Theoretical and Experimental Research on Money and Market System in the Pacific Island Countries
Project Year :
2018.04
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2023.03
Economic research on business and accounting systems in the world
Project Year :
2012.10
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2017.03
Theoretical and Empirical Studies on Economic Models with Discrete Structure
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In this research project, we study economic models with indivisible goods. There are two kinds of models : one-sided models and two-sided models. This research project consists of two parts : theoretical part and empirical part. In the theoretical research part, we have five papers. In the first paper, we study a one-sided model with indivisible good and asymmetric information. In the research we show that there exists a certain kind of equilibrium that cannot exists in models with infinitely divisible good. In the second paper, we give a complete characterization of the core of assignment problems by using some axioms including a consistency axiom. This characterization can be interpreted as a characterization of a set of competitive equilibria of a general equilibrium model with indivisible goods. In the third paper, we study matching problems with externalities. We give an appropriate definition of stability in this setting and investigate some properties of the set of stable matchinges Although a stable matching in not necessarily Pareto-optimal, we prove that there exists a stable and Pareto-optimal matching. In the fourth paper, we study a fixed-price economy with indivisible good. We show that there is only one resource allocation mechanism that satisfies the strategy-proofness, Pareto-optimality, and anonymity. In the fifth paper, we study a matching problem with one-sided externalities. For the empirical research, we study a college admission problems and we find some empirical evidences which indicate that recommendation by some high school is determined by the Gale-Shapley Algorithm. We discuss some merits of the mechanism
On theory of the collective choice and the mechanism design including the voting system with some applications to problems of the collective decision making of shareholders
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In this research project, we studied the mechanism design of resource allocation mechanisms from several different points of view when the price mechanism does not necessarily work well. If one cannot use the market mechanism for allocating resources, economic agents should report information on their own preferences to a coordinator (e.g., the government) of the allocation, and the coordinator should aggregate the information and perform the allocation according to a predetermined allocation rule. The voting system is a typical example of such an aggregation rule. We investigated and evaluated several resource allocation mechanisms including the voting mechanism
太平洋島嶼国の貨幣と市場制度の生成と発展に関する研究:理論と実験
日本学術振興会
科学研究費
Presentations
Presentations
"Apportionment Method and Procurement Contract" session chairperson
Hitotsubashi GCOE Lectures and Workshop on Choice, Games, and Welfare
Presentation date:
2010.10
The Second Best Efficiency of Allocation Rules : Strategy-proofness and Single-peaked Preferences with Multiple Commodities(with Hidekazu Anno)
RIEB Seminar, Kobe University
Presentation date:
2009.09
Equity and Efficiency: a method of finding all envy-free and efficient allocations where preferences are single-peaked (with Hidekazu Anno)
9th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (at Concordia University, Montreal, Canada)