2022/05/26 更新

写真a

カミジョウ ヨシオ
上條 良夫
所属
政治経済学術院 政治経済学部
職名
教授

学歴

  •  
     
     

    早稲田大学   経済学研究科   理論経済学・経済史  

  •  
     
     

    早稲田大学  

学位

  • 早稲田大学(日本)   経済学博士

経歴

  •  
     
     

    早稲田大学 高等研究所   助教

 

研究分野

  • 理論経済学

研究キーワード

  • 実験経済学

  • 産業組織論

  • ゲーム理論

  • 理論経済学

論文

  • The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society

    Hiroki Ozono, Yoshio Kamijo, Kazumi Shimizu

    Scientific Reports   10 ( 1 )  2020年12月  [査読有り]

    DOI

  • Effect of proxy voting for children under the voting age on parental altruism towards future generations

    Yoshio Kamijo, Teruyuki Tamura, Yoichi Hizen

    Futures   122  2020年09月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    © 2020 The Author(s) What types of people are most concerned about the sustainability of our society? Does empowering such people in the political process influence us to make collective decisions that best serve the interests of future generations? This study invites 1000 parents with children under the legal voting age and 1000 parents with children over the legal voting age to an incentivized donation experiment in which a donation will be made to non-profit organizations committed to a better future society. The size of the donation per participant is determined by vote among the participants. We compare two voting rules: ordinary voting, whereby each participant is given one ballot, and proxy voting, whereby parents with unenfranchised children are given an extra ballot on behalf of their children. We observe that, with ordinary voting, the mothers with children under the voting age exhibit a higher degree of altruism towards future generations. With proxy voting, however, this distinction disappears. Furthermore, with proxy voting, the overall average donation indicated by participants is smaller than that indicated under ordinary voting. These observations imply that empowering institutionally those who tend to be more altruistic does not necessarily result in collective decisions that are more altruistic towards future generations.

    DOI

  • Time Preferences between Individuals and Groups in the Transition from Hunter-Gatherer to Industrial Societies

    Hernuryadin Yayan, Kotani Koji, Kamijo Yoshio

    SUSTAINABILITY   11 ( 2 )  2019年01月  [査読有り]

    DOI

  • Generativity and social value orientation between rural and urban societies in a developing country

    Timilsina Raja R, Kotani Koji, Kamijo Yoshio

    FUTURES   105   124 - 132  2019年01月  [査読有り]

    DOI

  • Voting on behalf of a future generation: A laboratory experiment

    Kamijo Y, Hizen Y, Saijo T, Tamura T

    Sustainability (Switzerland)   11 ( 16 )  2019年  [査読有り]

    DOI

  • Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation

    Hiroki Ozono, Yoshio Kamijo, Kazumi Shimizu

    SCIENTIFIC REPORTS   7 ( 1 ) 14379  2017年10月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    Second-order free riders, who do not owe punishment cost to first-order free riders in public goods games, lead to low cooperation. Previous studies suggest that for stable cooperation, it is critical to have a pool punishment system with second-order punishment, which gathers resources from group members and punishes second-order free riders as well as first-order free riders. In this study, we focus on the priority of punishment. We hypothesize that the pool punishment system that prioritizes second-order punishment is more likely to achieve cooperation than the system that prioritizes first-order punishment, because the former is more likely to obtain sufficient punishment resources. In the experiments, we compare four pool punishment systems: 1To2 (first-order punishment to second-order punishment), 2To1 (second-order punishment to first-order punishment), 1ONLY (first-order punishment only), and 2ONLY (second-order punishment only). We find that the 2To1 and 2ONLY systems can receive more support than the 1To2 and 1ONLY systems and only the 2To1 system can achieve high cooperation. However, the effect of priority of second-order punishment is observed only when the punishment ratio (PR) is low (Experiment 1), not high (Experiment 2), in which the punishment resource is relatively abundant.

    DOI PubMed

  • Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance

    Koji Yokote, Yukihiko Funaki, Yoshio Kamijo

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   89   1 - 9  2017年09月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    We identify the necessary and sufficient condition under which the Shapley value coincides with the prenucleolus for general TU games. For 0-normalized 3-person games, the coincidence holds if and only if the game is symmetric or satisfies the PS property (Kar et al., 2009). We also identify the necessary and sufficient coincidence condition in the following allocation problems: the airport games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973), the bidder collusion games (Graham et al., 1990) and the polluted river games (Ni and Wang, 2007). The coincidence between the Shapley value and the CIS and ENSC values is discussed as well. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Negotiating with the future: incorporating imaginary future generations into negotiations

    Yoshio Kamijo, Asuka Komiya, Nobuhiro Mifune, Tatsuyoshi Saijo

    Sustainability Science   13 ( 4 ) 1193  2017年05月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    The article, Negotiating with the future: incorporating imaginary future generations into negotiations, written by Yoshio Kamijo, Asuka Komiya, Nobuhiro Mifune and Tatsuyoshi Saijo, was originally published Online First without open access. After publication in volume 12, issue 3, page 409–420 the author decided to opt for Open Choice and to make the article an open access publication. Therefore, the copyright of the article has been changed to © The Author(s) 2017 and the article is forthwith distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons. org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

    DOI

  • Negotiating with the future: incorporating imaginary future generations into negotiations

    Yoshio Kamijo, Asuka Komiya, Nobuhiro Mifune, Tatsuyoshi Saijo

    SUSTAINABILITY SCIENCE   12 ( 3 ) 409 - 420  2017年05月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    People to be born in the future have no direct influence on current affairs. Given the disconnect between people who are currently living and those who will inherit the planet left for them, individuals who are currently alive tend to be more oriented toward the present, posing a fundamental problem related to sustainability. In this study, we propose a new framework for reconciling the disconnect between the present and the future whereby some individuals in the current generation serve as an imaginary future generation that negotiates with individuals in the real-world present. Through a laboratory-controlled intergenerational sustainability dilemma game (ISDG), we show how the presence of negotiators for a future generation increases the benefits of future generations. More specifically, we found that when faced with members of an imaginary future generation, 60% of participants selected an option that promoted sustainability. In contrast, when the imaginary future generation was not salient, only 28% of participants chose the sustainable option.

    DOI PubMed

  • Sustainability of common pool resources

    Raja Rajendra Timilsina, Koji Kotani, Yoshio Kamijo

    PLOS ONE   12 ( 2 ) e0170981  2017年02月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    Sustainability has become a key issue in managing natural resources together with growing concerns for capitalism, environmental and resource problems. We hypothesize that the ongoing modernization of competitive societies, which we refer to as "capitalism," affects human nature for utilizing common pool resources, thus compromising sustainability. To test this hypothesis, we design and implement a set of dynamic common pool resource games and experiments in the following two types of Nepalese areas: ( i) rural ( non-capitalistic) and ( ii) urban ( capitalistic) areas. We find that a proportion of prosocial individuals in urban areas is lower than that in rural areas, and urban residents deplete resources more quickly than rural residents. The composition of proself and prosocial individuals in a group and the degree of capitalism are crucial in that an increase in prosocial members in a group and the rural dummy positively affect resource sustainability by 65% and 63%, respectively. Overall, this paper shows that when societies move toward more capitalistic environments, the sustainability of common pool resources tends to decrease with the changes in individual preferences, social norms, customs and views to others through human interactions. This result implies that individuals may be losing their coordination abilities for social dilemmas of resource sustainability in capitalistic societies.

    DOI PubMed

  • Institutionalize Reciprocity to Overcome the Public Goods Provision Problem.

    Ozono H, Kamijo Y, Shimizu K

    PloS one   11 ( 6 ) e0154321  2016年06月  [査読有り]

    DOI PubMed

  • Preemptive Striking in Individual and Group Conflict

    Nobuhiro Mifune, Yoichi Hizen, Yoshio Kamijo, Yoshitaka Okano

    PLOS ONE   11 ( 5 ) e0154859  2016年05月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    In this study, we conducted a laboratory experiment to assess preemptive striking by and towards individuals or groups. In the framework of a preemptive strike game, we set the following four conditions: one person faced another person, one person faced a three-person group, a three-person group faced an individual, and a three-person group faced another three-person group. Previous studies have revealed that greed is activated when participants belong to a group, while fear is activated when participants interact with a group, and further, that attacking behaviors in the preemptive strike game are driven by fear. These observations led to a hypothesis that high attack rates would be realized when participants interact with a group, regardless of whether the participants make decisions as individuals or a group. The results of our experiment, however, rejected this hypothesis. Among the four conditions, the attack rate was highest when a three-person group faced an individual. As possible reasons for our observation, we discuss the potential threat stemming from the imbalance in the effectiveness of attack between individuals and groups, and the (incorrect) belief by groups that single individuals would be more likely to attack out of fear.

    DOI PubMed

  • Overcoming coordination failure using a mechanism based on gradualism and endogeneity

    Yoshio Kamijo, Hiroki Ozono, Kazumi Shimizu

    EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS   19 ( 1 ) 202 - 217  2016年03月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple-choice coordination game. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult one. The Endogenous Ascending mechanism implies that a gradual increase in the upper bound of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. The Endogenous Descending mechanism requires that when the game's participants fail to coordinate, the level of the next coordination game be adjusted such that the game becomes simpler. We show that gradualism may not always work, but in such instances, its effect can be reinforced by endogeneity. Our laboratory experiment provides evidence that a mechanism that combines three tools, herein termed the "Gradualism with Endogenous Ascending and Descending (GEAD)'' mechanism, works well. We discuss how the GEAD mechanism can be applied to real-life situations that suffer from coordination failure.

    DOI

  • A new basis and the Shapley value

    Koji Yokote, Yukihiko Funaki, Yoshio Kamijo

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   80   21 - 24  2016年03月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new basis of the set of all TU games. Shapley (1953) introduced the unanimity game in which cooperation of all players in a given coalition yields payoff. We introduce the commander game in which only one player in a given coalition yields payoff. The set of the commander games forms a basis and has two properties. First, when we express a game by a linear combination of the basis, the coefficients related to singletons coincide with the Shapley value. Second, the basis induces the null space of the Shapley value. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Rewards versus punishments in additive, weakest-link, and best-shot contests

    Yoshio Kamijo

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION   122   17 - 30  2016年02月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    In this study, we provide a theory to explain how bottom punishment or top reward enhances performance of teams when there is heterogeneity across players in cost-performance relationships. In contrast to the existing literature, we consider three types of performance functions: additive, weakest link (the performance is the min of performances of n contestants), and best shot (the performance is the max of performances of n contestants). For any of the three types, we derive easy-to-check sufficient conditions to judge whether reward or punishment is better. From the sufficient condition for the additive performance function, we know that punishment is better for less heterogeneous people and reward is better for more heterogeneous people. In addition, the sufficient conditions for the best-shot and weakest-link cases suggest that some unintuitive results hold; even under the best-shot (weakest link) performance function, the bottom punishment (top reward) becomes better when the gap in the abilities of contestants becomes very small (large). (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Who is audited? Experimental study on rule-based tax auditing schemes

    Yoshio Kamijo, Takehito Masuda, Hiroshi Uemura

    Kochi University of Technology-SDE working paper series no. 2015-21   21   1  2015年07月

  • Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities

    Yoshio Kamijo, Takumi Kongo

    THEORY AND DECISION   78 ( 1 ) 77 - 87  2015年01月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    By focusing on players' relative contributions, we study some properties for values in positive cooperative games with transferable utilities. The well-known properties of symmetry (also known as "equal treatment of equals") and marginality are based on players' marginal contributions to coalitions. Both Myerson's balanced contributions property and its generalization of the balanced cycle contributions property (Kamijo and Kongo Int J of Game Theory 39:563-571, 2010; BCC) are based on players' marginal contributions to other players. We define relative versions of marginality and BCC by replacing marginal contributions with relative contributions, and examine efficient values satisfying each of the two properties. On the class of positive games, a relative variation of marginality is incompatible with efficiency, and together with efficiency and the invariance property with respect to the payoffs of players under a player deletion, a relative variation of BCC characterizes the proportional value and egalitarian value in a unified manner.

    DOI

  • The endogenous objective function of a partially privatized firm: A Nash bargaining approach

    Yoshio Kamijo, Yoshihiro Tomaru

    ECONOMIC MODELLING   39   101 - 109  2014年04月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    We establish a model wherein a private firm competes with a partially privatized firm whose objective function is endogenously determined through bargaining between owners the welfare-maximizing government and dividend-maximizing private shareholders. Many existing works on partial privatization have assumed that privatization increases the weight of profits in the partially privatized firm's objective, whereas it decreases the weight of welfare. However, our bargaining approach shows that this result can be reversed. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

    Y. Kamijo, T. Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi, Y. Funaki

    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR   84   180 - 195  2014年03月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures

    Yoshio Kamijo

    TOP   21 ( 3 ) 572 - 589  2013年10月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    In this study, we provide a new solution for cooperative games with coalition structures. The collective value of a player is defined as the sum of the equal division of the pure surplus obtained by his coalition from the coalitional bargaining and of his Shapley value for the internal coalition. The weighted Shapley value applied to a game played by coalitions with coalition-size weights is assigned to each coalition, reflecting the size asymmetries among coalitions. We show that the collective value matches exogenous interpretations of coalition structures and provide an axiomatic foundation of this value. A noncooperative mechanism that implements the collective value is also presented.

    DOI

  • Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms

    Emiko Fukuda, Yoshio Kamijo, Ai Takeuchi, Michiharu Masui, Yukihiko Funaki

    RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS   44 ( 3 ) 438 - 461  2013年09月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid their true values. In the theoretical investigation, by applying the locally envy-free Nash equilibrium to the VCG, we found that the allocations are efficient and that upper and lower bounds of the auctioneer's revenue coincide in the two mechanisms. A laboratory experiment, in which the revenues and efficiencies were similar in both mechanisms, supported this result.

    DOI

  • Smokers, smoking deprivation, and time discounting

    Shoko Yamane, Hiroyasu Yoneda, Taiki Takahashi, Yoshio Kamijo, Yasuhiro Komori, Fumihiko Hiruma, Yoshiro Tsutsui

    Journal of Socio-Economics   45   47 - 56  2013年08月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    This paper investigates whether smokers exhibit greater time discounting than non-smokers, and how short-term nicotine deprivation affects time discounting. A unique feature of our experiment is that our subjects receive rewards not only of money, but also of actual tobacco. This is done in order to elicit smokers' true preferences. Smokers are more impatient than non-smokers, consistent with previous studies. Additionally, nicotine deprivation makes smokers even more impatient. These results suggest that nicotine concentration has different effects on time preferences in the short and long runs. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.

    DOI

  • Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value

    Yoshio Kamijo, Takumi Kongo

    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH   216 ( 3 ) 638 - 646  2012年02月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    This study provides a unified axiomatic characterization method of one-point solutions for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Any one-point solution that satisfies efficiency, the balanced cycle contributions property (BCC), and the axioms related to invariance under a player deletion is characterized as a corollary of our general result. BCC is a weaker requirement than the well-known balanced contributions property. Any one-point solution that is both symmetric and linear satisfies BCC. The invariance axioms necessitate that the deletion of a specific player from games does not affect the other players' payoffs, and this deletion is different with respect to solutions. As corollaries of the above characterization result, we are able to characterize the well-known one-point solutions, the Shapley, egalitarian, and solidarity values, in a unified manner. We also studied characterizations of an inefficient one-point solution, the Banzhaf value that is a well-known alternative to the Shapley value. (C) 2011 Elsevier B,V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures

    Yoshio Kamijo

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   56 ( 3 ) 336 - 349  2008年11月  [査読有り]

     概要を見る

    This paper Studies a non-cooperative mechanism implementing a cooperative solution for a situation in which members of a society are Subdivided into groups and/or coalitions and there is asymmetry among the individuals of the society. To describe hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structure simultaneously, we present unified classes of games, the games with social structure. and define a weighted value for these games. We show that our mechanism works in any zero-monotonic environment and implements the Shapley Value, the weighted Shapley value, the Owen's coalitional Value, and the weighted coalitional value, in some special cases. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

▼全件表示

Misc

  • Who is audited? Experimental study on rule-based tax auditing

    Y. Kamijo, T Masuda, H. Uemura

    ISER Discussion Paper Series   1064  2019年10月

  • ダブルトラック・オークションの実験研究

    宇都伸之, 上條良夫, 船木由喜彦

    日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会和文論文誌   59   38‐59  2016年12月

    DOI J-GLOBAL

  • 経営者の情報開示・開示規制と投融資決定 : コーディネーション・ゲームを用いた分析

    上枝 正幸, 上條 良夫

    現代ディスクロージャー研究 = Contemporary disclosure research   ( 14 ) 7 - 23  2014年10月

    CiNii

  • Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation

    Yoshio Kamijo

    THEORY AND DECISION   75 ( 3 ) 339 - 357  2013年09月

     概要を見る

    We study the stable standard of behavior in a perfect foresight situation that was introduced by Xue (Econ Theory 11:603-627, 1998). We assume that the inducement relations are invertible and coalition free. We show that the conditions are sufficient for the existence of the nonempty-valued optimistic/conservative stable standard of behavior for perfect foresight situation (OSSB-PF/CSSB-PF). Moreover, we find that an OSSB-PF supports a Pareto-efficient outcome as a stable outcome; if the preference relations are strict, only the Pareto-efficient outcomes are supported by the OSSB-PF.

    DOI

  • 家計の金融資産選択と税制―フローベース需要関数による分析

    井上・上條

    証券経済研究   0 ( 77 ) 173 - 189  2012年03月

    CiNii

  • Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? the difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value

    Yoshio Kamijo, Takumi Kongo

    European Journal of Operational Research   216 ( 3 ) 638 - 646  2012年02月

     概要を見る

    This study provides a unified axiomatic characterization method of one-point solutions for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Any one-point solution that satisfies efficiency, the balanced cycle contributions property (BCC), and the axioms related to invariance under a player deletion is characterized as a corollary of our general result. BCC is a weaker requirement than the well-known balanced contributions property. Any one-point solution that is both symmetric and linear satisfies BCC. The invariance axioms necessitate that the deletion of a specific player from games does not affect the other players' payoffs, and this deletion is different with respect to solutions. As corollaries of the above characterization result, we are able to characterize the well-known one-point solutions, the Shapley, egalitarian, and solidarity values, in a unified manner. We also studied characterizations of an inefficient one-point solution, the Banzhaf value that is a well-known alternative to the Shapley value. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value

    Yoshio Kamijo, Takumi Kongo

    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH   216 ( 3 ) 638 - 646  2012年02月

     概要を見る

    This study provides a unified axiomatic characterization method of one-point solutions for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Any one-point solution that satisfies efficiency, the balanced cycle contributions property (BCC), and the axioms related to invariance under a player deletion is characterized as a corollary of our general result. BCC is a weaker requirement than the well-known balanced contributions property. Any one-point solution that is both symmetric and linear satisfies BCC. The invariance axioms necessitate that the deletion of a specific player from games does not affect the other players' payoffs, and this deletion is different with respect to solutions. As corollaries of the above characterization result, we are able to characterize the well-known one-point solutions, the Shapley, egalitarian, and solidarity values, in a unified manner. We also studied characterizations of an inefficient one-point solution, the Banzhaf value that is a well-known alternative to the Shapley value. (C) 2011 Elsevier B,V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • 監査制度の生成に関する実験比較制度分析 : 米国型監査システムは経営者を誠実にするのか

    田口 聡志, 上條 良夫

    企業会計   64 ( 1 ) 140 - 147  2012年01月

    CiNii

  • 2-H-6 検索連動型広告オークションにおける入札行動についての分析 : 入札額の秘匿環境が収束速度・収入に与える影響について(ゲーム理論(2))

    上條 良夫

    日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会秋季研究発表会アブストラクト集   2011   320 - 321  2011年09月

    CiNii

  • 2-H-8 Double-Trackオークションの実験研究(ゲーム理論(2))

    宇都 伸之, 上條 良夫, 船木 由喜彦

    日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会秋季研究発表会アブストラクト集   2011   324 - 325  2011年09月

    CiNii

  • 家計の金融資産選択に与える課税の影響--推計実効税率に基づく実証分析

    井上 智弘, 上條 良夫

    早稲田経済学研究   ( 70 ) 37 - 70  2011年01月

    CiNii

  • 監査制度の生成に関する実験比較制度分析:米国型監査システムは経営者を誠実にするのか

    田口・上條

    企業会計     140 - 147  2011年

  • 家計の金融資産選択に与える課税の影響

    井上智弘, 上條良夫

    早稲田経済学研究   70  2011年

  • The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures

    Yoshio Kamijo

    Top    2011年

  • 監査制度の生成に関する実験比較制度分析:米国型監査システムは経営者を誠実にするのか

    田口・上條

    企業会計    2011年

  • The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures

    Yoshio Kamijo

    Top    2011年

  • FARSIGHTED COALITIONAL STABILITY OF A PRICE LEADERSHIP CARTEL

    Yoshio Kamijo, Shigeo Muto

    JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW   61 ( 4 ) 455 - 465  2010年12月

     概要を見る

    This paper analyzes the farsighted behaviour of firms that form a dominant price leadership cartel. We consider stability concepts such as the farsighted core, the farsighted stable sets, and the largest consistent set. We show that: (i) the farsighted core is either an empty set or a singleton set of the grand cartel; (ii) any Pareto efficient cartel is itself a farsighted stable set; and (iii) the set of cartels in which fringe firms enjoy higher profits than the firms in the minimal Pareto efficient cartel is the largest consistent set.

    DOI

  • FARSIGHTED COALITIONAL STABILITY OF A PRICE LEADERSHIP CARTEL

    Yoshio Kamijo, Shigeo Muto

    JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW   61 ( 4 ) 455 - 465  2010年12月

     概要を見る

    This paper analyzes the farsighted behaviour of firms that form a dominant price leadership cartel. We consider stability concepts such as the farsighted core, the farsighted stable sets, and the largest consistent set. We show that: (i) the farsighted core is either an empty set or a singleton set of the grand cartel; (ii) any Pareto efficient cartel is itself a farsighted stable set; and (iii) the set of cartels in which fringe firms enjoy higher profits than the firms in the minimal Pareto efficient cartel is the largest consistent set.

    DOI

  • Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property

    Yoshio Kamijo, Takumi Kongo

    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY   39 ( 4 ) 563 - 571  2010年10月

     概要を見る

    This paper presents an axiomatization of the Shapley value. The balanced cycle contributions property is the key axiom in this paper. It requires that, for any order of all the players, the sum of the claims from each player against his predecessor is balanced with the sum of the claims from each player against his successor. This property is satisfied not only by the Shapley value but also by some other values for TU games. Hence, it is a less restrictive requirement than the balanced contributions property introduced by Myerson (International Journal of Game Theory 9, 169-182, 1980).

    DOI

  • 検索連動型広告オークションの最適広告枠数についての考察

    安達剛, 上條良夫

    日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会春季研究発表会アブストラクト集   2010   82 - 83  2010年03月

    J-GLOBAL

  • 1-E-7 検索連動型広告オークションの最適広告枠数についての考察(ゲーム理論)

    安達 剛, 上條 良夫

    日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会春季研究発表会アブストラクト集   2010   82 - 83  2010年03月

    CiNii

  • Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market

    Yoshio Kamijo, Ryo Kawasaki

    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS   46 ( 2 ) 214 - 222  2010年03月

     概要を見る

    While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by the weak dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market

    Yoshio Kamijo, Ryo Kawasaki

    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS   46 ( 2 ) 214 - 222  2010年03月

     概要を見る

    While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by the weak dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property

    Yoshio Kamijo, Takumi Kongo

    International Journal of Game Theory   39 ( 4 ) 563 - 571  2010年

     概要を見る

    This paper presents an axiomatization of the Shapley value. The balanced cycle contributions property is the key axiom in this paper. It requires that, for any order of all the players, the sum of the claims from each player against his predecessor is balanced with the sum of the claims from each player against his successor. This property is satisfied not only by the Shapley value but also by some other values for TU games. Hence, it is a less restrictive requirement than the balanced contributions property introduced by Myerson (International Journal of Game Theory 9, 169-182, 1980). © 2009 Springer-Verlag.

    DOI

  • A linear proportional effort allocation rule

    Yoshio Kamijo

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   58 ( 3 ) 341 - 353  2009年11月

     概要を見る

    This paper proposes a new class of allocation rules in network games. Like the solution theory in cooperative games of how the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition is distributed among a set of players, this new class of allocation rules focuses on the distribution of the dividend of each network. The dividend of each network is allocated in proportion to some measure of each player's effort, which is called an effort function. With linearity of the allocation rules, an allocation rule is specified by the effort functions. These types of allocation rules are called linear proportional effort allocation rules. Two famous allocation rules, the Myerson value and the position value, belong to this class of allocation rules. In this study, we provide a unifying approach to define the two aforementioned values. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic analysis of this class of allocation rules, and axiomatize the Myerson value, the position value, and their non-symmetric generalizations in terms of effort functions. We propose a new allocation rule in network games that also belongs to this class of allocation rules. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • A linear proportional effort allocation rule

    Yoshio Kamijo

    Mathematical Social Sciences   58 ( 3 ) 341 - 353  2009年11月

     概要を見る

    This paper proposes a new class of allocation rules in network games. Like the solution theory in cooperative games of how the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition is distributed among a set of players, this new class of allocation rules focuses on the distribution of the dividend of each network. The dividend of each network is allocated in proportion to some measure of each player's effort, which is called an effort function. With linearity of the allocation rules, an allocation rule is specified by the effort functions. These types of allocation rules are called linear proportional effort allocation rules. Two famous allocation rules, the Myerson value and the position value, belong to this class of allocation rules. In this study, we provide a unifying approach to define the two aforementioned values. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic analysis of this class of allocation rules, and axiomatize the Myerson value, the position value, and their non-symmetric generalizations in terms of effort functions. We propose a new allocation rule in network games that also belongs to this class of allocation rules. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs

    Yoshio Kamijo, Yasuhiko Nakamura

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS   98 ( 1 ) 1 - 24  2009年09月

     概要を見る

    This paper examines endogenous merger formations in a mixed oligopoly. Applying the core as a solution concept, we analyze which market structure(s) remain(s) stable when three firms-two symmetric private firms and one inefficient public firm-are allowed to merge with each other in a mixed Cournot industry. We show that according to the value of the marginal cost of the public firm, there always exists a pair of share ratios of the owners of both the (pre-merged) public firm and the (pre-merged) private firm such that the market structure with the merger between the public firm and one private firm belongs to the core. When the initial market structure is a mixed triopoly, it can only be blocked when one public firm and one private firm merge. Furthermore, we conduct a similar analysis in a general mixed oligopoly with one public firm and n private firms.

    DOI

  • Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs

    Yoshio Kamijo, Yasuhiko Nakamura

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS   98 ( 1 ) 1 - 24  2009年09月

     概要を見る

    This paper examines endogenous merger formations in a mixed oligopoly. Applying the core as a solution concept, we analyze which market structure(s) remain(s) stable when three firms-two symmetric private firms and one inefficient public firm-are allowed to merge with each other in a mixed Cournot industry. We show that according to the value of the marginal cost of the public firm, there always exists a pair of share ratios of the owners of both the (pre-merged) public firm and the (pre-merged) private firm such that the market structure with the merger between the public firm and one private firm belongs to the core. When the initial market structure is a mixed triopoly, it can only be blocked when one public firm and one private firm merge. Furthermore, we conduct a similar analysis in a general mixed oligopoly with one public firm and n private firms.

    DOI

  • A two-step shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures

    Yoshio Kamijo

    International Game Theory Review   11 ( 2 ) 207 - 214  2009年06月

     概要を見る

    In this paper, we study cooperative games with coalition structures. We show that a solution concept that applies the Shapley value to games among and within coalitions and in which the pure surplus that the coalition obtains is allocated among the intra-coalition members in an egalitarian way, is axiomatized by modified axioms on null players and symmetric players and the usual three axioms: efficiency, additivity and coalitional symmetry. In addition to the original definition, we give two expressions of this solution concept. One is an average of modified marginal contributions and the other is the weighted Shapley value of a game with restricted communication. © 2009 World Scientific Publishing Company.

    DOI

  • Interregional mixed duopoly

    Tomohiro Inoue, Yoshio Kamijo, Yoshihiro Tomaru

    REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS   39 ( 2 ) 233 - 242  2009年03月

     概要を見る

    We investigate an interregional mixed duopoly wherein a local public firm competes against a private firm. We employ a spatial model with price competition. The public firm is owned by the local government of the left half of the linear city called Region 1, and maximizes its welfare. We demonstrate that our two-stage game comprising location choice and price competition has two types of equilibria. In one equilibrium (E(1)), the local public firm locates in Region 1, and the private firm locates outside the region. In the other equilibrium (E(2)), both firms are located in Region 1. We find that although the two firms are closely located in E(2), E(2) payoff-dominates E(1). Moreover, E(2) is robust in the sense that the sequential choice of location adopts this equilibrium, regardless of whether the public firm is a leader or a follower. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Interregional mixed duopoly

    Tomohiro Inoue, Yoshio Kamijo, Yoshihiro Tomohiro

    Regional Science and Urban Economics   38   233 - 242  2009年

    DOI

  • A two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures

    Yoshio Kamijo

    International Game Theory Review   11 ( 2 ) 207 - 214  2009年

    DOI

  • Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures

    Yoshio Kamijo

    Mathematical social sciences   56 ( 3 ) 336 - 349  2008年11月

     概要を見る

    This paper studies a non-cooperative mechanism implementing a cooperative solution for a situation in which members of a society are subdivided into groups and/or coalitions and there is asymmetry among the individuals of the society. To describe hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structure simultaneously, we present unified classes of games, the games with social structure, and define a weighted value for these games. We show that our mechanism works in any zero-monotonic environment and implements the Shapley value, the weighted Shapley value, the Owen's coalitional value, and the weighted coalitional value, in some special cases. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI

  • Implementation of weighed values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures

    Yoshio Kamijo

    Mathematical Social Sciences   56   336 - 349  2008年

    DOI

  • OwenのCoalitional valueの非協力メカニズムによる遂行

    上條 良夫

    早稲田経済学研究   ( 65 ) 21 - 39  2007年09月

    CiNii

  • 企業の公的所有と政府間競争

    井上智宏, 上條良夫, 都丸善央

    早稲田大学経済学研究   65 ( 65 ) 1 - 20  2007年09月

    CiNii

  • 公共財供給ゲームと内生的制度選択:選択手続きとタイミングの影響に関する実験分析

    上條良夫, 竹内あい

    早稲田大学政治経済学雑   368 ( 368 ) 21 - 40  2007年07月

    CiNii

  • An Endogenous Objective Function of a Partially Privatized Firm: A Nash Bargaining Approach

    上條良夫, 都丸善央

    日本経済学会    2007年

  • Owen の coalitional value の遂行

    上條良夫

    早稲田大学経済学研究   65   21 - 39  2007年

  • Implementation of the Shapley value of games with coalition structures

    Yoshio Kamijo

    The Waseda Journal of Political Science and Economics   363   105 - 125  2006年

  • Implementation of the Shapley value of games with coalition structures

    Yoshio Kamijo

    The Waseda Journal of Political Science and Economics   363   105 - 125  2006年

  • 提携構造付き特性関数形ゲームの S-S value の公理化(協力形成のゲーム理論分析)

    上條 良夫

    日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会春季研究発表会アブストラクト集   2004   306 - 307  2004年03月

    CiNii

  • Stability and efficiency in the perfect foresight situation

    Yoshio Kamijo

    Theory and Decision   forthcoming

    DOI

  • Who will be Called Partner? A Public Firm's Incentive to Merge with Private Firms

    Yoshio Kamijo, Yasuhiko Nakamura, Yoshihiro Tomaru

    Waseda Journal of Political Science and Economics   forthcoming

  • Who will be Called Partner? A Public Firm's Incentive to Merge with Private Firms

    Yoshio Kamijo, Yasuhiko Nakamura, Yoshihiro Tomaru

    Waseda Journal of Political Science and Economics   forthcoming

▼全件表示

受賞

  • 研究科長賞(早稲田大学)

    2009年  

  • 飯島賞(早稲田大学)

    2004年  

共同研究・競争的資金等の研究課題

  • キーワードオークションの理論と実験による研究

  • -

特定課題研究

  • 情報更新と情報開示行動の理論仮説の構築とシミュレーション分析

    2021年  

     概要を見る

    現代社会は情報が氾濫している。これらの情報の中には、情報発信者が意図せず発信してしまったもの出る場合もあるが、より重要と考えられ情報の多くは、誰かの意思によって公開するべきか否かを事前にスクリーニングされた結果である。本研究は、発信者が側の情報公開の有無に関わる意思決定および、受信者側の情報入手後の信念更新に関する経済学の理論的モデルを構築し、実験による検証を最終目標とするものである。本研究では、理論仮説の導出および理論仮説からシミュレートされたデータに対して統計分析を行い、必要な分析手法やデータサイズを検討し、外部研究費の応募の際の基礎資料として利用した。

  • 協力ゲームの解の考察:公理的接近と非協力ゲームによる接近

    2010年  

     概要を見る

     本研究では、協力ゲームの様々な解を公理的に分析するにあたり、Kamijo and Kongo (2010, IJGT) により提案された一つの公理に注目する。この公理は、Shapley value を公理化する性質としてよく知られた Balanced Contributions Property (BC) の要求を弱めた、Balanced Cycle Contributions Property (BCC) という公理である。BCC は、BC の要求する社会に存在する任意の二人において成立するある種の衡平関係ないし緊張関係を、社会を構成する全員の間で成立するような緩やかな衡平関係として描きなおすものである。協力ゲームの解の理論において、BC の要求を BCC へと弱めることの一つの利点は、BCC により Shapley value 以外の解も公理化できる可能性があることである。実際、BC と効率性を満足する解が Shapley value だけであるのに対して、BCC と効率性を満足するような解は無数に存在している。BCC と効率性に追加的な公理を付け加えることにより、Shapley value 以外の様々な解が公理化できることが期待されるのである。 本研究を通じて、上記のような予測が実際に成立することが確認された。つまり、BCC を用いることにより、CIS value、Egalitarian value, Solidarity value, Banzhaf value などの先行研究で提案されてきた解達を統一的に公理化することに成功したのである。さらに、加法性と対称性を満たすような解が必ず BCC を満たすという、BCC を満足するための十分条件も発見された。

  • 最終提案ゲームにおける役割決定手続きの影響について

    2007年  

     概要を見る

     本研究課題は,申請者が数年にわたり継続してきた,最終提案ゲームにおける役割決定手続きの被験者行動に及ぼす行動についての研究の中に位置づけられるものである。これまでの実験研究により,役割決定手続きが自己決定的であるような場合には,提案者は自身の立場に正当性を見出しより利己的な提案をするようになるようになり,応答者は提案者の立場の正当性を認め,提案者の利己的な提案を受け入れるようになる,ことが明らかにされた。本研究課題では,このような実験結果の頑健性を確認するために追実験を行ったのである。 追実験は,2007年の7月30,31日に早稲田大学の学生56人を被験者として実施した。実験内容は,ランダムに提案者・応答者の役割が決定される状況下で,応答者が棄却した際の提案者と応答者の利得に格差があるように設計された。このような設定での提案者行動,応答者行動を観察することにより、これまで得られた知見の頑健性について確認できるのである。実験は4セッション行われ、一セッションあたり1時間10分程度であった。 本研究内容については,2007年日本経済学会秋大会(共同研究者,竹内あい氏による報告)や第11回実験社会科学コンファランスにおいて報告され、日経学会報告時の討論者である広島大学の草川孝夫氏をはじめ,多くの方々からコメントをいただいた。これらのコメントを含めた論文の修正も終了し,現在は査読付き雑誌への投稿準備中である。

 

現在担当している科目

▼全件表示