Updated on 2025/05/08

写真a

 
KIRATLI, Osman Sabri
 
Affiliation
Affiliated organization, Waseda Institute for Advanced Study
Job title
Associate Professor(non-tenure-track)
Homepage URL
https://www.osmansabrikiratli.com

Education Background

  • 　
    -
    2012.09

    University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA, USA   Political Science   Ph.D.  

Research Areas

  • International relations

Research Interests

  • International Political Economy

  • Conflict

  • Foreign Aid

  • International Organizations

  • Political Behavior

  • Public Opinion

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Awards

  • Humboldt Research Fellowship for Experienced Researchers

    2022   Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation (AvH), Germany  

  • Jacqui Briggs Prize

    2022   ECPR- European Consortium for Political Research  

  • Young Scientist Award

    2020   BAGEP, Turkey  

 

Papers

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Syllabus

 

Sub-affiliation

  • Faculty of Political Science and Economics   School of Political Science and Economics

Internal Special Research Projects

  • Populism and Support for International Cooperation

    2024  

    　View Summary

    As a part of the project, I completed a large-scalesurvey on a sample of over 1600 respondents in the United States. In thissurvey, I implemented two experiments. The first experiment aims to explore if internationalorganizations (IOs) suffer audience costs when they break their promises and whetherthe populist dispositions of the individuals moderate the size of audiencecosts. Audience cost theory concurs that democraticleaders face higher domestic political costs if they escalate a foreign policycrisis and subsequently back down. Though extensive literature examines itseffects on leaders who renege on their threats, no research has studied ifaudience costs could be generated vis-à-vis IOs. The second experiment wasimplemented to investigate citizen support for aid conditionality in donorcountries. More specifically, I analyzed if governance problems (i.e.,corruption, human rights violations, environmental policies) or certaineconomic and political policy decisions of the recipient country that clashwith the interests of the donor trigger support for the use of positive conditionality(rewarding recipient country in exchange of policy changes) or negative conditionality(punishing recipient country until it addresses problematic policies). Second, Iexplored how specific country characteristics, namely its regime type,development level, and trade ties with the donor, moderate support for aid conditionality.My theoretical expectation was that support for conditional aid ishigher than unconditional aid. Second, however, recipient countrycharacteristics significantly moderate support for aid conditionality.Specifically, if the recipient country is a democracy and has close politicaland economic ties, support for aid conditionality and aid-tying practices wouldbe significantly lower. Currently, I am in the process of finalizingdata analysis for the first experiment and writing a research paper for thesecond experiment. Additionally, I hope to turn both projects into acomparative study by conducting similar experiments in other major countries,especially Japan. To do that, I will seek additional funding -such as KAKENHI-,and explore avenues for collaboration with other researchers.