Updated on 2025/07/19

写真a

 
SHIMIZU, Kazumi
 
Affiliation
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, School of Political Science and Economics
Job title
Professor
Degree
経済学博士 ( グルノーブル大学（仏） )

Professional Memberships

  • 　
    　
    　

    Human Behavior and Evolutionary Science in Japan

Research Areas

  • Economic policy

Research Interests

  • Experimental Economics, Methodology of Political Economy

 

Papers

  • Is human life worth peanuts? Risk attitude changes in accordance with varying stakes

    Kazumi Shimizu, Daisuke Udagawa

    PLoS ONE   13 ( 8 )  2018.08  [Refereed]

    　View Summary

    © 2018 Shimizu, Udagawa. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Risk aversion is well-known as a general and robust characteristic of people’s decision making: people are less likely to gamble when they are unsure if they will obtain the expected value of the bet made. The “peanuts effect” is, however, an exception to this general rule. The “peanuts effect,” which states that people are more willing to gamble when playing for “peanuts” (a small outcome), has been stably observed in the context of a small monetary stake. We conducted two types of experiments to verify whether the peanuts effect still occurred when the type of stakes changed. We had two main findings. On the one hand, people tended to gamble more for a qualitatively smaller value when the stake was material in nature, meaning that the “peanuts effect” occurred with a qualitatively low stake. On the other hand, people were willing to take a risk for a qualitatively larger value when the stake was a human life: this is the opposite phenomenon of the “peanuts effect.”

    DOI PubMed

    Scopus

    6
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation

    Hiroki Ozono, Yoshio Kamijo, Kazumi Shimizu

    SCIENTIFIC REPORTS   7 ( 1 )  2017.10  [Refereed]

    　View Summary

    Second-order free riders, who do not owe punishment cost to first-order free riders in public goods games, lead to low cooperation. Previous studies suggest that for stable cooperation, it is critical to have a pool punishment system with second-order punishment, which gathers resources from group members and punishes second-order free riders as well as first-order free riders. In this study, we focus on the priority of punishment. We hypothesize that the pool punishment system that prioritizes second-order punishment is more likely to achieve cooperation than the system that prioritizes first-order punishment, because the former is more likely to obtain sufficient punishment resources. In the experiments, we compare four pool punishment systems: 1To2 (first-order punishment to second-order punishment), 2To1 (second-order punishment to first-order punishment), 1ONLY (first-order punishment only), and 2ONLY (second-order punishment only). We find that the 2To1 and 2ONLY systems can receive more support than the 1To2 and 1ONLY systems and only the 2To1 system can achieve high cooperation. However, the effect of priority of second-order punishment is observed only when the punishment ratio (PR) is low (Experiment 1), not high (Experiment 2), in which the punishment resource is relatively abundant.

    DOI

    Scopus

    30
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system

    Hiroki Ozono, Nobuhito Jin, Motoki Watabe, Kazumi Shimizu

    Scientific Reports   6  2016.12

    　View Summary

    Punishment of non-cooperators-free riders-can lead to high cooperation in public goods games (PGG). However, second-order free riders, who do not pay punishment costs, reduce the effectiveness of punishment. Here we introduce a "leader support system," in which one group leader can freely punish group followers using capital pooled through the support of group followers. In our experiment, participants engage in three stages repeatedly: a PGG stage in which followers decide to cooperate for their group
    a support stage in which followers decide whether to support the leader
    and a punishment stage in which the leader can punish any follower. We compare a support-present condition with a no-support condition, in which there is an external source for the leader's punishment. The results show that punishment occurs more frequently in the support-present condition than the no-support condition. Within the former, both higher cooperation and higher support for a leader are achieved under linkage-type leaders-who punish both non-cooperators and non-supporters. In addition, linkage-type leaders themselves earn higher profits than other leader types because they withdraw more support. This means that leaders who effectively punish followers could increase their own benefits and the second-order free rider problem would be solved.

    DOI

    Scopus

    32
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system

    Hiroki Ozono, Nobuhito Jin, Motoki Watabe, Kazumi Shimizu

    SCIENTIFIC REPORTS   6  2016.12  [Refereed]

    　View Summary

    Punishment of non-cooperators-free riders-can lead to high cooperation in public goods games (PGG). However, second-order free riders, who do not pay punishment costs, reduce the effectiveness of punishment. Here we introduce a "leader support system," in which one group leader can freely punish group followers using capital pooled through the support of group followers. In our experiment, participants engage in three stages repeatedly: a PGG stage in which followers decide to cooperate for their group; a support stage in which followers decide whether to support the leader; and a punishment stage in which the leader can punish any follower. We compare a support-present condition with a no-support condition, in which there is an external source for the leader's punishment. The results show that punishment occurs more frequently in the support-present condition than the no-support condition. Within the former, both higher cooperation and higher support for a leader are achieved under linkage-type leaders-who punish both non-cooperators and non-supporters. In addition, linkage-type leaders themselves earn higher profits than other leader types because they withdraw more support. This means that leaders who effectively punish followers could increase their own benefits and the second-order free rider problem would be solved.

    DOI

    Scopus

    32
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Institutionalize Reciprocity to Overcome the Public Goods Provision Problem

    Hiroki Ozono, Yoshio Kamijo, Kazumi Shimizu

    PLOS ONE   11 ( 6 )  2016.06  [Refereed]

    　View Summary

    Cooperation is fundamental to human societies, and one of the important paths for its emergence and maintenance is reciprocity. In prisoner's dilemma (PD) experiments, reciprocal strategies are often effective at attaining and maintaining high cooperation. In many public goods (PG) games or n-person PD experiments, however, reciprocal strategies are not successful at engendering cooperation. In the present paper, we attribute this difficulty to a coordination problem against free riding among reciprocators: Because it is difficult for the reciprocators to coordinate their behaviors against free riders, this may lead to inequality among players, which will demotivate them from cooperating in future rounds. We propose a new mechanism, institutionalized reciprocity (IR), which refers to embedding the reciprocal strategy as an institution (i.e., institutionalizing the reciprocal strategy). We experimentally demonstrate that IR can prevent groups of reciprocators from falling into coordination failure and achieve high cooperation in PG games. In conclusion, we argue that a natural extension of the present study will be to investigate the possibility of IR to serve as a collective punishment system.

    DOI

    Scopus

    5
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Overcoming coordination failure using a mechanism based on gradualism and endogeneity

    Kamijo, Yoshio, Ozono, Hiroki, Shimizu, Kazumi

    Experimental Economics   19 ( 1 ) 202 - 217  2016.03

    　View Summary

    © 2015, Economic Science Association.We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple-choice coordination game. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult one. The Endogenous Ascending mechanism implies that a gradual increase in the upper bound of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. The Endogenous Descending mechanism requires that when the game’s participants fail to coordinate, the level of the next coordination game be adjusted such that the game becomes simpler. We show that gradualism may not always work, but in such instances, its effect can be reinforced by endogeneity. Our laboratory experiment provides evidence that a mechanism that combines three tools, herein termed the “Gradualism with Endogenous Ascending and Descending (GEAD)” mechanism, works well. We discuss how the GEAD mechanism can be applied to real-life situations that suffer from coordination failure.

    DOI

    Scopus

    5
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • Public goods provision experiment with CASI survey

    Shimizu, Kazumi, Morimoto, Yuko, Watabe, Motoki, Iida, Takeshi, Kuriyama, Koichi

    Electoral Survey Methodology: Insight from Japan on Using Computer Assisted Personal Interviews     109 - 125  2016.03

    DOI

    Scopus

  • Overcoming coordination failure using a mechanism based on gradualism and endogeneity

    Yoshio Kamijo, Hiroki Ozono, Kazumi Shimizu

    Experimental Economics   19 ( 1 ) 202 - 217  2016.03

    　View Summary

    We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple-choice coordination game. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult one. The Endogenous Ascending mechanism implies that a gradual increase in the upper bound of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. The Endogenous Descending mechanism requires that when the game’s participants fail to coordinate, the level of the next coordination game be adjusted such that the game becomes simpler. We show that gradualism may not always work, but in such instances, its effect can be reinforced by endogeneity. Our laboratory experiment provides evidence that a mechanism that combines three tools, herein termed the “Gradualism with Endogenous Ascending and Descending (GEAD)” mechanism, works well. We discuss how the GEAD mechanism can be applied to real-life situations that suffer from coordination failure.

    DOI

    Scopus

    5
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • 第1章、第17章

    清水和巳

    実験が切り開く21世紀の社会科学    2014

  • 実験室からフィールドへ

    山崎新, 清水和巳

    世論調査の新しい地平-CASI方式世論調査     283 - 299  2013

  • 協調問題とコンテクスト:政治経済学実験の方法論

    清水和巳, 遠藤晶久

    新しい政治経済学の胎動     129 - 161  2013

  • 疎開させるか/疎開させないか—選択当事者としての視点

    清水和巳

    「震災後」に考える、「原発」に向き合う視点   16   31 - 53  2012.05

  • A re-examination of the effect of contextual group size on people's attitude to risk

    Co-author, Daisuke Udagawa

    Jugement and Decision Making   6 ( 2 ) 156 - 162  2011.03

  • How can group experience influence the cue priority? A re-examination of the ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis.

    Shimizu Kazumi, Udagawa Daisuke

    How can group experience influence the cue priority? A re-examination of the ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis.   2  2011

    　View Summary

    :Since the discovery of the "framing effect" by Kahneman and Tversky, the sensitivity of the "framing effect" - its appearance and in some cases its disappearance - has long been an object of study. However there is little agreement as to the reasons for this sensitivity. The "ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis" (Wang, 2008) aims to systematically explain the sensitivity of this effect by paying particular attention to people's cue priority: it states that the framing effect occurs when verbal framing is used to compensate for the absence of higher prioritized decision cues. The main purpose of our study is to examine and develop this hypothesis by examining cue priority given differences in people's "group experience." The main result is that the framing effect is absent when the choice problem is presented in a group context that reflects the actual size of the group that the participant has had experience with. Thus, in order to understand the choices that people make in life and death decisions, it is important to incorporate the decision maker's group experience explicitly into the ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis.

    DOI

    Scopus

    6
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • How can group experience influence the cue priority? A re-examination of the ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis

    Kazumi Shimizu, Daisuke Udagawa

    Frontiers in Psychology   2 ( OCT ) 1 - 9  2011

    　View Summary

    Since the discovery of the "framing effect" by Kahneman and Tversky, the sensitivity of the "framing effect" - its appearance and in some cases its disappearance - has long been an object of study. However there is little agreement as to the reasons for this sensitivity. The "ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis" (Wang, 2008) aims to systematically explain the sensitivity of this effect by paying particular attention to people's cue priority: it states that the framing effect occurs when verbal framing is used to compensate for the absence of higher prioritized decision cues. The main purpose of our study is to examine and develop this hypothesis by examining cue priority given differences in people's "group experience." The main result is that the framing effect is absent when the choice problem is presented in a group context that reflects the actual size of the group that the participant has had experience with.Thus, in order to understand the choices that people make in life and death decisions, it is important to incorporate the decision maker's group experience explicitly into the ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis. © 2011 Shimizu and Udagawa.

    DOI

    Scopus

    6
    Citation
    (Scopus)

  • 生死問題におけるサイズ効果—心の進化的基盤の検討—

    共著者

    早稲田政治経済学雑誌   ( 370 ) 81 - 91  2008

  • 入門政治経済学方法論

    編著(共編著者河

       2008

  • 価値感情と懲罰

    シリーズ 制度と秩序の政治経済学 第1 巻 新しい政治経済学の構築へ向けて    2006

  • AFTA and Asian Integration —A Step toward the “Globalization” or a “Regional Trading Block”?-

    Os Impasses da Globalização   ( 2 )  2005

  • On Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Genesis of Institutions: A Critical View

    Shimizu Kazumi

    Journal of International Economic Studies   18 ( 18 ) 1 - 14  2004.03

    CiNii

  • 「合理的経済人仮説」の終焉-進化と制度生成の観点から

    『市場経済の神話とその変革ー<社会的なこと>の復権』 法政大学出版局    2003.03

  • 進化ゲームによる制度生成について

    進化経済学会第7回    2003.03

  • PEKEA International Conference Theme 6 : Markets and Exchange

       2002.09

  • Fr.ペルーにおける経済社会の再生産装置とその配置について-「商品社会」から「進歩する社会」へ-

    早稲田政治経済学雑誌   349  2002.01

  • 市場経済の神話とその変革

    『市場経済の神話との変革』/法政大学比較経済研究所No95    2001.02

  • 経済学(史)における市場・社会・国家

    『経済学史学会ニュース』17号    2000.12

  • 「パレート派リベラルの不可能性とケィパビリティ・アプローチをつなぐもの」

    『早稲田政治経済学雑誌』第343号/早稲田大学政治経済学会    2000.12

  • 「グローバリゼーションとナショナリズム」

    『アソシエ』/御茶ノ水書房    2000.10

  • 「経済学の歩み」

    『経済学入門』/東洋経済新報社    2000.04

  • LA THEORIE DE FRANCOIS PERROUX A LA LUMIERE DES EXPERIENCES ASIATIQUES

    ECONOMIE ET SOCIETE    1999.11

  • Les courants migratoires actuels au Japon

    Informations et Commentaires   106  1999.01

  • 「国民経済」というプロブレマティーク(1)—「国民経済」概念と経済学

    早稲田政治経済学雑誌   336  1998.10

  • フランソワ・ペルーにおける経済動態概念について—「一般均衡理論」に対抗するパラダイム

    早稲田政治経済学雑誌   335  1998.07

  • L'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE DE FR.PERROUX : UNE THEORIE GENERALE?

    グルノーブル大学    1998.01

  • LA THEORIE DE FRANCOIS PERROUX EN LUMIERE DES EXPERIENCES ASIATIQUES :LA CRISE ASIATIQUE DU POINT DE L'ECONOMIE INTERNATIONALEMENT DOMINANTE

    6EME CONFERENCE FRANCO-JAPONAISE D'ECONOMIE   1998/10

  • 効用理論の解体と再生

    早稲田政治経済学雑誌   ( 361 )

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Research Projects

  • Experimental Approach for Income Disparity

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research

    Project Year :

    2019.04
    -
    2023.03
     

  • Economic and psychological effects of network diversification

    文部科学省  科学研究費助成事業(早稲田大学)

    Project Year :

    2018.04
    -
    2023.03
     

  • Economic and psychological effects of network diversification

    文部科学省  科学研究費助成事業(早稲田大学)

    Project Year :

    2018.04
    -
    2023.03
     

  • Experimental Studies on the Significance of Different Person-Viewpoints in Political Philosophy

    文部科学省  科学研究費助成事業(東京大学)

    Project Year :

    2018.04
    -
    2022.03
     

  • Experimental Studies on the Significance of Different Person-Viewpoints in Political Philosophy

    文部科学省  科学研究費助成事業(東京大学)

    Project Year :

    2018.04
    -
    2022.03
     

  • Experimental Approach for Rent Seeking Problem

    文部科学省  科学研究費助成事業(早稲田大学)

    Project Year :

    2016.04
    -
    2019.03
     

  • レント・シーキング抑制と懲罰に関する実験研究

    Project Year :

    2016.04
    -
    2019.03
     

    　View Summary

    市場経済社会において，その構成員である個人や集団が互いに競争することが，資源の効率的配分を促し，無駄を抑制することはよく知られている．しかし，その競争がレント・シーキングのために行われるとかえって資源は浪費され，社会的余剰は小さくなってしまう．したがって，レント・シーキングを抑制する方策を検討することは，経済学にとって興味深い対象であるだけではなく，社会的に大きな意味を持つと思われる．本研究の目的は，非生産的なレント・シーキングを抑制する方策を，実験的に検討することにある．平成28年に実施したプレ実験（Tullock contestをベースにして，プレイヤーは外生的に決定されたレント獲得のための努力量を決定し，個人の努力量と全体の努力量との兼ね合いで利得が決定される，実験デザイン）をふまえて，29年度は11月に本実験を行った．ステーキの獲得に運が介在する余地が多い場合には競争が激烈になって社会的効率性が下がり，運が介

  • How can we overcome the coordination/cooperation dilemma under stranger condition?

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research

    Project Year :

    2013.04
    -
    2016.03
     

    Shimizu Kazumi, Kamijo Yoshio, Ozono Haruki

    　View Summary

    We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple-choice coordination game. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult one. The Endogenous Ascending mechanism implies that a gradual increase in the upper bound of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. The Endogenous Descending mechanism requires that when the game’s participants fail to coordinate, the level of the next coordination game be adjusted such that the game becomes simpler. Our laboratory experiment proves that a mechanism that combines these three tools, herein termed the “Gradualism-Endogenous Ascending-Endogenous Descending (GEAD)” mechanism, works well

  • 匿名性の高い状況における協調問題を外部インセンティブなしに解決するための研究

    科学研究費助成事業(早稲田大学)  科学研究費助成事業(基盤研究(C))

    Project Year :

    2013
    -
    2015
     

    　View Summary

    本研究の目的は、構成員の匿名性を維持し、利害関係を大幅に変化させるような外部装置を用いないより現実的な状態で、協力行動を達成し維持しうる、幅広い適用可能性をもつ仕組みを提案し、その効果を明らかにすることである。
    「全員が合理的プレイヤーである」という一般的なゲーム理論の前提の下では、有限回繰り返し囚人のジレンマでは、毎期非協力を選択し続けることが唯一のゲーム理論からの予測となり、したがって、上記の仕組みが有効に機能するとは考えにくい。しかしながら、我々の理論分析の結果、集団内に一定割合の利他主義者が存在すれば、残りの利己的プレイヤーが利他的プレイヤーの行動を織り込むことにより、協力行動を選択し続けることが利己的プレイヤーの利益にかない、それゆえ部分ゲーム完全均衡となることが明らかにされた。現実世界に一定割合の利他主義者が存在することは明らかであり、それを前提とするなら、上記三つの仕組みにも協力形成・維持の効果があると期待できるのである。
    本年度は、上記二つの条件を満たした実験環境を実験室に設定し、三つの仕組み（段階的変化、内生性、目標値調整）を有したメカニズム―GEMメカニズム―が鹿狩りゲーム（ミニマム・エフォートゲーム）において高協力を形成・維持するのにどのような効果があるのかを明らかするために集団実験を実施した。その際、三つの仕組みの組み合わせを変えることで実験条件を設定し、これらの仕組みの効果を明らかにした。
    実験の結果は我々の理論予想通り、GEMメカニズムが他の諸条件より高い協力率を生み出しかつ維持しうることを明確に示した。この結果を英文論文としてまとめ現在、専門雑誌に投稿中である。

  • How can we overcome the coordination/cooperation dilemma under stranger condition?

    Project Year :

    2013
    -
    2015
     

    　View Summary

    We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple-choice coordination game. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult one. The Endogenous Ascending mechanism implies that a gradual increase in the upper bound of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. The Endogenous Descending mechanism requires that when the game’s participants fail to coordinate, the level of the next coordination game be adjusted such that the game becomes simpler. Our laboratory experiment proves that a mechanism that combines these three tools, herein termed the “Gradualism-Endogenous Ascending-Endogenous Descending (GEAD)” mechanism, works well

  • Role of Social Capital and its Construction

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research

    Project Year :

    2007.07
    -
    2013.03
     

    SHIMIZU Kazumi, SHEN Junyi, SERIZAWA Shigehiro, YAMATO Takehiko, WATABE Motoki

    　View Summary

    1. Social capital measurements primarily include behavioral and attitudinal survey questionnaires, like General Social Survey (GSS). However the relationship between trust attitudes measured in surveys and trust behavior measured in experiments is not clear. Our research states that to measure social capital it is very important to take into account seriously that relation provided that trust have a positive correlation with voluntary cooperation, risk preferences and opinions of others' trusting behavior, all of which are indispensable to economic prosperity.2. Although definitions of social capital vary, the general consensus is that its main components include cooperation, trust, trustworthiness and risk preference. Our research shows that trusting behavior in male participants significantly increased in relation to the perceived attractiveness of the female partner, but that attractiveness did not impact trusting behavior in the minocycline group. Animal studies have shown that minocycline inhibits microglial activities. Therefore, this minocycline effect may shed new light on the unknown roles microglia play in human mental activities.3. We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple choice stag hunt game, namely gradualism, endogeneity, and modification. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult but profitable one. Endogeneity implies that a gradual increase in the upper limit of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. Modification requires that in the case of coordination failure, the level of the next coordination game should be adjusted to an easier one at which participants have successfully coordinated in previous periods. Based on experimental results generated in a laboratory setting, we find that a mechanism that combines these three tools, termed herein the GEM mechanism, is beneficial not only to achieve coordination success but also to enhance cooperative behavior in a social dilemma

  • Support for Experimental Social Science Research

    Project Year :

    2007
    -
    2013
     

    　View Summary

    The role of the supporting unit was to support planned research of each research unit, to coordinate the units, and to keep the consistency of all units. In particular, the supporting unit helped computer programming of experiments of many units since the research project used experimental method. Under the steering committee that carried out the entire planning of the whole project, two project researchers supported research activity, summer school, and public relation coordination. Furthermore, the unit helped many conferences under the project.

  • Psychological basis of institutions and its evolutionary and cultural factors

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research

    Project Year :

    2006
    -
    2008
     

    WATABE Motoki, BAN Hiroshi, YAMAMOTO Hiroki, SHIMIZU Kazumi

  • Toward Political Economy of Social Justice : Synthesis of Researches by Economics, Political Science, and Legal Studies

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research

    Project Year :

    2006
    -
    2008
     

    SUGA Koichi, YOSHIHARA Naoki, YABUSHITA Shiro, IIJIMA Shozo, FUNAKI Yukihiko, WAKAMATSU Yoshiki, UMEMORI Naoyuki, KAWAGISHI Norikazu, SHIMIZU Kazumi, WAKATABE Masazumi, YAZAWA Masashi

  • Political Change and Decision Making Mechanism of the Japanese : Integration of Psychological Economic Experiment and Public Opinion Survey

    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science  Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research

    Project Year :

    2006
    -
    2008
     

    TANAKA Aiji, KOHNO Masaru, SHIMIZU Kazumi, YAMADA Masahiro, WATABE Motoki, KUME Ikuo, NISHIZAWA Yoshitaka, HASEGAWA Mariko, FUNAKI Yukihiko, SHINADA Yutaka, KURIYAMA Kohichi, FUKUMOTO Kentaro, IMAI Ryosuke, HINO Airo, IIDA Takeshi

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Syllabus

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Overseas Activities

  • 規範の実験的・理論的研究

    2009.05
    -
    2011.03

    オランダ   アムステルダム大学

Sub-affiliation

  • Faculty of Political Science and Economics   Graduate School of Political Science

  • Faculty of Political Science and Economics   Graduate School of Economics

  • Faculty of Commerce   Graduate School of Commerce

  • Faculty of Social Sciences   Graduate School of Social Sciences

Research Institute

  • 2025
    -
    2026

    Center for Data Science   Concurrent Researcher

Internal Special Research Projects

  • 協調ゲームにおける社会的ジレンマ解決のためのメカニズムに関する実験研究

    2016  

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    囚人のジレンマ・鹿狩りゲームはそれぞれ、協力・協調の失敗を引き起こす状況として広く知られている。本研究では、これらのゲームを繰り返し行う状況下で協力・協調を導くと期待できる三つの仕組み、すなわち、①協力・協調の難易度の段階的変化、②変化の内生性、③目標値の調整、について理論・実験により考察する。これらの仕組みは、匿名性の高い現代社会において解決が難しいジレンマ、また、権力の干渉の余地の小さい国家間の問題や個人裁量の範囲内の問題にも適用可能と考えられ、それゆえ外的妥当性が高く、応用範囲も広いと考えられる。2016年度は、三つの仕組み（段階的変化、内生性、目標値調整）が鹿狩りゲームにおいて高協力を形成・維持するのにどのような効果があるのかを明らかするために集団実験を実施した。実験研究の結果、上記三つの仕組みが鹿狩りゲームの調整問題を解決するのに有効であり、かつ、多値選択型の囚人のジレンマにおける協力の失敗の解決にも有効であることがわかった。現在、成果を英文論文にまとめ投稿するための準備を行っている。

  • リバタリアン・パナータリズムの実験アプローチによる批判的検討

    2013  

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    行動経済学の功績は、人々が従来の経済学で想定されている合理性からシステマティックに乖離した行動をとることを示した点にあるが、行動経済学が政策的にどのような含意を有するものであるのかに関する研究は端緒についたばかりである。その中でも有力な傾向の一つがパターナリズムへの注目であり、従来の自由放任主義に対する反省がこの領域においても始まりつつある。なかでもリバタリアン･パターナリズムの新しさは、個人の選択肢を狭めないことで従来のパターナリズムのもつ強制的な性格を払拭しつつ、人々が気付かないうちに緩やかに望ましい方向へと誘導しようとする点にある。本研究はこの動向の中でも最も注目すべきＣ．サンスティーンとＲ．セイラーによるリバタリアン･パターナリズムを素材とする。リバタリアン・パターナリズムとは、人々の選択の自由を尊重しつつも、人々の選択を厚生改善の方向へと誘導（ナッジ）する政策を構想する規範理論上の立場であり、誘導（ナッジ）に際しては行動経済学の知見を利用する。　彼らが、実証研究を超えて行動経済学を政策提言の領域に利用する以上、規範理論との対話を回避することはできない。本研究の第一の特徴は、実証理論家と規範理論家とからなる共同研究であり、実証理論の規範的意義、規範理論の実証的意義についての検討を行うことを目的としている。この目的のために、本研究は規範理論家から提出されたリバタリアン・パターナリズムへの疑問を実証によって確かめるという手法を採っており、この点に本研究の第二の特徴がある。具体的には、本研究は、リバタリアン・パターナリズムの堅牢性の調査を目的としている。リバタリアン・パターナリズムは、暗黙のうちに、「人々は誘導されたとしても、自分にとって結果がよければ、当人の厚生は向上する」という想定を行っている。しかし、この想定が妥当であるとしてもそれは一回限りのものではないか、誘導されていたことを知らされたならば人々の厚生は減少し別の行動様式を模索するのではないか。本研究の出発点はこの疑念にある。すなわち、リバタリアン・パターナリズムは秘教的な性格を有しており、人々に誘導の事実を知られた途端にその効果は薄れるのではなかろうか。もしそうであるならば、誘導という手法は、人々の行動の公共的なコントロールの手段としてそれほど有効ではないことになる。この仮説を実験により検討することが本研究の目的である。　本研究は、その準備作業として、2012年度より実験デザインの構築に着手し、2013年度にパイロット実験を行った。同実験においては、第一段階として実際にナッジ政策が用いられるような状況下で人々の選択を誘導し、第二段階として誘導していたことを告知し、第一段階での選択を変更する希望があるのかを調査した。さらに、変更希望の有無や程度（支払意思額）と人々が社会的決定に対して持つ「規範意識」との関係について検討した。　予算の制約から、回答者数(約700人)は十分なものではなく、また質問数も制限されたが、いくつかの興味深い傾向を読みとることができた。第一に、10～20%の人々は、自分が操作されていたことを知ると、それが結果的に自分あるいは社会とって良い選択であってもその選択を変更すること。第二に、選択変更には人々の規範意識（リバタリアニズム、パターナリズム、民主的手続き主義）が関連していること、である。

  • ドルから円への通貨変更が沖縄の社会経済制度に与えた影響について

    2003  

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    本特定課題研究費によって、沖縄現地で二回にわたる資料収集が可能になった。その成果は、「米軍占領下における通貨切替が沖縄経済社会に及ぼした影響について」という論文となった。この論文は、科研費研究「経済制度の補完性と経済調整の安定性との関連の研究」（代表者：京都大学経済学研究科宇仁宏幸教授）の中の1部なす論文として、2004年4月に発行される予定である。

  • 「制度」の概念からみたフランソワ・ペルーの社会経済学

    2001  

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    As H.A. Simon pointedout, the “rationality” of human beings is not perfect. He called therationality of actual human beings as “procedural rationality.” Today, it ismore often called “bounded rationality,” but there is not much differencebetween the two in substance. What is significant is that human beings areengaged in economic activities taking various limits as a given. Shiozawa(1990) called the bounds as 1) limits of vision; 2) limits of rationality and3) limits of influences. Human beings with those bounds are unable to grasp theworld perfectly and the thinking and cognitive faculty is limited. To achieve ourobjectives, we have to take various steps learning by mistakes. However, we,despite such limitations and bounds, choose our actions and live our dailylives without making serious mistakes. Usually our actions are not so muchhindered by the above-mentioned limits and we live our daily lives as if we arenot aware of those limits. Such a situation is made possible by a patternedbehavior called institutions, customs and habits. (Institutions, customs andhabits respectively have different nuances, and hereinafter the term “institutions”shall be used to signify people’s patterned behaviors except in special cases).Owing to such “institutions”, we can avoid fretting over unlimited options onone hand, and on the other, can continue to live our lives without encounteringserious inconveniences.&nbsp;Institutionshave two major characteristics, 1) self-enforcement and 2) self-sustenance. Inother words, people are “willingly (accepting it as a given)” and “repeatedly”follow “institutions”. “Comparative Institutional Analysis (CIA)” is an attemptthat has been made by Masahiko Aoki and others to grasp those “institutions” ina uniform manner as Nash equilibrium of the game. In this article, I shall, bychiefly focusing on CIA, analyze how evolutionary game theory accounts for thegenesis of “institutions” and examine its effectiveness.