分析」    2015.03

  • 低価格入札に関する研究

    鈴木彩子, 大久保直樹, 塚田益徳, 高橋理人, 荒井弘毅, 工藤恭

    公正取引委員会競争政策研究センター共同研究報告書   CR04-12  2012.10

  • A generational difference in reference point adaptation: an experimental study

    Koichi Kume, Ayako Suzuki

    The Empirical Economics Letters   11 ( 9 ) 909 - 916  2012.09

  • Yardstick Competition to Elicit Private Information: An Empirical Analysis

    Ayako Suzuki

    REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION   40 ( 4 ) 313 - 338  2012.06  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    The Japanese regulatory authority has introduced a new hybrid regulation that combines a fixed-price contract with ex ante yardstick inspection for local (public utility) gas distribution. The latter compares a firm's reported costs with those of 'similar' firms, and penalizes high-cost firms. We infer the effect of yardstick on information revelation by comparing the actual welfare level with the hypothetical full-information welfare level. Our results suggest that only the very first inspection was effective in reducing firms' incentive to report higher costs.

    DOI

  • 規制の競争への効果の分析-広告時間の自主規制に関する経済分析-

    鈴木彩子, 松島法明, 荒井弘毅, 松八重泰輔

    公正取引委員会競争政策研究センター共同研究報告書   CR 03-11  2011.11

  • An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Electric Power Procurement Auctions

    Ayako Suzuki

    Waseda Global Forum 2010   7   385 - 404  2011.03

  • 競争政策研究センターだより

    鈴木彩子

    公正取引    2010.09

  • 気鋭の論点: オークション理論 弱者優遇にプラス効果

    鈴木彩子

    日経ビジネス   2010年5月31日号  2010.05

  • Bundling Products with Decreasing Value: Evidence from the US Cable Television Industry

    Ayako Suzuki

    Waseda Global Forum 2009   6   265 - 284  2010.03

  • Market foreclosure and vertical merger: A case study of the vertical merger between Turner Broadcasting and Time Warner

    Ayako Suzuki

    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION   27 ( 4 ) 532 - 543  2009.07  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We employ an event-study methodology, the event being the vertical merger between Time Warner and Turner Broadcasting, distribution and programming, respectively, in the cable television industry. We assess the effects of the merger on final prices, subscriptions, and carriage and marketing decisions of Time Warner. The analysis finds several interesting facts. First, foreclosure in Time Warner markets following the merger is observed for the rival channels that are not integrated with any cable distributors. Second, the Turner Broadcasting channels that increased market shares because of this merger appeared to be foreclosed by Time Warner prior to the merger. The preference for own channels by Time Warner persisted, despite a lower quality of channel bundles in its markets; efficiency gains from the merger were not passed on to consumers. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • セット販売商品はお買い得か

    鈴木 彩子

    大竹文雄編「こんなに使える経済学」ちくま新書 第3章の1     79 - 85  2008.01

  • サザエさんの本当の歳を知るには

    鈴木 彩子

    大竹文雄編「こんなに使える経済学」ちくま新書 第5章の5     167 - 172  2008.01

  • バンドリングはお買い得か

    鈴木 彩子

    週刊エコノミスト   84 ( 68 ) 116 - 117  2006.12

  • 嘘をつかせないルール設計を

    鈴木 彩子

    週刊エコノミスト   84 ( 56 ) 104 - 105  2006.10

  • The basket-peg, dollar-peg, and floating: A comparative analysis

    N Yoshino, S Kaji, A Suzuki

    JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES   18 ( 2 ) 183 - 217  2004.06  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    The topic of this paper is the optimal exchange rate regime for a small open economy. We argue that the best exchange rate regime depends on the policy goal. Small open economies, such as those that experienced the recent currency and economic crises in Asia, should decide for themselves what their policy goals are, and then choose the exchange rate regime that is most conducive to achieving those goals. Adopting a basket-peg with trade weights will not in general be the optimal choice. In comparison to the dollar-peg, there are three possible advantages to the peg against the basket comprising two currencies, say the dollar and the yen. If the policy goal is to maintain monetary policy autonomy, then the best exchange rate regime is floating exchange rates, provided the autonomy is used wisely. J. Japanese Int. Economies 18 (2) (2004) 183-217. Faculty of Economics, Keio University, Japan; Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University, USA. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  • A comparative analysis of exchange rate regimes

    N Yoshino, S Kaji, A Suzuki

    EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY     107 - 131  2003  [Refereed]

  • 為替制度の比較分析

    吉野直行, 嘉治佐保子, 鈴木彩子

    金融の新しい流れ    2001

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Awards

  • Kenichi Miyazawa Memorial Award by Fair Trade Institute

    2012  

  • The Seimeikai grant

    2011.06  

  • Fulbright Scholarship

    2001  

  • Class Prize (Glasgow University)

    1998  

Research Projects

  • 日本の上下水道事業における官民連携制度の実証分析

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業 基盤研究(C)

    Project Year :

    2021.04
    -
    2024.03
     

    鈴木 彩子

  • Economic Analysis of Procurement: Theory and Applications

    Project Year :

    2015.04
    -
    2019.03
     

     View Summary

    First, we establish some foundations of the analysis of auctions and contracts in public procurement, contributing to our understanding of bidder behavior and desirable institutional design. In particular, we find a workable model to study bidder behavior in general scoring auctions, derive optimal scoring rule when the quality is multidimensional, and also establish a method to detect bidder collusion from large scale auction data.Second, we find how procurement design affects the performance. In particular, we empirically analyze the effect of bundling in procurement, and theoretically discover how bidder incentive changes in simultaneous or sequential multi-unit auctions

  • Empirical analysis of asymmetric auction in electric power procurement auctions

    Project Year :

    2010.04
    -
    2014.03
     

     View Summary

    This study investigates the bidding patterns of entrant and incumbent firms in electric power procurement auctions in the Japanese retail electricity market. The study explores the reasons for the persistently low participation rate of entrants and the effects of preferential treatment aimed at enhancing the participation of entrants. The achievement of the study includes the data collection. We collected the information on each auction, including losing bids, from each auctioneer in accordance with the information disclosure system. The structural estimation of a static model found that bid discounts have little effect on entrant participation and that a lump-sum subsidy to entrants is more cost effective by enhancing participation of entrants. However, this model fails to consider the effect of supply capacity constraints of entrant, and the next step of the current study will be to take the capacity constraint into account of the model

  • Economic Analysis of Human Resource Allocation

    Project Year :

    2009.04
    -
    2014.03
     

     View Summary

    This project is aimed at analyzing the role of human resource allocation on the productivity and hierarchy in the society. We summarize the results below. To understand how human resource allocation influences the aggregate productivity, we theoretically analyzed the relation between higher education and human resource allocation and between a firm specific human capital and human resource allocation. We also empirically investigated how the changes in presidents at Japanese corporations change the firms' strategy. To understand how human resource allocation influences the hierarchy in the society, we empirically investigated the relation between promotion and lateral transfer and how managers' tenure in target influences the retention rate as a director after M&A. We also applied a previously developed model to Japanese data to understand the hierarchy across firms. Finally, we accumulated several data such as university ranking and career for bureaucrats

  • The Analysis on the Source and the Economic Impacts of Manager's Vision and Organizational Capacity

  • Vertical integration and market foreclosure

     View Summary

    This project analyzes effects of vertical integrations on market outcomes. Specifically, I empirically examine the relative size of the efficiency and foreclosure effects of vertical integrations in the US cable television industry for the purpose of understanding the welfare implication of vertical integration. The analysis finds that market prices were dropped due to the merger in the industry, suggesting that there might have been an improvement in efficiency. However, the preference for own channels by the integrated cable television company persisted despite a lower quality of channel bundles; efficiency gains from the merger were not passed on to consumers

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Presentations

  • Pharmaceutical Price Regulation and Timing of Market Entry

    Japanese Economic Association Fall Meeting 

    Presentation date: 2011.10

  • An empirical analysis of entrant and incumbent bidding in electric power procurement auctions

    European Economic Association (Glasgow) 

    Presentation date: 2010.08

  • An empirical analysis of entrant and incumbent bidding in electric power procurement auctions

    Japanese Economic Association Spring Meeting 

    Presentation date: 2010.06

  • An empirical analysis of entrant and incumbent bidding in electric power procurement auctions

    Japanese Economic Association Spring Meeting 

    Presentation date: 2010.06

  • An empirical analysis of entrant and incumbent bidding in electric power procurement auctions

    International Industrial Organization Conference (Vancouver) 

    Presentation date: 2010.05

  • An empirical analysis of entrant and incumbent bidding in electric power procurement auctions

    European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (Ljubljana) 

    Presentation date: 2009.09

  • Yardstick Competition to Elicit Private Information: An Empirical Analysis of the Japanese Gas Distribution Industry

    European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (Toulouse) 

    Presentation date: 2008.09

  • Yardstick Competition to Elicit Private Information: An Empirical Analysis of the Japanese Gas Distribution Industry

    European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (Toulouse) 

    Presentation date: 2008.09

  • Bundling Products with Decreasing Value

    Japanese Economic Association Spring Meeting 

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Syllabus

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