2022/12/08 更新

写真a

チョン フン
チョン フン
Scopus 論文情報  
論文数: 0  Citation: 0  h-index: 4

Citation Countは当該年に発表した論文の被引用数

所属
政治経済学術院 政治経済学部
職名
准教授
メールアドレス
メールアドレス
ホームページ

他学部・他研究科等兼任情報

  • 政治経済学術院   大学院政治学研究科

学歴

  • 2012年06月
    -
    2017年12月

    University of Rochester   Department of Political Science   MA/Ph.D. in Political Science  

  • 2007年08月
    -
    2012年01月

    Cornell University   Sage School of Philosophy   MA/Ph.D. in Philsoophy  

  • 2000年03月
    -
    2006年08月

    Seoul National University   Department of Philosophy   BA in Philosophy (Summa Cum Laude)  

学位

  • University of Rochester   M.A./Ph.D. in Political Science

  • Cornell University   M.A./Ph.D. in Philosophy

  • Seoul National University   B.A. in Philosophy (Summa Cum Laude)

経歴

  • 2020年09月
    -
    継続中

    早稲田大学   政治経済学術院   准教授

  • 2018年09月
    -
    2020年08月

    Waseda University   Faculty of Political Science and Economics   Associate Professor (tenure-track)

  • 2018年01月
    -
    2018年08月

    Korea Military Academy   Department of Philosophy   Assistant Professor (with tenure)

  • 2015年08月
    -
    2016年05月

    University of Arizona   Center for Philosophy of Freedom   Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy, Politics, & Economics

  • 2014年08月
    -
    2015年05月

    Rochester Institute of Technology   Department of Philosophy   Visiting Assistant Professor

  • 2011年08月
    -
    2012年05月

    Cornell University   Sage School of Philosophy   Instructor/Postdoctoral Visiting Scholar

▼全件表示

 

研究分野

  • 哲学、倫理学

  • 理論経済学

研究キーワード

  • PPE (Philosophy, Politics, & Economics)

  • Formal Theory (Game/Social Choice Theory)

  • Political Philosophy

論文

  • Prospect Utilitarianism and the Original Position

    Hun CHUNG

       2022年11月  [査読有り]

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 責任著者

    DOI

  • When utilitarianism dominates justice as fairness: an economic defence of utilitarianism from the original position

    Hun Chung

    Economics and Philosophy     1 - 26  2022年08月  [査読有り]

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 責任著者

     概要を見る

    Abstract

    The original position together with the veil of ignorance have served as one of the main methodological devices to justify principles of distributive justice. Most approaches to this topic have primarily focused on the single person decision-theoretic aspect of the original position. This paper, in contrast, will directly model the basic structure and the economic agents therein to project the economic consequences and social outcomes generated either by utilitarianism or Rawls’s two principles of justice. It will be shown that when the differences in people’s productive abilities are sufficiently great, utilitarianism dominates Rawls’s two principles of justice by providing a higher level of overall well-being to every member of society. Whenever this is the case, the parties can rely on the Principle of Dominance (which is a direct implication of instrumental rationality) to choose utilitarianism over Rawls’s two principles of justice. Furthermore, when this is so, utilitarianism is free from one of its most fundamental criticisms that it ‘does not take seriously the distinction between persons’ (Rawls 1971 [1999]: 24).

    DOI

  • Chain Connection, Close-Knitness, and the Difference Principle

    Hun Chung

        000 - 000  2022年07月  [査読有り]

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 責任著者

    DOI

    Scopus

  • Locke’s State of Nature and Its Epistemic Deficit: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

    Hun Chung

    SYNTHESE    2022年04月  [査読有り]

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 最終著者, 責任著者

    DOI

    Scopus

  • Book Reviews: Modern Social Contract Theory (by Albert Weale)

    チョン フン

    Journal of Economic Literature   59 ( 1 ) 285 - 287  2021年03月  [招待有り]

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 責任著者

    DOI

  • On Choosing the Difference Principle behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Reply to Gustafsson

    チョン フン

    The Journal of Philosophy    2021年  [査読有り]

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 最終著者, 責任著者

  • Rawls's Self-Defeat: A Formal Analysis

    チョン フン

    Erkenntnis   85 ( 5 ) 1169 - 1197  2020年10月  [査読有り]

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 最終著者, 責任著者

  • Diversity and rights: a social choice-theoretic analysis of the possibility of public reason

    チョン フン, ブライアン·コグルマン

    Synthese   197 ( 2 ) 839 - 865  2020年02月  [査読有り]

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 責任著者

    DOI

    Scopus

    3
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • A Formal Theory of Democratic Deliberation

    Hun Chung

    American Political Science Review   114 ( 1 ) 14 - 35  2020年02月  [査読有り]

    担当区分:筆頭著者

  • The Well-Ordered Society Under Crisis: A Formal Analysis of Public Reason vs. Convergence Discourse

    Hun Chung

    American Journal of Political Science   64 ( 1 ) 82 - 101  2020年01月  [査読有り]

    担当区分:筆頭著者

  • THE INSTABILITY OF JOHN RAWLS'S “STABILITY FOR THE RIGHT REASONS”

    チョン フン

    Episteme   16 ( 1 ) 1 - 17  2019年03月

    担当区分:筆頭著者, 最終著者, 責任著者

    DOI

    Scopus

    6
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF LIBERAL RIGHTS IN A DIVERSE WORLD

    チョン フン

    Economics and Philosophy   35 ( 1 ) 1 - 27  2019年03月

    DOI

  • Directional Equilibria

    CHUNG, Hun, John DUGGAN

    Journal of Theoretical Politics   30 ( 3 ) 272 - 305  2018年07月  [査読有り]

  • Prospect utilitarianism: A better alternative to sufficientarianism

    Hun Chung

    PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES   174 ( 8 ) 1911 - 1933  2017年08月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    Ever since the publication of Harry Frankfurt's "Equality as a Moral Ideal" (Ethics 98(1):21-43, 1987), the doctrine of sufficiency has attracted great attention among both ethical theorists and political philosophers. The doctrine of sufficiency (or sufficientarianism) consists of two main theses: the positive thesis states that it is morally important for people to have enough; and the negative thesis states that once everybody has enough, relative inequality has absolutely no moral importance. Many political philosophers have presented different versions of sufficientarianism that retain the general spirit of what Frankfurt had proposed in his seminal work. However, all of these different versions of sufficientarianism suffer from two critical problems: (a) they fail to give right answers to lifeboat situations, and (b) they fail to provide continuous ethical judgments. In this paper, I show a version of utilitarianism that solves these problems while retaining the major attractions of sufficientarianism. I call it "prospect utilitarianism." In addition, I show that prospect utilitarianism can avoid standard objections to utilitarianism and has aspects that can appeal to both prioritarians and egalitarians as well.

    DOI

    Scopus

    3
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • A Game-Theoretic Solution to the Inconsistency Between Thrasymachus and Glaucon in Plato’s Republic

    チョン フン

    Ethical Perspectives   23 ( 3 ) 383 - 410  2016年09月  [査読有り]

    DOI

    Scopus

    1
    被引用数
    (Scopus)
  • PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND HOBBES

    Hun Chung

    FILOZOFIA   71 ( 3 ) 197 - 208  2016年03月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    Many commentators think that Hobbes was committed to psychological egoism. Psychological egoism is a theory of human psychology claiming that all human actions are ultimately motivated solely by one's own self-interest. In this paper, I argue that there are reasons to think that Hobbes was not committed to psychological egoism in any of its plausible formulations.

  • Is Harry Frankfurt’s ‘Doctrine of Sufficiency’ Sufficient?

    チョン フン

    Organon F   23 ( 1 ) 50 - 71  2016年  [査読有り]

  • Hobbes’s State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Game-Theoretic Analysis

    チョン フン

    Journal of the American Philosophical Association   1 ( 3 ) 485 - 508  2015年09月  [査読有り]

  • Philippa Foot’s Ethical Naturalism: A Defense

    チョン フン

    Journal of Ethics   101   101 - 135  2015年05月  [査読有り]

  • Game Theory, Rational Choice Theory, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Some Clarifications

    チョン フン

    The Korean Journal for Philosophy of Science   17 ( 3 ) 23 - 51  2014年11月  [査読有り]

  • Social Power and Systematic Luck: A Critical Analysis of Brian Barry and Keith Dowding’s Debate on Power

    チョン フン

    Korean Journal of Ethics   3 ( 2 )  2014年10月  [査読有り]

  • R. M. Hare’s Reconstruction of G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument

    チョン フン

    Korean Journal of Ethics   3 ( 1 )  2014年05月  [査読有り]

  • Are Decent Non-Liberal Societies Really Non-Liberal? – A Critical Response to John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples

    チョン フン

    Journal of Philosophical Ideas   52   201 - 231  2014年05月  [査読有り]

  • A Critical Analysis of Michael Smith’s Ethical Internalism”

    チョン フン

    Journal of Ethics   95   85 - 105  2014年05月  [査読有り]

  • UNDERSTANDING RATIONALITY IN HOBBES AND HUME

    Hun Chung

    FILOZOFIA   69 ( 8 ) 687 - 696  2014年  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    Many commentators think that Hobbes was committed to an instrumental view of rationality which foreshadows that of David Hume. The Humean conception of instrumental rationality is a conjunction of the following two claims: (a) no preferences or desires can properly be said to be irrational in themselves, and (b) the role of reason or rationality can only be confined to informing the agent with true beliefs about the world, and revealing the most effective means that could satisfy the agent's current ends whatever they happen to be. In this paper, I argue that, unlike what many people think, a careful reading of Hobbes shows that he was committed to neither of these claims.

  • Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory and Its Problems

    チョン フン

    Journal of Philosophical Ideas   48   175 - 204  2013年05月  [査読有り]

  • Reconsidering the Principle of Fair-Play and a Reply to Richard Arneson

    チョン フン

    CHEOLHAK: Korean Journal of Philosophy   110   231 - 279  2012年02月  [査読有り]

  • Overlapping Consensus and Utilitarianism – A Reply to Samuel Scheffler

    チョン フン

    CHEOLHAK: Korean Journal of Philosophy   103   275 - 311  2010年05月  [査読有り]

  • Sandel’s Republicanism-its meaning and possible problems

    チョン フン

    Philosophical Forum   34  2006年  [査読有り]

▼全件表示

書籍等出版物

  • How Economics Can Help Ethical Theorists

    チョン フン( 担当: 分担執筆,  担当範囲: Reading Ethics for the First Time)

    SNU Institute of Philosophical Research  2014年

受賞

  • 2020 Waseda University Research Award (for High-Impact Publications)

    2021年   Waseda Universiety  

    受賞者: CHUNG, Hun

  • The Annual Department of Political Science Prize for Excellence in Teaching by a Graduate Student

    2017年   University of Rochester  

    受賞者: CHUNG, Hun

  • The 1st Mo-Ha Prize for Best Paper Written in Analytic Philosophy by a Korean Philosopher (for “Prospect Utilitarianism: A Better Alternative to Sufficientarianism” published in Philosophical Studies 174 (8), 1911-1933)

    2017年   The Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy  

    受賞者: チョン フン

  • The Myungkyung Prize (Best BA Thesis in the Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University)

    2006年   Seoul National University  

    受賞者: CHUNG, Hun

  • KFAS Overseas Doctoral Fellowship Award

    2006年   The Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies  

    受賞者: CHUNG, Hun

学内研究費(特定課題)

  • A Formal Theory of Democratic Deliberation

    2018年   John Duggan

     概要を見る

    [Abstract of Research Paper] Inspired by impossibility theorems of social choice theory, many democratic theorists have argued that aggregative forms of democracy cannot lend full democratic justification for the collective decisions reached. Hence, democratic theorists have turned their attention to deliberative democracy, according to which “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals.” (Cohen 1997a: 73) However, relatively little work has been done to offer a formal theory of democratic deliberation. This paper helps fill that gap by offering a formal theory of three different modes of democratic deliberation: myopic discussion, constructive discussion, and debate. In either form of discussion, positions are considered according to an exogenous protocol and arguments applied to them, whereas in a debate, two participants who have diametrically opposed preferences take turns and propose positions with supporting reasons/arguments. We show that myopic discussion suffers from indeterminacy of long run outcomes, while constructive discussion and debate are conclusive, i.e., both forms of deliberation converge to a position that is maximally justified according to at least one reason/argument. Finally, unlike the other two modes of deliberation, debate is path independent and converges to a unique compromise position, irrespective of the initial status quo.

 

現在担当している科目

▼全件表示